State Marshall Association of Connecticut, Inc. v. Johnson

STATE MARSHALL ASSOCIATION OF CONNECTICUT, INC. v. Erin JOHNSON in her Official Capacity as Tax Collector for the Town of Canton

No. HHDCV186086546S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford

August 6, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

PECK JTR

The plaintiff, State Marshal Association of Connecticut, Inc. brought the current action against defendant, Erin Johnson in her official capacity as Tax Collector for the Town of Canton, on December 26, 2017. The complaint is comprised of four counts seeking declaratory judgment of Johnson’s statutory authority to contract with law firm Pullman & Comley, LLC ("P & C"), to collect tax payments in the Town of Canton pursuant to General Statutes § § 12-35(a), 12-155, 12-157, and 12-162. On January 3, 2018, Pullman & Comley, LLC, filed a motion to intervene in the action, which was granted by the court. P & C moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on February 27, 2018, arguing that the plaintiff lacks standing. Johnson joined P & C’s motion to dismiss and adopted its arguments on March 1, 2018. The motion has been fully briefed and oral argument was heard on April 23, 2018.

"A motion to dismiss [for lack of standing] ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the Court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Emerick v. Glastonbury, 145 Conn.App. 122, 127, 74 A.3d 512 (2013).

"[I]t is a basic principle of our law ... that the plaintiffs must have standing in order for a court to have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment ... Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ... When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue ... [Because] [s]tanding requires no more than a colorable claim of injury ... a [party] ordinarily establishes ... standing by allegations of injury [that he or she has suffered or is likely to suffer]. Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Insurance, 315 Conn. 196, 224-25, 105 A.3d 210 (2014).

"Thus, [s]tanding is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved ... The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] ... Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest ... has been adversely affected." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 225-26; Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Netherlands Insurance Co., 312 Conn. 714, 727-29, 95 A.3d 1031 (2014); see also Connecticut Business & Industry Association, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 218 Conn. 335, 347-48, 589 A.2d 356 (1991).

"A plaintiff has the burden of proof with respect to standing ... To establish aggrievement, first, the plaintiff [must allege] facts which, if proven, would constitute aggrievement as a matter of law, and, second ... [prove] the truth of those factual allegations." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Emerick v. Town of Glastonbury, supra, 145 Conn.App. 128-29.

Finally "[a]n association [such as the plaintiff] has standing to bring [an action] on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to [bring the action] in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation...