State ex rel. Heyside v. Calabrese

190 N.E.3d 55

STATE EX REL., Neil HEYSIDE, Relator,

v.The Honorable Judge Deena R. CALABRESE, Respondent.

No. 111200

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

April 8, 2022

Lester S. Potash, Cleveland, for relator.

Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nora E. Poore, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

{¶ 1} Relator, Neil Heyside ("Heyside"), seeks a writ of prohibition preventing respondent, Judge Deena R. Calabrese, from exercising jurisdiction in Heyside v. Heyside , Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-21-954944. We grant respondent's motion to dismiss and dismiss the complaint for writ of prohibition for the following reasons.

I. Background

{¶ 2} On January 12, 2022, relator filed a complaint for writ of prohibition alleging that he and nonparty Erica Heyside ("Erica") were previously married. In 2016, they litigated to conclusion a divorce proceeding in the Domestic Relations Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. As part of those proceedings, Heyside and Erica entered into a separation agreement that was incorporated into a final decree of divorce.¹ The separation agreement called for various payments to be made to Erica by Heyside. According to the instant complaint, on October 27, 2021, Erica instituted a breach-of-contract action that sought monetary damages from Heyside totaling $486,679.06. Erica's complaint in the underlying action, which is attached to relator's complaint in the present action, points to the separation agreement and divorce decree as the source of her breach-of-contract claim. Erica's complaint also referenced an additional agreement for payments of $5,000 per month commencing in September 2019, which Heyside allegedly breached as well. Heyside filed a motion to dismiss the underlying action, which respondent denied. After that, Heyside filed the instant action seeking to preclude respondent from hearing Erica's claims.

{¶ 3} In his complaint, Heyside asserted that an action for breach of the separation agreement must be brought in the appropriate domestic relations court, pointing to R.C. 3105.10(B)(3) and the holding in paragraph four of the syllabus of Wolfe v. Wolfe , 46 Ohio St.2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976). This holding provides that a separation agreement "loses its nature as a contract the moment it is adopted by the court and incorporated into a decree of divorce. ( Law v. Law , 64 Ohio St. 369, 60 N.E. 560 (1901) ; Newman v. Newman , 161 Ohio St. 247, 118 N.E.2d 649 (1954), and Mozden v. Mozden , 162 Ohio St. 169, 122 N.E.2d 295 (1954), modified)."

{¶ 4} On February 15, 2022, respondent timely filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Respondent argued that prohibition was inappropriate for several reasons. First, she argued that, as a common pleas court judge, she does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over an action for breach of contract. She further argued that the domestic relations case was litigated to its conclusion, meaning that court no longer had exclusive jurisdiction. Next, respondent argued that the holding is Wolfe was abrogated as recognized by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Morris v. Morris , 148 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-Ohio-5002, 69 N.E.2d 664, ¶ 23-27. Finally, she asserted that R.C. 3105.10(B)(3) did not apply to Erica's claims asserted in the breach-of-contract action.

{¶ 5} On February 17, 2022, relator filed a brief in opposition arguing that Morris did not overrule paragraph four of Wolfe , which is still valid law in Ohio. He also argued that sole and exclusive jurisdiction to enforce a divorce decree rests with the domestic relations court pursuant to statute.

{¶ 6} Respondent filed a reply brief in support of her motion to dismiss on February 24, 2022.

II. Law and Analysis

Standards Applicable to This Action

{¶ 7} The case is before this court on respondent's motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) — failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. "Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate when it appears beyond doubt, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and making all reasonable inferences in the relators’ favor, that relators are not entitled to extraordinary relief in prohibition." State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday , 164 Ohio St.3d 121, 2021-Ohio-194, 172 N.E.3d 114, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Zander v. Judge of Summit Cty. Common Pleas Court , 156 Ohio St.3d 466, 2019-Ohio-1704, 129 N.E.3d 401, ¶ 4.

