State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper

256 Ariz. 1

535 P.3d 3

STATE of Arizona EX REL. Rachel H. MITCHELL, Maricopa County Attorney, Petitioner,

v.The Honorable Katherine COOPER, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Judge,Lonnie Allen Bassett, Real Party in Interest.

No. CR-22-0227-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed September 18, 2023

Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney, Julie A. Done (argued), Deputy County Attorney, Jessi Wade, Deputy County Attorney, Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Amy E. Bain (argued), Bain & Lauritano, P.L.C., Glendale, Attorney for Real Party in Interest Lonnie Allen Bassett

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Joshua Bendor, Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Eliza C. Ybarra, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorney General

Craig M. Waugh, Laura Sixkiller, DLA Piper LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Kaleem Nazeem, Louis Gibson, Shakur Abdullah, and Greg Greenwood

Andrew T. Fox, Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix; and Marsha L. Levick, Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center, Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, and Human Rights for Kids

Gary Kula, Maricopa County Public Defender, Kevin D. Heade (argued), Deputy Public Defender, Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Maricopa County Public Defender

Karen S. Smith, Randal McDonald, Arizona Justice Project, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Justice Project

JUSTICE KING authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, BEENE, and BERCH (RETIRED) joined.^*

JUSTICE KING, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 At age sixteen, Lonnie Bassett shot and killed two people. A jury convicted him on two counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Bassett to natural life for one murder and life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for the other murder. We must determine whether the post-conviction relief ("PCR") court erred in determining that Bassett's natural life sentence was mandatory under Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (holding the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juvenile offenders, reversing the sentences of two defendants, and remanding for further proceedings).

We must also determine whether the PCR court erred in concluding Bassett was entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to State v. Valencia , 241 Ariz. 206, 386 P.3d 392 (2016).

¶2 We conclude Bassett's natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller , and he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We dismiss Bassett's PCR petition as there has not been a significant change in the law that, if applied to his case, would probably overturn his sentence. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Bassett's Criminal Conduct

¶3 In 2004, Bassett was riding in the back seat of a car driven by Frances Tapia. Joseph Pedroza, Tapia's boyfriend, was seated in the front passenger seat with Bassett directly behind him. Chad Colyer was sitting next to Bassett in the back seat. As Tapia was driving, Bassett pulled out a shotgun and fatally shot Pedroza in the head. Bassett then turned and fired two shots at Tapia, killing her. The vehicle crashed into a pole. Bassett left the area but subsequently returned to retrieve the shotgun. The next day, officers apprehended Bassett.

B. Trial And Sentencing Proceedings

¶4 Bassett was convicted on two counts of first degree murder. In its sentencing memorandum, the State argued that the possible sentences included natural life or life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years but asked for consecutive natural life sentences. The State explained that the "age of the Defendant of 16.5 at the time of the murder is a mitigating factor" and "this factor requires consideration of the Defendant's 1) level of intelligence, 2) maturity, 3) participation in the murder, and 4) criminal history and past experience with law enforcement," citing State v. Clabourne , 194 Ariz. 379, 386 ¶ 28, 983 P.2d 748, 755 (1999).

¶5 As to Bassett's age, the State's memorandum asked the trial court to consider that (1) Bassett was extremely intelligent; (2) the State was unaware of anyone describing him as immature or impulsive; (3) he was a full-time student, worked during the summer, and was mature enough to handle his own money; (4) he was "a lady's man" who was sexually active but kept condoms in his room, showing his maturity; (5) he was the sole participant in the murders; (6) he had three juvenile court referrals for violating an injunction, drug possession, and a curfew charge; and (7) his mother was present during his police interview. The State also noted he "had a reputation for carrying a gun and was nicknamed ‘Little Scrapper’ for fighting."

¶6 Bassett submitted a sentencing memorandum arguing the existence of several mitigating factors, including his (1) dysfunctional family, abandonment by his parents, and kidnapping and abuse by his father; (2) reputation as an ethical, hard worker; (3) attempts at self-improvement while incarcerated; (4) mental health, including a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"); (5) age of sixteen at the time of the offenses; (6) capacity to conform his conduct to the law; (7) prospects for rehabilitation; and (8) remorse. According to Bassett, just before his second birthday, Bassett's father kidnapped him and his brother. His father was later arrested and charged with two counts of custodial interference. Bassett was raised by another family, the Alexanders, as his mother did not want him but kept custody of her other son.

¶7 As to his age, Bassett's sentencing memorandum claimed it "is common knowledge that 16 year olds do not possess the judgment and impulse control of an adult. This is why they are not allowed to drink, vote or otherwise engage in certain adult activities." Bassett cited Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders). He then discussed three general differences between juveniles and adults set forth in Roper —a lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, greater susceptibility to negative influences and outside pressures, and a character that is not well formed.

¶8 Bassett also noted that he was diagnosed with PTSD in 2002 and was prescribed medications, but he stopped taking those medications in 2003 because of side effects. Bassett claimed his PTSD, hypervigilance, and "exaggerated startle response when confronted with stressful situations ... may well have led [him] to severely overreact to events on the night of the shootings."

¶9 Tapia's mother submitted a victim's sentencing memorandum, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4426 and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 39(c). She argued that when Bassett's age "at the time he killed two people and the parents of three children" is "considered in light of the degree of planning and his callous conduct following the murders, all in an effort to avoid responsibility, it would be an injustice for him to be mature enough to commit the crime but be too immature to face the consequences."

¶10 The trial court held a sentencing hearing. At this hearing, the court explained it had read the presentence report, letters, and sentencing memoranda. The State acknowledged Bassett's age as a mitigating factor, but maintained the following aggravating factors supported imposition of natural life sentences: (1) this was a double homicide; (2) the murder of Tapia was especially cruel because she endured mental and physical anguish as she watched Bassett kill Pedroza and then tried to "ward off the blow" that hit her shoulder before Bassett fired a second time and killed her; (3) use of a deadly weapon; (4) grave risk of death to Colyer; and (5) lack of remorse for Tapia's death, as Bassett told the police, "[o]h well, I thought I missed her" before shooting her a second time and called her "that girl."

¶11 Bassett called Charles Alexander, who helped raise him, to testify on his behalf. Alexander stated that Bassett was a sixteen-year-old kid preyed upon by Pedroza. Bassett's girlfriend also spoke, asserting that he "made a bad decision" and "the biggest thing" the court should consider "is his age. He was 16 when it happened. He was scared." The presentence report noted that Bassett claimed Pedroza was threatening his life before the murders.

¶12 Bassett's counsel argued he "was a child" at sixteen years old and "juveniles are susceptible to negative influences" and their "characters are not fully formed." He claimed that the United States Supreme Court "took notice of numerous scientific studies that have been done recently that establish that the portions of the brain that control impulsivity and foresight and appreciation of consequences don't really form fully until the early 20's," and quoted directly from Roper : "[T]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside." 543 U.S. at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (quoting Johnson v. Texas , 509 U.S. 350, 368, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) ). He argued that juveniles have "poor impulse control," and this may have been compounded here by Bassett's PTSD, but he "may well have the tools to better himself in the future." Bassett requested sentences that would allow the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.

¶13 The trial court reiterated that it had carefully read and considered all submitted materials and explained its...