Starr v. Hill

353 S.W.3d 478

Arlene R. STARR

v.Paul B. HILL, Sr., et al.

No. W2009–00524–SC–R11–CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,Western Section, at Jackson.

April 6, 2011 Session.Aug. 31, 2011.

Kirk A. Caraway and Heather W. Fletcher, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Paul B. Hill, Sr.

S. Newton Anderson and Paul R. Sciubba, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Arlene R. Starr.

OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., JANICE M. HOLDER, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ. joined.

SHARON G. LEE, J.

A father and his sixteen-year-old son were sued after the son was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle owned, insured, and provided to him by his father. The basis for the suit against the father was the family purpose doctrine, which imposes vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a family member. Whether the family purpose doctrine applies to the father requires us to address these issues: (1) whether the father, who does not reside in the same household as the son, was a head of the household under the family purpose doctrine; (2) whether the vehicle was maintained for the comfort or pleasure of the family or solely for use by the son; and (3) whether the vehicle was being driven with the father's permission such that he had control over its use. The essential elements of the family purpose doctrine are that the owner must be a head of the household who furnishes and maintains the vehicle for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort for the family, and at the time of the injury, the vehicle must have been driven in furtherance of that purpose with the head of the household's express or implied permission. The trial court granted summary judgment to the father, finding that the family purpose doctrine did not apply. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the family purpose doctrine applied to the father as a matter of law. We hold that the father was a head of the household because he had a family relationship with his son and a duty to support his son and the father furnished and maintained the vehicle for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort to the family. However, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the father had sufficient control over the vehicle. We vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for trial.

On Christmas Eve 2002, Paul B. Hill, Jr. (“Son”), who was sixteen years old, was returning from a holiday shopping trip with his sister and her friend, when the vehicle he was driving collided with another vehicle. Arlene R. Starr (“Plaintiff”), a passenger in the other vehicle, was allegedly injured. She filed suit against Paul B. Hill, Sr., (“Father”), who was the owner of the vehicle, and Son.¹ She asserted that Son's negligent conduct caused the accident and that Father, as the owner of the vehicle, was liable based on the family purpose doctrine. At the time of the accident, Son's parents were divorced, and Father did not live in the same household as Son. Father, as required by the terms of his divorce decree, had purchased the vehicle for Son when he turned sixteen years old. Father owned and insured the vehicle; Son drove the vehicle.

Father filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the family purpose doctrine was not applicable to him because at the time of the accident he did not reside with Son, he provided the vehicle only for the pleasure or comfort of Son, not the family, and he did not have day-to-day control over Son. Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that Father was a head of household under the family purpose doctrine and therefore the doctrine applied to Father as a matter of law. The trial court granted Father's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, ruling that the family purpose doctrine applied as a matter of law.

We granted Father's application for permission to appeal to address the following issues: (1) whether Father, who does not reside with Son, was a head of the household for purposes of the family purpose doctrine; (2) whether the vehicle, which Father provided to Son in compliance with terms of a divorce decree and for Son's sole use, was provided and maintained for the pleasure or comfort of the family; and (3) whether the vehicle was being driven with Father's permission such that he had control over its use.

The case before us involves a grant of summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn.2008). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the trial court must accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true and resolve any doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 5. A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when the facts and the reasonable inferences from those facts would permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion. Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn.2000). The resolution of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law; therefore, we review the trial court's judgment de novo with no presumption of correctness. Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Tenn.2008).

Tennessee courts have treated the application of the family purpose doctrine as a question for the trier of fact when the facts are disputed or subject to more than one interpretation, and as a question of law for the court when the facts are undisputed and subject to only one interpretation. See, e.g., Droussiotis v. Damron, 958 S.W.2d 127 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997); Gray v. Amos, 869 S.W.2d 925 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993); Redding v. Barker, 33 Tenn.App. 132, 230 S.W.2d 202 (1950). Other jurisdictions are in accord. See, e.g., First–City Bank & Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.2d 225 (Ky.Ct.App.1958); Madrid v. Shryock, 106 N.M. 467, 745 P.2d 375 (1987); Reid v. Swindler, 249 S.C. 483, 154 S.E.2d 910 (1967). Application of the family purpose doctrine involves a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, “our standard of review is de novo with a presumption of correctness extending only to the lower court's findings of fact.” Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 305 (Tenn.2005). Although a presumption of correctness attaches to the trial court's findings of fact, we are not bound by the trial court's determination of the legal effect of its factual findings, nor by its determination of a mixed question of law and fact. State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass'n Self Ins. Grp. Trust, 209 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006). If we find that all elements of the family purpose doctrine are established by undisputed facts, we may properly conclude that the doctrine applies as a matter of law and affirm the grant of summary judgment by the Court of Appeals. However, if we conclude that there is a dispute as to material facts necessary to establish an element of the doctrine, we must reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Family Purpose Doctrine

The family purpose doctrine was first recognized in Tennessee in King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918), just ten years after the introduction of the Ford Model T automobile when the automotive industry was still in its infancy. This doctrine imposes vicarious liability on a head of the household for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a family member provided that the head of the household maintains the vehicle “for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort for his or her family,” and “the family purpose driver [was] using the motor vehicle at the time of the injury ‘in furtherance of that purpose with the permission, either express or implied of the [head of the household] owner.’ ” Strine v. Walton, 323 S.W.3d 480, 489 (Tenn.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Redding v. Barker, 33 Tenn.App. 132, 230 S.W.2d 202, 205 (1950)) (emphasis omitted); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 447 (Tenn.1996).

The doctrine is “a court-created legal fiction” that employs agency principles to hold the owner of the vehicle vicariously liable. Thurmon v. Sellers, 62 S.W.3d 145, 156 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). As one learned legal treatise has observed,

[s]ometimes it is said that the owner would be liable for the negligence of a chauffeur whom he hires to drive his family, and therefore should be liable when he entrusts the same task to a member of his family instead. There is obviously an unblushing element of fiction in this manufactured agency; and it has quite often been recognized, without apology, that the doctrine is an instrument of policy, a transparent device intended to place the liability upon the party most easily held responsible.

W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 73, at 524 (5th ed.1984) (footnotes omitted). While the doctrine is grounded in the law of agency, as the Court clarified in King, “[t]he law of agency is not confined to business transactions,” and when, as happened in that case, a father buys a car “for the pleasure and entertainment of his family, and ... gives his ... son, who is a member of his family, permission to use it for pleasure, ... the son is in the furtherance of this purpose of the father while driving the car for his own pleasure.” 204 S.W. at 298. The doctrine is based on the theory that a family member who provides and maintains a vehicle for the pleasure or convenience of the family makes the vehicle's use his or her business, and that in using the vehicle, the family members are furthering the purpose for which it is maintained. Redding, 230 S.W.2d at 205 (citing Scates v. Sandefer, 163 Tenn. 558, 44 S.W.2d 310, 311 (1931)).

As a matter of public policy, we choose to apply the doctrine to create an incentive...