State ex rel. Dickey v. Besler

954 N.W.2d 425

STATE of Iowa EX REL. Gary DICKEY, Appellant,

v.Jason BESLER, Appellee.

No. 19-1598

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Submitted October 15, 2020

Filed February 5, 2021

Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey Thompson, Solicitor General, and Emily Willits, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, McDonald, and Oxley, JJ., joined. Appel, J., filed a dissenting opinion. McDermott, J., took no part.

MANSFIELD, Justice.

When does a citizen have standing to bring a quo warranto action challenging someone's right to hold public office? When is an appointment to public office "made"? Most importantly, should courts get involved in deciding whether an appointment was timely made if the person who would otherwise get to make that appointment agreed to treat it as timely made?

This case presents all these questions. In May 2018, two finalists were sent to the Governor for a district judge position. The Governor had thirty days to appoint one of them; if she failed to do so, the chief justice was required to make the appointment. On the thirtieth day, a Thursday, the Governor communicated to her chief of staff—but not to the nominees or the secretary of state—the identity of the nominee she had selected. The following Monday, the Governor told this person he had been selected and signed his commission. About a week and a half later, responding to a communication from the Governor's office, the chief justice's legal counsel confirmed in writing that the chief justice "defer[red] to and accept[ed]" the Governor's view that her appointment was timely.

No one directly involved in the appointment process has ever challenged this judicial appointment, including the other nominee. However, in the fall of 2018, a private citizen applied for leave to file a quo warranto action seeking a determination that this judge was holding his office unlawfully. The district court denied the citizen's application, and he appealed.

On appeal, we now affirm the district court's judgment, although our reasoning differs somewhat from the district court's. We conclude that this case presents a nonjusticiable controversy, in that both the Governor and the chief justice deferred to and accepted the view that the appointment was timely.

I. Facts and Procedural Background.

In April 2018, the chief judge of the sixth judicial district convened that district's judicial nominating commission to fill a district judge vacancy created by a retirement. See Iowa Code § 46.12(1) (2018). A letter invited applications. The letter advised applicants that they would be interviewed by the commission on May 21 and, following the interviews, the commission would send two nominees to the Governor.

The commission interviewed fifteen candidates on May 21. The next day, May 22, the chief judge transmitted the names of two nominees to the Governor. See id. § 46.14(1). One was Jason Besler.

On June 11, the Governor interviewed both nominees. On Thursday, June 21, the thirtieth day after the chief judge's transmittal letter, the Governor told her chief of staff that she had made a final decision: she was appointing Besler to fill the vacancy. However, no one communicated the decision to Besler. The following Monday, June 25, the Governor called and wrote Besler to inform him of his appointment. That day, she also signed Besler's commission.

Iowa law provides, "If the governor fails to make an appointment within thirty days after a list of nominees has been submitted, the appointment shall be made from the list of nominees by the chief justice of the supreme court." Id. § 46.15(2). In addition, article V, section 15 of the Iowa Constitution states, "If the governor fails for thirty days to make the appointment, it shall be made from such nominees by the chief justice of the supreme court."

Recognizing there could be an issue with the timing of Besler's appointment, the Governor's chief of staff contacted the chief justice's legal counsel.¹ On July 6, the chief justice's legal counsel responded in writing as follows:

The chief justice asked me to write to you regarding the appointment process for the most recent district judge position in the 6th judicial district. I hope I do not sound too formal, but I think it is important to speak in a way that captures the true thoughts and feelings of the chief justice about the essential need for trust in government and its application to this matter.

Those authorized to act in government must often also decide what is required to be done to carry out their responsibilities. This is true in making a judicial appointment under the Constitution. It means it is up to the governor to give meaning to the constitutional directive for judicial appointments to be made within thirty days. This decision is not unlike many decisions that must be made throughout government each day to carry out the responsibilities within each branch of government. Indeed, it is a critical part of our democratic process and the reason public officials take an oath to support the Constitution and the law. The chief justice understands and appreciates the responsibility of the Governor and other public officials to make such decisions, and views that authority and discretion with the greatest deference and respect. He believes respect and comity from within government is as essential to achieving greater public trust and confidence of government, as are the checks and balances built into government.

In practice, the chief justice has always considered a judicial appointment was made when it was communicated to the nominee. This communication from the governor to the nominee is a time-honored practice that every judge in this state has experienced, and an honor no judge has ever forgotten. To my knowledge, it is a practice that has always occurred within thirty days of the nomination by the judicial nominating commission. Nevertheless, this long-standing practice does not mean judicial appointments cannot be made in other ways.

With the recent district judge appointment in the 6th judicial district, the Governor's Office communicated to the chief justice, the secretary of state, and the public that the appointment of Jason Besler as district judge was made on Thursday, June 21, 2018, which was day thirty following the nomination. You have further communicated that Governor Reynolds made "the verbal appointment" on that date, but did not notify Besler or issue a public statement on the appointment until Monday, June 25, 2018. Although the appointment was not communicated to Besler or made public until Monday, June 25, Governor Reynolds determined that the appointment was made on June 21 when she made the decision to select Besler. Consequently, the chief justice respectfully defers to and accepts the decision by Governor Reynolds that this appointment was made on June 21.²

Later, information about the timing and circumstances of Besler's appointment became public. On October 9, Gary Dickey wrote the Johnson County Attorney requesting that she pursue a quo warranto action against Besler challenging his entitlement to his office pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1302(1). On October 19, the county attorney responded that she would not be filing such an action. Dickey also visited by phone with a senior official in the attorney general's office who advised that the attorney general would not be bringing a quo warranto action.

Thus, on November 1, Dickey filed his own application for leave to file a petition for writ of quo warranto in the Iowa District Court for Linn County. He alleged that the Governor had failed to appoint Besler by the June 21 deadline for making an appointment, and therefore Besler was holding the office of district judge unlawfully.

The attorney general's office filed a resistance to Dickey's application on behalf of Besler. The resistance asserted three separate grounds why the action should not go forward. First, according to the resistance, Dickey did not have standing. Second, "principles of comity and separation of powers" dictated that the action should not proceed. Third, the Governor had in fact appointed Besler within the required thirty days.

At the request of the chief judge of the sixth judicial district, we directed that the case be assigned to a judge of another judicial district. Subsequently, on February 18, 2019, the district court held a hearing on Dickey's application. On April 23, it issued a ruling denying it. In substance, the district court's order concluded that the Governor had appointed Besler within the required thirty days.

Dickey moved for reconsideration under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(3). His motion urged that the court had improperly considered matters other than standing. Dickey also argued that the court had resolved factual disputes in its decision. In particular, he said he "does not accept a[t] face value the claim that Governor Reynolds communicated her appointment to her chief of staff [on June 21, 2018]." Lastly, Dickey asked the court to enlarge its ruling to find that he did have standing. The court denied Dickey's motion in a written order.

Dickey appealed, and we retained his appeal. In the meantime, Besler has continued to serve as a judge of the sixth judicial district. Judge Besler was retained in office by the voters on November 3, 2020.

II. Standard of Review.

"We review questions of standing for correction of errors at law." Homan v. Branstad , 864 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Iowa 2015). We also review questions of statutory interpretation for correction of errors at law. See Doe v. State , 943 N.W.2d 608, 609 (Iowa 2020). Whether an action should be dismissed as nonjusticiable is likewise reviewed for correction of errors at law. See King v. State , 818 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2012).

III. Legal Analysis.

On appeal, Dickey argues that he...