State v. Adams

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Richard Lanell Adams, Appellant.

A19-1348

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

August 10, 2020

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed

Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-17-7809

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FLOREY, Judge

Appellant seeks review of his convictions for first- and third-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the district court erred in failing to provide the jury with a unanimity instruction on "force and coercion" and "act of penetration," and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Richard Darnell Adams was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2016), and third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (2016). The evidence at trial showed that Adams and the victim, T.J., had known each other since 2012 and had previously engaged in consensual sexual activity, including after T.J. became paraplegic. T.J. is paralyzed from her chest down and does not have full function of her arms. Adams was aware that T.J. was paraplegic and had reduced mobility.

On March 24, 2017, T.J. and Adams made plans to "hang out" at T.J.'s apartment. When Adams arrived, they started watching pornographic videos in T.J.'s bedroom. This included an image of a man putting his fist inside a woman's vagina. T.J. testified she told Adams she was disgusted by the image and that she would hurt him if he ever tried to do that to her. Adams claimed that he did not recall such a comment.

Adams and T.J. began to engage in sexual activity. Adams gave T.J. consensual oral sex and then began touching her genitals with his fingers. T.J. testified that this touching became "extreme" as Adams inserted more and more fingers into her vagina, up to his knuckles. According to T.J., this was uncomfortable and she repeatedly asked Adams to stop. She tried to grab his hand and push him away. Adams eventually removed his hand and performed oral sex again. T.J. testified that she did not want this and toldAdams to stop but he held her down. Then Adams had vaginal sex with her, which T.J. testified she also did not want, again telling Adams to stop and trying to push him away.

During this incident, T.J.'s son approached her bedroom door and asked if she was ok. At T.J.'s request, Adams closed the door. At some point, T.J. noticed she was bleeding from her genital area and became scared; T.J. has limited sensation in this area since becoming paraplegic and was concerned Adams had seriously injured her. She also saw blood on Adams's shirt. After the vaginal intercourse ended, Adams got T.J. peroxide to clean up the blood and left her apartment. T.J. testified that she felt betrayed by Adams and did not understand why he had hurt her. Over the next couple days she felt like she was going "a little crazy" and started pulling out her hair.

Over the weekend, T.J.'s children went to their maternal grandmother's house. T.J.'s son informed T.J.'s mother that T.J. had been crying and T.J.'s mother reached out to T.J., who told her what had happened with Adams. At her mother's urging, T.J. went to the hospital for a sexual-assault examination. During this examination, which occurred three days after the incident, T.J. recounted the encounter with Adams and was physically examined by a certified sexual-assault nurse examiner. T.J. told the nurse she had internal pain and that her vaginal area felt swollen. There was one abrasion documented on T.J.'s thigh and four genital abrasions. One of the genital abrasions was actively bleeding a very small amount at the time of examination. The nurse testified that T.J.'s genital abrasions were consistent with forcible digital penetration by someone wearing a ring and nonconsensual sex. The nurse also testified that the genital injuries she observed on T.J. would typically be painful.

A police officer was dispatched to the hospital to interview T.J. regarding the alleged sexual assault. T.J. relayed a version of events similar to what she told the nurse during her examination. Adams was later arrested and told the investigating officer that he and T.J. had engaged in oral sex, and then digital and penile penetration, and that at no point did T.J. complain of pain or seem upset. Adams reported that T.J. had started bleeding after intercourse and told the investigating officer he believed either the ring he was wearing or his large penis might have injured her. In Adams's version of events, T.J. became upset later—after the encounter ended and he had left her apartment.

At trial, Adams testified that he never put more than two fingers in T.J.'s vagina and that she never asked him to stop or indicated she was in pain or upset during the sexual activity. Part of this testimony was contrary to what Adams had previously stated in a recorded jail call, which was played for the jury, where Adams recalled inserting his "whole hand" inside the T.J., making her "tweak[] out." During cross examination, Adams agreed that he is physically bigger than T.J. and that, throughout the sexual encounter, he was on top of her and she could not move her legs to kick him off.

During the trial, Adams moved for two separate verdict forms as to whether penetration was accomplished by force or by coercion; this request was denied by the district court. The jury found Adams guilty of first- and third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The jury also made specific Blakely findings including (1) T.J. is a paraplegic; (2) her physical condition impaired her ability to seek help, fight back, or escape harm; (3) Adams knew or should have known T.J. is a paraplegic; (4) Adams used force in the commission of the offense; (5) Adams used coercion in the commission of the offense; and(6) Adams used force and coercion in the commission of the offense. Based on those findings, the district court sentenced Adams to 240 months in prison, an upward durational departure. This appeal follows.

DECISION

I. Specific unanimity instruction

Adams contends that the jury instructions deprived him of his right to a unanimous verdict. "District courts are entitled to considerable latitude when selecting language for jury instructions," but a jury instruction cannot materially misstate the law. State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 144 (Minn. 2012). "We review jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the instructions accurately state the law in a manner that can be understood by the jury." State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn. 2014).

Where the appellant objects at trial, as Adams did on the instruction regarding unanimity on force or coercion, we review a district court's jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 2016). Where the appellant fails to object to jury instructions at trial, as Adams failed to do regarding the instruction on the act of penetration, we may still review the jury instructions for plain error. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). When we review for plain error, we examine the instructions to see whether there was (1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected the appellant's substantial rights. State v. Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. App. 2012). If all three elements are met, we will reverse the district court only if the error "seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Kelly, 855 N.W.2d at 274 (quotation omitted).

In this case, the district court did not give separate jury instructions for force and coercion; instead the jury was instructed that Adams could be convicted of first- and third-degree criminal sexual conduct if "[he] used force or coercion to accomplish the act." Adams argues that, if he was convicted under a scenario where some jurors believed the state proved coercion while others believed the state proved force, this would violate his due-process rights to a unanimous verdict. Minnesota requires that in criminal trials, a jury unanimously find that the state proved each element of the offense. Minn. R. Crim. P. 2601, subd. 1(5) (2018); State v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d 717, 730-31 (Minn. 2007). "But a jury need not agree unanimously with respect to the alternative means or ways in which a crime can be committed." State v. Rucker, 752 N.W.2d 538, 547 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008).

Adams cites State v. Stempf for the proposition that "the jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime." 627 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Minn. App. 2001). In Stempf, the state charged the defendant with one count of possession of a controlled substance based on allegations that he possessed substances found hours apart (1) at his workplace and (2) in a truck. Id. at 354. This court, noting that the "two incidents of possession did not constitute a single act" and "occurred in different places and at different times," vacated the conviction, holding that failing to instruct the jury to specify which act was committed meant that the verdict was possibly not unanimous. Id. at 358-59.

In State v. Hart, this court observed that Minnesota's first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct statute—Minn. Stat. § 609.342—allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty ifhe caused the victim to have reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm or if he caused personal injury while using force or...