State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Simonelli

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER SIMONELLI, ET AL Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-01431 (JCH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JULY 28, 2014

RULING RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 69)

I. INTRODUCTION

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") brings this action seeking a declaratory judgment that it has no obligation under its automobile liability policy ("Policy") with Mailex Corporation ("Mailex") to defend or indemnify Christopher Simonelli ("Simonelli") in a series of lawsuits resulting from an incident on November 16, 2010. Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.") (Doc. No. 17) ¶¶ 1, 2, 19, 113. On November 1, 2013, State Farm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J.") (Doc. No. 69). Defendants Benedetto and Audrey Napoleone ("Napoleones") object to State Farm's Motion on the grounds that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding: (1) whether Simonelli had Mailex's permission or consent to operate the company vehicle at the time of the incident; and (2) whether Simonelli intended to cause the injuries that occurred. Defendants' Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defs.' Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J.") (Doc. No. 76).

For the reasons stated below, State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 69) is DENIED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND¹

On November 16, 2010, Simonelli was a part-time employee of Mailex, where he worked as a driver and in the office. Plaintiff's Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement ("Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)(1) Stmt.") (Doc. No. 69-3) ¶ 72; Defendants' Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ("Defs.' L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt.") (Doc. No. 76-3) ¶ 72. At some point during his shift, Simonelli took the keys for the company box truck, drove onto CT Transit property, and drove directly into a locked gate. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. (Doc. No. 69-3) ¶ 73-74; Defs.' L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. (Doc. No. 76-3) ¶ 73-74. Simonelli then backed up and drove into the gate again, and this time the truck broke through the gate and continued onto Myrtle Avenue. Id. This part of the incident was captured on a security camera and viewed by the Stamford Police Department. Id.

Once on Myrtle Avenue, Simonelli drove on the wrong side of the road and struck a vehicle, causing it to collide with a parked car. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. (Doc. No. 69-3) ¶ 75; Defs.' L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. (Doc. No. 76-3) ¶ 75. He then turned onto East Main Street, where he hit several more vehicles. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. (Doc. No. 69-3) ¶¶ 76-78; Defs.' L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. (Doc. No. 76-3) ¶¶ 76-78. The truck then swerved across the road onto the opposite sidewalk and struck a parking meter, a city-owned garbage can, and a street sign. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. (Doc. No. 69-3) ¶ 79; Defs.' L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. (Doc. No. 76-3) ¶ 79. Lastly, Simonelli struck a school bus, causing it to swerve into a dump truck. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. (Doc. No. 69-3) ¶ 80; Defs.' L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. (Doc. No. 76-3) ¶ 80.

Following the incident, the Stamford Police Department obtained a search warrant and viewed Simonelli's toxicology test from the Stamford Hospital Laboratory. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. (Doc. No. 69-3) ¶ 81; Defs.' L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. (Doc. No. 76-3) ¶ 81. The report indicated that Simonelli had PCP in his system when he was admitted to the hospital shortly after the incident. Id.

On December 9, 2010, Simonelli was arrested based on this incident and was charged with four counts of evading responsibility and one count of illegal operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. (Doc. No. 69-3) ¶ 83; Defs.' L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. (Doc. No. 76-3) ¶ 83. On March 7, 2014, Simonelli pled guilty to four counts of assault in the first degree, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59(a)(3). Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s Suppl. Brief in Supp.") (Doc. No. 78-1) at 1.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only if "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." O'Hara v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 642 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2011). Thus, the role of the district court in deciding a summary judgment motion "is to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist for trial, not to make findings of fact." Id. In making this determination, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep't, 706 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2013).

"The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep't, 613 F.3d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 2010). Once the moving party has satisfied that burden, to defeat the motion "theparty opposing summary judgment . . . must set forth 'specific facts' demonstrating that there is 'a genuine issue for trial.'" Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). "For summary judgment purposes, a 'genuine issue' exists where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could decide in the non-moving party's favor." Cambridge Realty Co., LLC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 421 F. App'x 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)) (stating that the non-moving party must point to more than a mere "scintilla" of evidence in its favor). "[U]nsupported allegations do not create a material issue of fact." Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).

IV. DISCUSSION

"Under Connecticut law, it is well established that a liability insurer has a duty to defend its insured if the pleadings" against the insured "allege a covered occurrence." Ryan v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 692 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 457 (2005) (alterations omitted)). "In determining whether a claim falls within the scope of an insurance policy, the Supreme Court of Connecticut 'construes broad policy language in favor of imposing a duty to defend on the insurer,' and 'requires a defense if an allegation of the complaint falls even possibly within the coverage.'" Id. (quoting Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 274 Conn. at 466 (2005) (alterations omitted)).

"[A]n insurer's duty to defend is measured solely by whether the complaints against the insured allege facts that, if proven true, would present a claim within the scope of the policy's coverage. It is well settled that an insurer's duty to defend, beingmuch broader in scope and application than its duty to indemnify, is determined by reference to the allegations contained in the [underlying] complaint." Coregis Ins. Co. v. American Health Found., 241 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Springdale Donuts, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 247 Conn. 801, 807 (1999)). "[T]he obligation of the insurer to defend does not depend on whether the injured party will successfully maintain a cause of action against the insured." Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mara, 699 F. Supp. 2d 439, 448 (D. Conn. 2010) (quoting Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 274 Conn. at 463)). "[W]hen an exclusion clause is relied upon to deny coverage, the insurer has the burden of demonstrating that the allegations of the underlying complaint cast that pleading solely and entirely within the policy exclusions, and, further, that the allegations, in toto, are subject to no other interpretation." VT Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ciccone, 900 F. Supp. 2d 249, 273 (D. Conn. 2012). "In insurance cases, summary judgment may be granted as to the extent of coverage as a matter of law." Mara, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 445.

A. Duty to Defend: Consent/Permission to Use the Company Truck

State Farm first argues that it has no duty to defend Simonelli because he was not an insured under the Policy. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J.") (Doc. No. 69-1) at 28. The Policy between State Farm and Mailex defines an insured, inter alia, as one who uses Mailex's vehicle "within the scope of [Mailex's] consent." Id. State Farm argues that Simonelli does not meet this definition because he "did not have permission to take the box truck in question at the time of the accident." Id.

In order to establish Simonelli's lack of permission, State Farm relies on an affidavit from the president of Mailex, Ellen Connery, who was at the office the day of the incident. Id. In her affidavit, Connery claims that Simonelli was working his regular shift, but that "[h]e was not scheduled to drive until 4pm." Id. at Ex. J. Because Simonelli took the box truck around 2:30 pm, Connery claims that Simonelli "did not have Mailex Corporation's permission to operate any of the Mailex motor vehicles at the time of the accident." Id.

In response, the Napoleones argue that Connecticut state law creates a statutory presumption that "Mr. Simonelli as the operator of the vehicle was the agent/servant of Mailex and was operating it in the course of employment." Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defs.' Mem. in Opp.") (Doc. No. 76-1) at 3. The Napoleones cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-183 as the source of this presumption, which states:

In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of

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