Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Signature Flight Support Corp.

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STARR INDEMNITY AND LIABILITY COMPANY, dba STARR INSURANCE COMPANIES as Subrogee of GLF AIR, LLC., and 60-206, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. SIGNATURE FLIGHT SUPPORT CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation; SIGNATURE FLIGHT SUPPORT, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; SIGNATURE FLIGHT SUPPORT OF NEVADA, INC., a Nevada corporation; DOES 1 - X, inclusive, and ROW CORPORATIONS 1 - X, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-02011-LRH-CLB

United States District Court, D. Nevada

March 24, 2024

ORDER

LARRY R. HICKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Starr Indemnity and Liability Company (“Starr”) filed its motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 70), Defendant Signature Flight Support, LLC (“Signature”) responded in opposition (ECF No. 74), and Starr replied (ECF No. 76). Signature also filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 71) to which Starr responded in opposition (ECF No 73) and Signature replied (ECF No. 75). For the reasons articulated herein, the Court denies Starr's motion and grants Signature's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This subrogation matter stems from property damage done to a privately owned noncommercial aircraft while it was parked and stored at a third-party aircraft facility. At all relevant times to this litigation, Patrick Marino (“Marino”) owned a 2000 Bombardier 60 Learjet bearing Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) Registration No. N448GL (the “Learjet”) through 60206, LLC, his limited liability company. ECF No. 70-1 at 4, 5; ECF No. 71-7 at 4. After purchasing the Learjet, Marino informally used a friend-of-a-friend Kevin Young (“Young”) and his company GLF Air, LLC-an aircraft management and consulting company specializing in Gulfstream aircraft management-to insure and make the Learjet operational while Marino shopped around for a management company. ECF No. 70-1 at 130, 190, 191. Once operational, Young informally contacted an independent contractor pilot Leonardo Gomez to pilot the Learjet when needed by Marino. Id. at 191, 192. On several occasions, however, Gomez arranged for other independent contractor pilots to fly the Learjet. ECF No. 70-2 at 4. In May of 2019, Gomez arranged for independent contractor pilot Thomas Troncone to fly Marino and others on the Learjet from Florida to Las Vegas, the flight underlying this litigation. Id. at 7; ECF No. 70-1 at 74, 85. Upon arrival in Las Vegas, Troncone parked the Learjet at a fixed base operation (“FBO”) operated by Signature (“Signature's Las Vegas FBO”) and signed a Landing Card.^[1] ECF No. 71-2 at 2; ECF No. 71-9 at 5-8. The Learjet was stored at Signature's Las Vegas FBO overnight and damaged the following day when Signature employees towed another aircraft which hit the Learjet. See ECF No. 40-2. At the time the property damage occurred, GLF Air, LLC arranged for the Learjet to be insured pursuant to its fleet insurance policy, a policy issued by Starr (Policy No. 100022914603). ECF No. 70-1 at 238, 198, 199.

Armed with this background, the facts to which the parties have jointly stipulated are more properly framed:

This matter involves an incident that occurred on or about May 18, 2019, at the Harry Reid International Airport, located in Las Vegas when employees of [Signature], a [FBO], were towing a Citation 650 bearing [FAA] Registration No. N820FJ (“Citation”) when the wingtip of the Citation made contact with [the Learjet], causing damage to [the Learjet's] baggage door (“Incident”). At the time of the Incident, [the Learjet] was owned by 60-206, LLC and was insured by [Starr]. Prior to the Incident, [the Learjet's] pilot signed [Signature's] Landing Card while at [Signature's Las Vegas FBO], which provided, in part, that “under no circumstances shall Signature be liable to the customer for indirect, consequential, special or exemplary damages, whether in contract or tort (including strict liability and negligence), such as, but not limited to, loss of revenue, loss of use or anticipated profits, diminution or loss of value, or costs associated with substitution or replacement aircraft.” ... As a result of the Incident, Starr alleges that its insureds incurred $61,277.21 to repair [the Learjet] (the “Repair Damages”) and $279,413.23 of other damages for loss of use and rental aircraft expenses (“Other Damages”), all of which were paid by Starr pursuant to the insurance policy for [the Learjet] . The parties have resolved [Starr's] claims for the Repair Damages, and on September 12, 2022, the parties filed the Stipulation to Dismiss with Prejudice All Claims Regarding the Repair Damages. On September 13, 2022, the Court granted the stipulation. As to the alleged claim for Other Damages, the parties agree that the facts of the Incident are not in dispute, and that liability of [Signature] as to the Other Damages, is contingent only on the enforceability of the terms of the Landing Card. If there is no liability because of the Landing Card, then there will be no need to conduct discovery on damages. Once liability is determined, damages can be the focus of the case if liability is found.

ECF No. 40 at 2, 3. Thus, at primary dispute here is the enforceability of the fourth footnote clause in the Landing Card that the Learjet's contract pilot Troncone executed upon arrival to Signature's Las Vegas FBO.

In December 2019, Starr demanded that Signature pay for the post-accident costs its insureds incurred (ECF No. 18 at 3) but Signature rejected the demand. Subsequently on January 31, 2022, Starr filed an original complaint in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe. ECF No. 1 at 3. After correcting plaintiff-related party information, Starr filed an amended complaint on March 28, 2022, in which it alleges that Signature negligently cared for and maintained the Learjet. ECF No. 1-2. In April 2022, Signature then removed the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. ECF No. 1. Upon removal, the matter was randomly assigned to the Honorable James C. Mahan of the District of Nevada's unofficial Southern Division until it was ordered “administratively closed and transferred to the unofficial northern division in Reno for further action per LR IA 1-8(c)[.]” ECF No. 5. After transfer, the matter was reassigned to the Honorable Larry R. Hicks and Magistrate Judge Carla L. Baldwin of the District of Nevada's unofficial Northern Division. ECF No. 17. After reassignment, Starr filed a motion to remand (ECF No. 18) and Signature filed a motion for intradistrict transfer back to the unofficial Southern Division (ECF No. 33). The Court denied Starr's motion to remand and granted Signature's motion for intradistrict transfer but ordered that the action remain before the two unofficial Northern Division courts. ECF No. 41.

On November 7, 2022, Magistrate Judge Carla L. Baldwin granted the parties' joint stipulation to bifurcate liability and damages. ECF No. 40. As a result of bifurcation, the only issue remaining before the Court is the issue of liability, namely the enforceability of the Landing Card that the Learjet's pilot signed upon arrival at Signature's Las Vegas FBO and, consequentially, whether Signature can be held liable for the Other Damages. ECF No. 40 at 3, 4. On July 18, 2023, both Starr and Signature filed competing motions for summary judgment on the issue of the Landing Card's enforceability and Signature's possible liability for the Other Damages. ECF Nos. 70, 71. The motions are addressed below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, and other materials in the record show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the evidence, together with all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001).

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, along with evidence showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On those issues for which it bears the burden of proof, the moving party must make a showing that is “sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 487-88 (1984)); see also Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2001).

To successfully rebut a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must point to facts supported by the record which demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000). A “material fact” is a fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not appropriate. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983). A dispute regarding a material fact is considered genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [party's] position [is] insufficient” to...