State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis

336 So.3d 392

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.Christel DAVIS, Individually and as Parent and Guardian of C.H., a Child, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Case No. 5D20-1595, 5D20-1601

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed March 25, 2022

Jennifer J. Kennedy and Jeffrey M. Adams, of Abbey, Adams, Byelick & Mueller, LLP, St. Petersburg, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

John N. Bogdanoff, of The Carlyle Appellate Law Firm, Orlando, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

EDWARDS, J.

Appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), appeals the trial court's several orders that permitted Appellee, Christel Davis ("Davis"), to argue and present for the jury's decision the element of personal injury damages for aggravation of preexisting injuries or conditions. State Farm repeatedly objected below and on appeal asserts that the trial court erred in permitting that issue to be tried, given that Davis failed to plead that claim of special damages in her complaint.¹ Additionally, State Farm argues that its motion for directed verdict regarding aggravation damages should have been granted because Davis failed to present any evidence to support that claim. We agree with both of State Farm's arguments, quash the subject orders, reverse the final judgment, and remand for entry of an order granting State Farm's motion for directed verdict and for a new trial on the issues of causation and monetary amount, if any, for future medical expenses and future non-economic damages but excluding recovery for any aggravation of preexisting conditions.

Davis’ Claims

On October 15, 2016, Davis was involved in a collision between her car and another vehicle. She claimed that the wreck and her injuries were caused by the negligence of an uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UM"). State Farm was Davis’ auto insurer and the policy issued to Davis provided UM coverage for this incident and her related claims.

Pleadings

Davis filed suit against both the negligent driver and State Farm "for the total amount of loss, injury, and damages caused by" the negligent driver and for recovery of "damages" from State Farm pursuant to her UM policy.² In her complaint and amended complaint, Davis claimed that as a result of the collision, she sustained personal injury, had "suffered loss, injury and damages," alleged that her "injuries are permanent, and losses and damages are continuing," and she "will suffer losses and damages into the future." In its answer, State Farm admitted that the uninsured driver was negligent and the sole cause of the crash. Thus, State Farm only contested the causation, nature, extent, and consequences of Davis’ injuries or medical conditions.

Medical Evidence

Discovery and trial testimony revealed that beginning in 2002, Davis sought chiropractic care and treatment from Dr. Oliverio for pain, restricted movement, and related conditions in her low back and neck. From 2008 until the crash in 2016, Davis went to Dr. Oliverio forty-three times for treatment of her cervical spine, thoracic spine, lumbar spine, and sacrum. Three days after the subject 2016 crash, Davis went to Dr. Oliverio complaining of pain in her neck, ribs, middle back, shoulders, hip, lumbar spine, and headaches. Dr. Oliverio testified that the injuries and related symptoms that Davis sustained in the 2016 crash were not the same as those for which he had been treating her during the fourteen years prior to the crash.

Dr. Oliverio referred Davis to a medical doctor, Dr. Marsh, who provided steroid and nerve block injections to deal with her headaches, muscle spasms, and tenderness in her neck and low back. Dr. Marsh then referred Davis to Dr. Sullivan, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed Davis as having two herniated discs, which he testified were caused by the wreck. Dr. Sullivan further opined that Davis suffered pain from her sacroiliac joints and her neck, also caused by the wreck. Dr. Sullivan recommended surgery as the required future treatment for each of the abovementioned conditions.

State Farm retained Dr. Martinez to perform a compulsory medical examination of Davis. After performing his examination and reviewing her medical records, Dr. Martinez reached the conclusion and testified that her neck and back pain and her headaches were unrelated to the crash.

There was absolutely no medical testimony or any other evidence presented by either side that the subject wreck had aggravated any of Davis’ preexisting injuries or conditions.³

Aggravation of Preexisting Condition Issue

Davis did not include any claim for special damages for aggravation of preexisting injuries or conditions in her complaint even though her counsel acknowledged such claims were "standard pleadings."⁴ In her pretrial statement Davis simply claimed that "as a result of this crash," she "suffered significant and permanent loss, injury and damages"; she did not make any mention of or claim regarding aggravation of preexisting conditions. Nevertheless, shortly before trial, Davis presented her proposed verdict form which contained Question 4: "What is the total amount of Christel Davis's damages for pain, suffering, disability, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, inconvenience, aggravation of a disease or physical defect and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life." (emphasis added).

