State ex rel. T.S. v. State

365 P.3d 1221

STATE of Utah, in the interest of T.S., a person under eighteen years of age.

T.S., Appellant,

v.State of Utah, Appellee.

No. 20140656–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Dec. 31, 2015.

Monica Maio and Tasha M. Williams, for Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City and Jeanne B. Inouye, for Appellee.

Judge MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in which Judges STEPHEN L. ROTH and JOHN A. PEARCE concurred.¹

Opinion

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶ 1 T.S. appeals from the juvenile court's denial of his motion to dismiss a delinquency petition filed against him for rape of a child. He contends that strict-liability crimes cannot constitutionally be applied to individuals under the age of eighteen because juveniles are too immature to have constructive knowledge that their actions might be criminal. T.S. also contends that application of the rape-of-a-child statute to the facts of this case would produce an absurd result. See In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, 165 P.3d 1206. Because T.S. fails to demonstrate that juveniles' diminished capacity renders their adjudication under a strict-liability statute unconstitutional, and because T.S. does not challenge the juvenile court's factual findings that differentiate his case from In re Z.C., we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 T.S. and the State stipulated to the facts recounted in this paragraph. T.S., aged fifteen, and A.R., aged twelve, attended the same school. They began dating. Shortly thereafter, A.R. sent a text message to T.S. telling him that she liked short shorts. T.S. replied that he too liked short shorts and invited A.R. to his house. She accepted his invitation and walked to T.S.'s home. After she arrived, the two began kissing. A.R. told T.S. that she had had sex before, and the two engaged in mutually welcome sexual intercourse.

¶ 3 We recite further facts as briefed by the parties. A.R. later wrote about the encounter in her diary. A.R.'s father read her diary and apparently reported the incident to the police. The police interviewed A.R., who described T.S. as "sensitive in a way that's sweet" and stated that "we knew everything that was going on." The State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court against T.S. for rape of a child, a strict-liability offense under Utah Code section 76–5–402.1 (the Statute). If committed by an adult, rape of a child would be a first degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–402.1(2) (LexisNexis 2012). As part of the juvenile proceedings against T.S., A.R. and her mother completed a victim impact statement; A.R.'s mother wrote that "[b]oth minors are equally accountable for their actions. Both parties owe each other an apology[.]" After the petition was filed against him, T.S. voluntarily enrolled in a sexual education class that addressed healthy sexual boundaries.

¶ 4 T.S. filed a motion to dismiss the delinquency petition on the basis that, as applied to him, the strict-liability nature of the Statute violated his due process right to fundamental fairness and worked an absurd result. The juvenile court denied the motion. T.S. then entered an admission to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, conditioned on a reservation of his right to appeal the juvenile court's denial of his motion to dismiss.² After he entered the admission, T.S. was adjudicated as delinquent and ordered to complete sixty hours of community service with credit for the time he had spent in the sexual education class.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 5 T.S. contends that the Statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because it violates the guarantee of fundamental fairness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. "Whether a statutory scheme conforms with state and federal constitutional provisions is a question of law." State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 66, 20 P.3d 342. Similarly, a court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss presents a question of law. West Valley City v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, ¶ 5, 329 P.3d 833. We review a juvenile court's resolution of a question of law for correctness. See In re A.M., 2009 UT App 118, ¶ 6, 208 P.3d 1058.

¶ 6 T.S. also contends that applying the Statute to him produces an absurd result of the kind recognized by In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, 165 P.3d 1206. To the extent that this contention challenges the juvenile court's interpretation of statutes and case law, we review that interpretation for correctness.³

ANALYSIS

I. Due Process

¶ 7 T.S. argues that applying the strict-liability rape-of-a-child statute to him "violates his due process guarantee to fundamental fairness because such application fails to take into account the effects of his emerging adolescent brain development on his ability to foresee and assume the risk of his conduct; weigh the immediate benefit with the risk of harm; resist peer pressure and control hormonal and other impulses; self-regulate; and, perhaps most importantly, recognize the behavior as criminally sanctionable." More specifically, he asserts that the application of the Statute "fails to allow for individualized consideration and fails to account for age and developmental limitations."

¶ 8 "[D]ue process takes on an altered form in juvenile courts because of the rehabilitative focus of the juvenile court system." In re K.M., 2007 UT 93, ¶ 23, 173 P.3d 1279. Juvenile courts are designed to rehabilitate a juvenile's behavior "rather than merely to accuse, convict and punish." In re Lindh, 11 Utah 2d 385, 359 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1961). "[T]he proceedings of the juvenile court do not fall, nor are they intended to come, within what is termed criminal procedure, nor are the acts therein mentioned, as applied to children, crimes." Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 P. 609, 613 (Utah 1907). Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the same due process guarantees afforded to adults in criminal cases are not necessarily afforded to juveniles in delinquency adjudications. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).⁴ "[T]he applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings ... is fundamental fairness." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (plurality opinion).

¶ 9 T.S.'s argument proceeds in three steps: (1) ongoing brain development causes adolescents to evaluate situations and consequences poorly; (2) as a result, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the United States Constitution requires that juveniles not be treated as fully competent adults in regards to the death penalty, life sentences without parole, or understanding the waiver of their rights; and (3) applying a strict-liability statute to a juvenile therefore runs afoul of the Constitution because juveniles lack awareness that their actions might be criminal.

¶ 10 T.S. quotes several sources that address behavioral changes during adolescence due to the process of brain development. See generally Sara B. Johnson, Robert W. Blum, & Jay N. Giedd, Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. Adolescent Health 3, 216–21, Sept. 2009, http://www.jahonline.org/article/S1054–139X09002511/fulltext# sec3 (last visited Dec. 1, 2015); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age–Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 Neuroscience & Behavioral Reviews 4, 417–63, June 2000; American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Center, Kids Are Different: How Knowledge of Adolescent Development Theory Can Aid Decision–Making in Court 21–23 (Lourdes M. Rosado ed., 2000); National Juvenile Defender Center, Toward Developmentally Appropriate Practice: A Juvenile Court Training Curriculum 6 (2009); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile Justice (2010); Brief for the American Psychological Association, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos.08–7412, 08–7621), 2009 WL 2236778. The changes identified by the sources include increased thrill-seeking, increased risk-taking, increased susceptibility to peer pressure, and ignoring future consequences in favor of immediate gratification.

¶ 11 T.S. explains that, in light of such research, the United States Supreme Court "has repeatedly acknowledged that juveniles are different in constitutionally significant ways." He points us to several cases: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty upon juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding that, in non-homicide cases, juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole); Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (holding that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life in prison without parole even in homicide cases); and J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (holding that the proper standard for evaluating Miranda claims in juvenile cases is that of a reasonable child, not that of a reasonable adult). T.S. explains that in each of these cases, the ongoing development of adolescent brains was of central importance to the Supreme Court's analysis. T.S. also refers us to two Utah cases that considered the impact of juvenile status: In re K.M., 2007 UT 93, 173 P.3d 1279 (holding that, where a juvenile court had failed to ensure that a juvenile understood the nature and elements of the crime to which she was admitting, the juvenile's plea was not knowing and voluntary) and In re D.V., 2011 UT App 241, 265 P.3d 803 (reversing a contempt finding against a juvenile because the court order he was accused of violating was, in light of his age, not sufficiently specific to inform him of what he was required to do or what consequences he faced for failing to obey).

¶ 12 T.S. continues by...