State, Department of Insurance v. Freedom of Information Commission

State of Connecticut Department of Insurance et al. v. Freedom of Information Commission

No. HHBCV176036748S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Britain, New Britain

June 26, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (#106) AND MOTIONS FOR STAY (#103 AND #109)

Sheila A. Huddleston, Judge.

This administrative appeal was brought pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183(b), which permits a person to appeal a " preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency ruling" if (1) it appears likely that the person appealing will otherwise be entitled to appeal from the final agency action, and (2) postponement of the appeal would result in an inadequate remedy. The plaintiffs challenge an intermediate ruling requiring them to submit certain documents for agency review. They also seek to stay the administrative proceeding pending judicial review of the intermediate order. The defendant has moved to dismiss asserting that the plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies and that postponement of the appeal therefore, would not result in an inadequate remedy. The court concludes that under controlling appellate authority the plaintiffs are required to exhaust their administrative remedies. The appeal is therefore dismissed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs in this action are the Connecticut Department of Insurance and the Commissioner of the Department of Insurance (collectively, department). The defendant is the Freedom of Information Commission (commission). On March 8, 2017, the department filed this appeal to challenge an order by the commission's hearing officer to submit certain documents for in camera review to determine whether they were exempt from disclosure. The department asserted that General Statutes § § 38a-131(c) and 38a-137 categorically prohibit it from disclosing to anyone information provided to the department by insurance companies that are required to file preacquisition notifications pursuant to § 38a-131(a). It further argued that filing of an in camera index would violate those statutes because it would implicitly acknowledge that a filing had been made under § 38a-131(a).

On March 15, 2017, the department moved to stay the commission proceeding pending this interlocutory appeal. In that motion the department represented that an evidentiary hearing was scheduled to take place on April 3, 2017. The court ordered the commission to file any objection or other response to the appeal by March 30, 2017.

On March 27, 2015, the commission moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the department had not exhausted its administrative remedies. Before the motion could be heard in this court, the parties agreed that the department would seek a ruling by the commission as a whole on the hearing officer's order to submit documents for in camera review. At the parties' request, the court did not proceed with a hearing on the motion to dismiss at that time.

On May 19, 2017, the department filed an objection to the commission's motion to dismiss. It represented that the commission had voted to uphold the hearing officer's order requiring the department to submit documents for in camera review, and that it had therefore exhausted its administrative remedy with respect to that order. It further argued that it would be unable to prevail before the commission without presenting testimony that the documents are exempt from disclosure under other provisions of state law, including General Statutes § § 1-210, 38a-69a, and 38a-8.

The court heard argument on the motion to dismiss on June 9, 2017. At that argument, the department represented that after its objection was filed, the hearing officer issued a proposed final decision requiring disclosure of documents that the department believes are statutorily confidential under § § 38a-131(c) and 38a-137. On June 16, 2017, the department filed a second motion to stay and submitted exhibits documenting the progress of the complaint before the commission, up to and including the proposed final decision, which is scheduled to come before the commission at its meeting on June 28, 2017. The department contends that a stay is necessary because, if the commission proceeds to vote on the proposed final decision, the commission's proceeding will be concluded and the department will not have an opportunity to present its alternative claims of exemption to the commission. The department acknowledges that the issues it presents are novel, both as to procedure under General Statutes § 4-183(b) and as to the merits of its claims with respect to General Statutes § § 38a-131 and 38a-137. As of the date of this decision, the commission has not filed a response to the department's second motion to stay.

DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss is properly used to test the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Practice Book § 10-30. " Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it." Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441, 870 A.2d 448 (2005). When a question of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be adjudicated before the court can proceed any further. See Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v. Blake, 186 Conn 295, 297, 441 A.2d 183 (1982).

It is well established there is no absolute right of appeal to the courts from the decision of an administrative agency. Middlebury v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 283 Conn. 156, 163, 927 A.2d 793 (2007). The Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-183, " grants the Superior Court jurisdiction over appeals of agency decisions only in certain limited and well-delineated circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. As a general rule, an aggrieved party can appeal only from a final decision in a contested case under § 4-183(a). However, § 4-183(b) provides a limited exception to the requirement of a final decision. The question presented here is whether " postponement of the appeal would result in an inadequate remedy, " as required by § 4-183(b)(2).^[1]

In Doe v. Dept. of Public Health, 52 Conn.App. 513, 519, 727 A.2d 260, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 908, 733 A.2d 225 (1999), the Appellate Court held that § 4-183(b) " reflects the principle that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required except in exceptional circumstances." It concluded that to satisfy § 4-183(b)(2), a person appealing under § 4-183(b) must show that the agency is incapable of providing an adequate remedy. In Doe, a physician challenged the jurisdiction of the Connecticut medical examining board to adjudicate a statement of disciplinary charges brought against him by the department of public health, where the department had failed to complete the investigation leading to the charges in a timely manner. He claimed that the board's proceeding against him would violate his rights to due process and to confidentiality. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the appeal, holding that the board was " capable of providing an adequate remedy because completing the administrative proceedings could provide the plaintiff with complete vindication." Id., 522.

In Doe, the Appellate Court analyzed the availability of an appeal under General Statutes § 4-183(b) under the general principles of the exhaustion doctrine as established and articulated by many Supreme Court decisions, including Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 558, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993); Housing Authority v. Papandrea, 222 Conn. 414, 420, 610 A.2d 637 (1992); and Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, 207 Conn. 346, 353, 542 A.2d 672 (1988). In each of those cases, the Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies because the administrative agency in question had the authority to provide complete vindication of the plaintiff's rights. By contrast, in Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 223-24, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984), and Cahill v. Board of Education, 187 Conn. 94, 444 A.2d 907 (1982), the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because the defendant agency lacked the authority to provide an adequate remedy.

In Dukes, a class action, the plaintiffs were low-income families who had been forced to vacate their substandard housing in New Haven when the city condemned that housing. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to require the city to provide adequate housing to families displaced by the city's housing code enforcement. The defendants asserted that the plaintiffs were required first to exhaust their administrative remedies under General Statutes § 8-278, which authorized any person aggrieved by an agency action concerning eligibility for relocation payments to appeal to the commissioner of transportation or to the commissioner of housing. The Supreme Court disagreed. It concluded that the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief was based on the defendants' failure to provide decent, safe and adequate housing prior to displacing the plaintiffs, and that § 8-278 was limited to a determination of eligibility for relocation payments. Consequently, resort to that administrative procedure would have been futile because the statute did not authorize the agency to provide such injunctive relief. Dukes v. Durante, supra, 192 Conn. 223-24.

In Cahill v. Board of Education, supra, 187 Conn. at 103-04, the plaintiff, a teacher, challenged the defendant's failure to restore her to a position of like nature, seniority, status and pay after she returned from a sabbatical. The defendant asserted that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under a collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court disagreed because the relevant...