While it is not clear from the record, it would appear that receipt of Davis’ proposed verdict form caused State Farm justifiable concern that Davis would try to seek recovery for aggravation of a preexisting condition. Just before trial started, State Farm brought the matter to the trial court's attention by advising that Davis’ complaint did not allege or seek aggravation damages and State Farm did not want Davis to try to interject that issue into the trial. State Farm specifically stated that it wanted to make sure that claim was not included in the verdict form that would be provided to the jury.⁵ Davis responded that State Farm had engaged in discovery regarding her previous injuries and medical treatment which led her to anticipate that "the defense is going to be that our client had prior back and neck ... treatment."

After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court stated that because State Farm was aware of Davis’ prior injuries and treatment, a claim for aggravation of preexisting conditions would be permitted. Thus, the trial court denied State Farm's request to exclude any mention of aggravation of preexisting conditions or injuries.⁶ When Davis asked the venire during voir dire whether they thought somebody should be allowed to recover for aggravation of preexisting injuries, State Farm objected, and its objection was overruled. Repeatedly during trial, State Farm objected whenever Davis tried to interject that unpled claim into trial, and the objections were consistently overruled.

At the close of Davis’ case, State Farm moved, unsuccessfully, for entry of a directed verdict because no evidence was presented by any witness that the subject collision aggravated any of Davis’ preexisting conditions. Likewise, State Farm's objections to instructing the jury on aggravation damages and to inclusion of aggravation damages on the verdict form were overruled.

The jury returned a verdict which awarded Davis zero dollars for past lost wages, zero dollars for future loss of earning capacity, and zero dollars for past non-economic damages. The jury's verdict, which State Farm contests, awarded Davis $350,000 for future medical expenses and $150,000 for all future non-economic damages including for aggravation of preexisting conditions. State Farm's motion for new trial, which was denied, asserted inter alia that the trial court erred by permitting the claim of aggravation damages to be presented to the jury. State Farm timely appealed.

Analysis

Pleadings Define the Issues to Be Tried

We now consider the first argument made by State Farm: the trial court erred in permitting the trial of an unpled claim for damages caused by aggravation of preexisting conditions. Essentially, at the encouragement of Davis, the trial court disregarded the claims actually pled and focused instead on what claims and defenses the evidence disclosed in discovery might support. As discussed below, the trial court erred in that regard.

The important role of pleadings was long ago confirmed. "[I]ssues in a cause are made solely by the pleadings ...." Hart Props. Inc. v. Slack , 159 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1963). " ‘Pleadings are the allegations made by the parties to a suit for the purpose of presenting the issue to be tried and determined. They are the formal statements by the parties of the operative, as distinguished from the evidential, facts on which their claim or defense is based.’ " Id. (quoting 25 Fla. Jur., Pleadings, § 2). "The purpose of pleadings is to present, define, and narrow the issues, and to form the foundation of, and to limit, the proof to be submitted on the trial." White v. Fletcher , 90 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1956) (quoting 71 C.J.S., Pleading, § 1 ).

The objective sought in the present rules is to reach issues of law and fact in one affirmative and one defensive pleading.

This purpose will not be served nor this objective achieved if operational issues, as distinguished from evidential issues, are allowed to be created outside the pleadings in depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the like, which may be filed in a cause. If this were allowed neither the parties nor the court would be able to say with certainty what the triable issues in a cause are.

Hart Props. , 159 So. 2d at 239 (internal citation omitted).

Lest someone suggest that the rule limiting trial to the claims and defenses actually pled is as outdated as relying on books for case law, it remains the law. "Litigants in civil controversies must state their legal positions within a particular document, a pleading, so that the parties and the court are...