State v. Abreu, No. 28450.

941 A.2d 974

106 Conn.App. 278

STATE of Connecticut v. Rafael ABREU.

No. 28450.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 15, 2007.

Decided March 11, 2008.

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, state's attorney, and Terence D. Mariani, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

FLYNN, C.J., and HARPER and PETERS, Js.

FLYNN, C.J.

The defendant, Rafael Abreu, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a(a).¹ On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) violated his right to present a defense by excluding evidence of (a) the victim's alleged drug activity and (b) the defendant's knowledge of the prior arrests of the victim, the victim's alleged status as a fugitive, the victim's use of an alias and the victim's blood alcohol content on the night of the shooting and (2) improperly denied his motion to suppress the statement he gave to the police. We disagree with the defendant's principal evidentiary claim and conclude that he may not ask the jury to infer from the victim's alleged status as a drug dealer that the victim was armed and about to use deadly physical force against him and may not rely on that improper inference as justification for killing the victim in self-defense. See State v. Lewis, 220 Conn. 602, 619-20, 600 A.2d 1330 (1991). Evidence of the victim's alleged involvement in drug activity was, thus, properly excluded. We also conclude that the court properly excluded evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the prior arrests of the victim, the victim's alleged status as a fugitive and the victim's blood alcohol content on the night of the shooting and, therefore, reject all of the defendant's evidentiary claims. Finally, because the defendant has not shown that the court's findings as to the voluntariness of his confession were clearly erroneous, and because the court's factual determinations support the finding that the defendant's confession was voluntary, we conclude that the court properly denied the motion to suppress the defendant's confession and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. Several days prior to October 20, 2002, the defendant and some others, including Elvis Castro and Castro's girlfriend, Vanessa Garcia, were at the Los Amigos pool hall in Waterbury. At some point, an altercation ensued between the defendant and a group of patrons,² which included the victim, Juan Carlos Martinez, also known as Jeremy Contres. During the altercation, the defendant was beaten and struck in the head with beer bottles.

On October 20, 2002, the defendant, Castro and a few others went to the Eldorado Cafe in Waterbury. While having drinks, the defendant recognized one or more persons in the cafe as having been part of the group of people who had been at the pool hall days earlier and had beaten him. Thereafter, the defendant exited the cafe. A confrontation subsequently occurred between the defendant, the victim and others. The defendant shot the victim, and the victim died. The defendant admitted shooting the victim but asserted that the shooting had been done in self-defense. The defendant subsequently was arrested. He was charged by information with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a). After a trial to the jury, the defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. The court sentenced the defendant to thirty-eight years imprisonment. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court's exclusion of certain evidence constituted an abuse of discretion and deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court improperly excluded evidence material to his claim of self-defense. We disagree.

We first set forth our standard of review. "As we recently observed, [a] defendant's right to present a defense does not include a right to present evidence that properly is excluded under the rules of evidence.... The sixth amendment to the United States constitution require[s] that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.... The defendant's sixth amendment right, however, does not require the trial court to forgo completely restraints on the admissibility of evidence .... Generally, [a defendant] must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence in exercising his right to present a defense.... A defendant, therefore, may introduce only relevant evidence, and, if the proffered evidence is not relevant, its exclusion is proper and the defendant's right is not violated...."

"The standard of review we apply to a trial court's evidentiary rulings is well settled. Such rulings are entitled to great deference .... The trial court is given broad latitude in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb such a ruling unless it is shown that the ruling amounted to an abuse of discretion.... Even when a trial court's evidentiary ruling is deemed to be improper, we must determine whether that ruling was so harmful as to require a new trial.... In other words, an evidentiary ruling will result in a new trial only if the ruling was both wrong and harmful.... In our review, we make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling....

"Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue.... Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence or nonexistence of any other fact more probable or less probable than it would be without such evidence.... To be relevant, the evidence need not exclude all other possibilities; it is sufficient if it tends to support the conclusion [for which it is offered], even to a slight degree.... The determination of whether a matter is relevant to a material issue rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miller, 95 Conn.App 362, 386-88, 896 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 907, 901 A.2d 1228 (2006).

A

The defendant claims that the court's refusal to allow him to testify regarding the victim's alleged drug activity constituted an abuse of discretion and deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this issue. At the close of the state's case-in-chief, the court heard an offer of proof concerning certain evidence sought to be admitted by the defendant. The defendant sought to testify that the victim had been engaged in the selling of drugs and that persons engaged in such activity usually carry guns and large amounts of cash. The defendant also sought to testify that he had been engaged in drug transactions with the victim and the other participants in the pool hall fight and that the initial fight did not concern a baseball cap, but rather concerned a drug transaction that had ended badly. See footnote 2. The defendant claimed that this evidence was admissible as proof of his state of mind, namely, his fear of the victim and his perception that the victim was dangerous and armed, and, therefore, that the evidence was relevant to his claim of self-defense. The court excluded the proffered evidence regarding drug related activity, reasoning: "I'm not trying, [a] drug case.... It is confusing the issue at hand. Did [the defendant] intend to cause the death of [the victim]? That's the issue."

The matter was revisited the next morning. The defendant again sought to testify that the pool hall incident was the result of a disagreement concerning a drug transaction but acknowledged that such evidence might be prejudicial and inflammatory. The court repeated its earlier ruling that the evidence related to "a collateral issue at best in terms of his self-defense.... [I]t focuses the jury on something other than the issue here.... It's not going to be a minitrial on who's a drug dealer, how is he involved in drug dealing. It lends itself to speculation, conjecture, aside from the issue."

At trial, the defendant testified that the pool hall fight did not concern a baseball cap. He also testified that the victim had participated in the fight and had struck him in the head with a beer bottle. He further testified that he had not sought medical attention following the pool hall fight because Castro had told him that he and his family would be in danger from the people who had attacked him at the pool hall if the police became involved. Specifically, the defendant testified that on October 20, 2002, he was in fear of the victim, who had a reputation in the community as being a dangerous and violent person. Additionally, the defendant testified that as a result of his fear, he had purchased a handgun for protection.

The defendant claims that the excluded evidence was relevant to his state of mind at the time of the shooting. The defendant argues that his proffered testimony that the victim was a drug dealer and that drug dealers are often armed constitutes evidence of the victim's propensity for violence and was relevant to his state of mind. The defendant, however, has failed to demonstrate that the evidence of drug activity on the part of the victim was relevant to the issue before the jury.

The unsubstantiated allegation by the defendant regarding the status of the victim as a drug dealer, without more, was...