State ex rel. M.P.

476 N.J.Super. 242

299 A.3d 133

STATE of New Jersey IN the INTEREST OF M.P., a minor.

DOCKET NO. A-1229-22

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued June 6, 2023

Decided July 12, 2023

John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant M.P. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, of counsel and on the briefs).

Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey ( Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Barbara A. Rosenkrans, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey ( Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Lila B. Leonard, of counsel and on the brief).

Elana Wilf argued the cause for amicus curiae Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic and American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation (Laura Cohen and Elana Wilf, attorneys for Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic; Alexander Shalom, Newark, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, attorneys for American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation; Laura Cohen, Elana Wilf, Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the joint brief).

Before Judges Geiger, Susswein and Berdote Byrne.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUSSWEIN, J.A.D.

By leave granted, M.P., a juvenile, appeals an interlocutory Family Part order admitting into evidence the statement he gave to police during a stationhouse interrogation. M.P. was sixteen years old when he was questioned in connection with his participation in a murder. His mother attended the interrogation session. M.P. claims the motion court erred in finding he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda ¹ rights.

M.P. argues, among other things, the motion court improperly excluded expert testimony pertaining to his intellectual capacity and ability to comprehend his constitutional rights. The State argued in the Family Part that the defense expert's testimony was inadmissible, filing a motion to exclude it from the suppression hearing. The State's position has since changed; the prosecutor acknowledged at oral argument before us that the defense expert's testimony should have been admitted. The State nonetheless contends that, considering the totality of the relevant circumstances, the motion court correctly decided that M.P.’s waiver of his Miranda rights was valid.

Aside from seeking to suppress his incriminating statement to police applying a fact-sensitive totality-of-the-circumstances test, M.P. asks us to adopt a new categorical rule that would prohibit police from conducting a stationhouse interrogation of a juvenile unless and until the minor is represented by an attorney. M.P. relies on neuroscience and behavioral science research that shows juveniles are not only more impulsive and compliant than adults but also tend to lack the cognitive skills to comprehend Miranda rights. He contends that in view of advances in the scientific understanding of adolescent brain development, no juvenile should be subjected to a stationhouse interrogation—with or without parental participation—until the juvenile has consulted with counsel.

We have no authority to pronounce any such per se requirement, especially in light of our Supreme Court's rejection of a less-expansive request for an attorney-appointment rule in State in Int. of A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 154, 999 A.2d 1136 (2010). We acknowledge there have been significant reforms to New Jersey's juvenile justice system in recent years based on scientific research on how a juvenile's brain develops and how it functions differently from a fully mature adult brain. ² But even accepting for the sake of argument the validity and relevance of the scientific studies M.P. relies on, those research findings do not confer upon us authority to substantially rework our State's juvenile interrogation jurisprudence, and certainly not to overturn New Jersey Supreme Court precedent. See Pannucci v. Edgewood Park Senior Hous. — Phase 1, LLC, 465 N.J. Super. 403, 414, 243 A.3d 948 (App. Div. 2020) (noting plaintiff asked us "to change the law the Supreme Court has established," and holding, "[t]hat, we may not do" (citing State v. Steffanelli, 133 N.J. Super. 512, 514, 337 A.2d 625 (App. Div. 1975) )).

Stated another way, we are bound by precedents that already account for the fact that juveniles are different from adults and thus are to be treated differently for purposes of custodial interrogations. While the rules and principles announced in those precedents are not immutable, it is for our Supreme Court and the Legislature—not an intermediate appellate court—to weigh the benefits and costs of the major juvenile justice system policy shift M.P. proposes.

M.P. also asks us to revise the Miranda warnings administered by police in New Jersey to make them more comprehensible to adolescents. We decline that request as well for similar reasons. In doing so, we do not mean to suggest the current warnings are sacrosanct and cannot be improved based on juvenile brain research. Rather, we believe the task of revising the familiar Miranda warnings to address the inherent differences between adults and juveniles is beyond our authority, especially considering the limited record before us. Cf. State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 217, 27 A.3d 872 (2011) (appointing a Special Master to review and report on scientific studies pertaining to the reliability of eyewitness identifications, providing the evidence-based foundation for significant reforms).

Turning to the application of existing precedents and guiding principles to the present case, although we are mindful of the deference we owe to the motion court's factual findings, we are not persuaded the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. Considering all relevant circumstances, including M.P.’s intellectual challenges, mental conditions, and highly emotional state, as well as the role his mother played, we conclude his statement should have been suppressed.

I.

We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record. ³ At approximately 11:40 a.m. on December 11, 2019, Newark police took M.P. into custody for possession of a handgun. The Essex County Prosecutor's Office (ECPO) learned of his arrest and had him transported for questioning in relation to a shooting death three days earlier.

Police found the victim's body across the street from his home with a gunshot wound to the back. A surveillance video recovered near the crime scene showed five individuals, one of whom was M.P., approached the victim's car. The State alleges that M.P. and another individual, N.H., forced the victim to exit the car at gunpoint and had him walk towards his house. When the victim began to run, N.H. fired two shots, one of which struck the fleeing victim in the back. The victim died shortly thereafter. A surveillance video captured the group running away from the scene; M.P. was carrying a gun.

After the stationhouse interrogation, M.P. was formally charged by complaint with several acts of delinquency. At issue in this appeal are charges that would constitute the following crimes if committed by an adult: first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) ; first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) ; first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) ; second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:15-1(a)(1) ; second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) ; and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1).

On February 7, 2020, the State filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to adult court. ⁴ In May 2022, the State moved to admit into evidence the statement M.P. gave to police during the stationhouse interrogation. He opposed the motion, arguing that he did not make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights. The Family Part court ruled that it would decide the motion to suppress before deciding the motion to transfer jurisdiction.

M.P. sought to present expert testimony from Dr. Emily Haney-Caron on adolescent brain development and juvenile comprehension of Miranda warnings and rights. The State filed a motion pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104 and 702 to exclude her testimony from the suppression hearing. The motion court reserved decision on the State's application, ruling it would consider her report and hear her testimony during the Miranda hearing before issuing a decision on the testimony's admissibility. Following the two-day Miranda hearing, the motion court excluded Dr. Haney-Caron's testimony on the grounds it was not beyond the ken of the average factfinder.

The motion court heard testimony from one of the two detectives who conducted the interrogation. The court also watched an electronic recording of the interrogation, whereupon it ruled M.P.’s waiver of Miranda rights was valid and that his statement would be admissible at trial. We granted M.P.’s motion for leave to appeal that interlocutory order. We also granted a motion by the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and the Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic (collectively, defense amici) to participate as amici curiae. We invited the Attorney General to also participate as amicus.

M.P. raises the following contentions for our consideration:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE CUSTODIAL STATEMENT BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO CARRY ITS HEAVY BURDEN TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THE MIRANDA WAIVER BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

A. The trial court abused its discretion in disregarding the expert's testimony, which detailed factors present in M.P's case that cast doubt on the validity of his Miranda waiver.

B. The detectives’

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