{¶ 8} "[W]ith few exceptions, ‘a writ of prohibition "tests and determines ‘solely and only’ the subject[-]matter jurisdiction" of the lower court.’ " State ex rel. Thomas v. McGinty , 164 Ohio St.3d 167, 2020-Ohio-5452, 172 N.E.3d 824, ¶ 26, quoting State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster , 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998), quoting State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster , 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 534 N.E.2d 46 (1988), quoting State ex rel. Staton v. Franklin Cty. Common Pleas Court , 5 Ohio St.2d 17, 21, 213 N.E.2d 164 (1965). A writ of prohibition will only issue when a relator shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the respondent "is about to exercise or has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law." State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose , 156 Ohio St.3d 425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128 N.E.3d 209, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese , 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. However, where a court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, a writ will issue regardless of whether an adequate remedy at law exists. State ex rel. Bohlen at ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Bates v. Court of Appeals for Sixth Appellate Dist. , 130 Ohio St.3d 326, 2011-Ohio-5456, 958 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 12. A writ will not issue in a doubtful case because a writ is an extraordinary remedy granted with great caution. Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman , 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Corn v. Russo , 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554, 740 N.E.2d 265 (2001).

{¶ 9} Judges of the Domestic Relations Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court have "all the powers relating to all divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation, and annulment cases, except in cases that are assigned to some other judge of the court of common pleas for some special reason." R.C. 2301.03(L)(1). However, the general division of a common pleas court usually has subject-matter jurisdiction over matters of breach of contract so long as the claims meet the jurisdictional minimums set forth in R.C. 2305.01. Further, the jurisdictional priority rule is not implicated in this case because both parties agree that the domestic relations case has concluded.

{¶ 10} Heyside argues that the separation agreement is no longer enforceable as a contract and R.C. 3105.10(B) bestows exclusive jurisdiction on a domestic relations court, where one exists in the relevant jurisdiction, to hear and determine the claims raised in the underlying action. Cuyahoga County has a domestic relations court. R.C. 2301.03(L). Heyside asserts, that consequently, respondent patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction.

Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction

{¶ 11} Relying on paragraph four of the syllabus in Wolfe , 46 Ohio St.2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976), Heyside argues the separation agreement lost its nature as a contract when it was incorporated into the divorce decree. Heyside relies exclusively on this case for this point. Respondent argues that Wolfe has been overruled by statute as recognized in Morris , 148 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-Ohio-5002, 69 N.E.2d 664, ¶ 28 ("the General Assembly swept away all the common law enunciated in Wolfe "). The Morris Court specifically mentioned two of the three cases that were modified by paragraph four of Wolfe as felled by the General Assembly's actions in enacting statutes that abrogated the holdings in Wolfe . Morris at ¶ 28. In fact, Heyside acknowledges at page five of his brief in opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss that "other courts, including [the Eighth District Court of Appeals], have held that a separation agreement retains its contract nature following its incorporation into the divorce decree." Heyside objects to these holdings by various courts by arguing that paragraph four of Wolfe precludes them.

{¶ 12} However, this argument does not demonstrate that a court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to hear an action. The nonexistence of a contract is a defense to a breach-of-contract action; it usually does not affect the general subject-matter jurisdiction of a court. The argument that the separation agreement is unenforceable as a contract after incorporation into a divorce decree is a reason to deny the claim in the underlying action. Heyside is essentially asking for immediate appellate review of respondent's denial of his motion to dismiss in the underlying action — something prohibition generally precludes. See State ex rel. Gross v. Marshall , 39 Ohio St.2d 92, 314 N.E.2d 170 (1974), syllabus.

{¶ 13} Further, Erica's complaint in the underlying case references an agreement other than the separation agreement whereby Heyside agreed to make certain payments at set intervals, which Heyside is also alleged to have breached. This claim must be considered when determining whether respondent patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. "If a court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter involved in litigation, a writ of prohibition will not issue to prohibit it from exercising such jurisdiction. Issuance of this writ is dependent upon the issue of whether it appears that the court in which an action is sought to be prohibited has no jurisdiction of the matter under adjudication." State ex rel. Dayton Power & Light...