State ex rel. Adel v. Covil

252 Ariz. 40

497 P.3d 989

STATE of Arizona EX REL. Allister ADEL, Maricopa County Attorney, Petitioner,

v.The Honorable Max COVIL, Commissioner of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Respondent Commissioner,Anthony Omar Santiago Morales, Real Party in Interest.

Sean Wilder, Petitioner,

v.The Honorable Joshua Yost, Commissioner of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Commissioner,State of Arizona ex rel. Allister Adel, Maricopa County Attorney, Real Party in Interest.

Laurence Lee Lawrence, Petitioner,

v.The Honorable Jay Adelman, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Judge,State of Arizona ex rel. Allister Adel, Maricopa County Attorney, Real Party in Interest.

Nos. 1 CA-SA 20-0162

1 CA-SA 20-0163

1 CA-SA 20-0173 (Consolidated)

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

FILED August 5, 2021

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix, By Amanda M. Parker, Counsel for State of Arizona

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix, By Michelle L. Young, Counsel for Anthony Omar Santiago Morales

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix, By John D. Gattermeyer, Ashley R. Oddo, Counsel for Sean Wilder

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix, By Kacie T. Nickel, Jamie A. Jackson, Counsel for Laurence Lawrence

Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the opinion of the court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop¹ joined.

SWANN, Judge:

¶1 These consolidated special actions present the question whether the superior court may continue in-custody defendants’ preliminary hearings upon finding "that extraordinary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensable to the interests of justice" under Ariz. R. Crim. P. ("Rule") 5.1(c)(2). By order, we accepted jurisdiction and answered that question in the affirmative. We write now to explain our ruling.

¶2 We accepted jurisdiction because we are faced with a purely legal question of first impression that is of statewide importance and is likely to recur. Vo v. Superior Ct. (State) , 172 Ariz. 195, 198, 836 P.2d 408, 411 (App. 1992). We review the interpretation of rules de novo, "apply[ing] ‘fundamental principles of statutory construction, the cornerstone of which is the rule that the best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute's construction.’ " State v. Hansen , 215 Ariz. 287, 289, ¶¶ 6–7, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007) (citation omitted). In the case of ambiguity, we determine meaning "by reading the [rule] as a whole, giving meaningful operation to all of its provisions, and by considering factors such as the [rule]’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose." Zamora v. Reinstein , 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996).

¶3 Rule 5.1(a) provides that a felony defendant must be afforded a preliminary hearing no later than 10 days after his or her initial appearance if he or she is in custody,² and no later than 20 days after his or her initial appearance if he or she is not in custody, "unless ... the magistrate orders the hearing continued under (c)." Subsection (c) provides:

(c) Continuance.

(1) Release Absent Continuance . If a preliminary hearing for an in-custody defendant did not commence within 10 days as required under (a) and was not continued , the defendant must be released from custody, unless the defendant is charged with a non-bailable offense, in which case the magistrate must immediately notify that county's presiding judge of the reasons for the delay.

(2) Continuance . On motion or on its own, a magistrate may continue a preliminary hearing beyond the 20-day deadline specified in (a). A magistrate may continue the hearing only if it finds that extraordinary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensable to the interests of justice. The magistrate also must file a written order detailing the reasons for these findings. The court must promptly notify the parties of the order.

(Emphasis added.)

¶4 By its plain language, Rule 5.1 provides in subsections (a) and (c)(1) that the court may continue preliminary hearings for in-custody defendants—subsection (a) lists continuance as a generally applicable exception, and subsection (c)(1) makes clear that continuance is a possibility for in-custody cases. (By contrast, former Rule 5.1, abrogated effective 2018, did not list continuance as an exception in subsection (a), and it provided in subsection (c) that violation of the 10-day deadline would mandate the defendant's automatic release. See Rule 5.1 (2017).) And though neither subsection (a) nor subsection (c)(1) set forth a standard for continuance, subsection (c)(2) does.

¶5 We are unpersuaded by the argument that subsection (c)(2)—broadly titled "Continuance"—applies only to out-of-custody defendants. To be sure, subsection (c)(2)’s first sentence, by its reference to the 20-day deadline, recognizes (consistent with subsection (a)) that continuance is available in out-of-custody cases. But nothing in subsection (c)(2)’s next sentence, which sets forth the standard for continuance, limits that standard's application to out-of-custody cases. Cf. Rule 5.1 (2017). To the extent that subsection (c)(2)’s mention of the 20-day deadline could be said to create ambiguity regarding the scope of the continuance standard, that ambiguity is easily resolved by reading the rule as a whole and considering its purpose. The rule clearly contemplates that preliminary hearings may be continued for in-custody and out-of-custody defendants alike, and it clearly sets forth a standard for continuance. In the absence of express language to the contrary, it would be nonsensical to require the court to create a novel standard to order continuances in in-custody cases. We hold that in both in-custody and out-of-custody cases, the superior court may continue preliminary hearings when, consistent with Rule 5.1(c)(2), "it finds that extraordinary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensable to the interests of justice."

¶6 Here, the consolidated special actions concern...