State v. Adams, A22A0931

364 Ga.App. 864

876 S.E.2d 719

The STATE

v.ADAMS.

A22A0931

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 20, 2022

Keith Elliott Gammage, Solicitor-General, Tamara Natasha Crawford, Assistant Solicitor-General, for Appellant.

The Sessions Law Firm, D. Benjamin Sessions, for Appellee.

Phipps, Senior Appellate Judge.

In this prosecution for driving under the influence and an open container violation, the State appeals from the state court's order granting defendant Terrance Adams's¹ plea in bar and motion to dismiss due to a violation of his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions. The State contends on appeal that the state court made several factual errors and improperly weighed the pertinent factors in finding a speedy trial violation. Because the state court's analysis was incomplete, we vacate its order and remand this case to the state court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The record shows that Adams was arrested on March 18, 2018, and subsequently released on bond. During an October 2018 municipal court hearing, the City of Atlanta moved to bind the case over to state court. Adams objected and requested a bench trial in municipal court, citing concerns over excessive delays when cases are bound over to state court, and highlighting that his case already had experienced a "really long delay" due to a "computer issue."² On October 26, 2018, the municipal court granted the City's motion and bound the case over to state court, and the State filed an accusation in state court on May 13, 2019. In the interim, Adams had moved, but there was no pending case in which his address could be updated with the state court clerk until after the accusation was filed. When Adams did not appear for his arraignment in August 2019, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He subsequently was arrested in early February 2020, at which time he was required to post bond a second time in the amount of $400. Adams filed his plea in bar and motion to dismiss on February 18, 2020. The state court granted the motion and dismissed the charges against Adams on December 16, 2021. This appeal followed.

The United States and Georgia Constitutions both guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. U. S. Const. Amend. VI ; Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a). The test for determining whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated is set forth in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514, 530-533 (IV), 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and clarified further in Doggett v. United States , 505 U. S. 647, 651-658 (II)-(III), 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992).

In considering a defendant's claim that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, the trial court is required to decide as a threshold matter whether the delay at issue was long enough to create "presumptive prejudice." If the delay was not long enough to create presumptive prejudice, the speedy trial claim fails at the threshold. A delay long enough to be presumptively prejudicial triggers a requirement that the trial court analyze the speedy trial claim by balancing the conduct of the state and the defendant under four factors set forth in Barker : (1) whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long; (2) whether the state or the defendant is more to blame for the delay; (3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay.

Goffaux v. State , 313 Ga. App. 428, 428-429, 721 S.E.2d 635 (2011) (citations omitted); see also Barker , 407 U. S. at 530-533 (IV), 92 S.Ct. 2182 ; State v. Porter , 288 Ga. 524, 525-526 (2) (a), 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011). Thus, "after making a threshold determination that the delay was long enough to create presumptive prejudice, the trial court must consider the delay a second time as part of the prejudice factor of the four-factor Barker analysis." Goffaux , 313 Ga. App. at 429, 721 S.E.2d 635.

"In reviewing the trial court's ruling on appeal, no single factor is necessary or sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim, and we afford deference to the trial court's findings of fact and weighing of disputed facts. We review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion." Goffaux , 313 Ga. App. at 429, 721 S.E.2d 635 (citations and punctuation omitted). Nevertheless, "the trial court's order must provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to permit [an appellate court] to determine if the trial court properly exercised its discretion under the Barker analysis." Porter , 288 Ga. at 526 (2) (a), 705 S.E.2d 636. "Absent such findings, there is no exercise of discretion for this Court to review, and the trial court's order must be vacated and the case remanded for the entry of a proper order pursuant to Barker ." Id. at 533 (2) (e), 705 S.E.2d 636 (citation and punctuation omitted); see Higgenbottom v. State , 288 Ga. 429, 431, 704 S.E.2d 786 (2011) (observing that a trial court order must contain findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each Barker factor and vacating an order denying a constitutional speedy trial claim on the ground that "the limited findings made by the trial court [were] insufficient to provide for proper appellate review").

Here, the State challenges the state court's rulings at several steps of the analysis. We address each step in turn.

1. The Threshold Inquiry: Presumptive Prejudice. "The right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest or formal accusation or indictment, whichever occurs first, and the courts measure the delay from the time the right attaches." State v. Buckner , 292 Ga. 390, 393 (2), 738 S.E.2d 65 (2013). Where, as here, a trial has not occurred, "the delay should be calculated from the date of arrest or other formal accusation to the date on which a defendant's speedy trial motion was granted or denied." Labbee v. State , 362 Ga. App. 558, 562 (1), 869 S.E.2d 520 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Buckner , 292 Ga. at 393 (2), 738 S.E.2d 65 (measuring delay from indictment to grant of motion to dismiss); State v. Johnson , 291 Ga. 863, 864 (1), 734 S.E.2d 12 (2012) (same).

In this case, 45 months passed between Adams's initial arrest on March 18, 2018, and the dismissal of the charges against him on December 16, 2021. "A one-year delay is typically presumed to be prejudicial." Labbee , 362 Ga. App. at 562 (1), 869 S.E.2d 520 (citation and punctuation omitted); accord Porter , 288 Ga. at 526-527 (2) (b), 705 S.E.2d 636 (delay of more than one year from arrest to disposition of speedy trial motion generally is presumptively prejudicial). The state court properly found that the delay in this case — a total of nearly four years — was presumptively prejudicial and triggered full analysis of the four Barker - Doggett factors.³ See Porter , 288 Ga. at 526-527 (2) (b), 705 S.E.2d 636 ; Labbee , 362 Ga. App. at 562 (1), 869 S.E.2d 520. The State does not challenge this ruling on appeal.

2. The Barker - Doggett Factors.

(a) Length of Delay. "The first Barker - Doggett factor, whether the pretrial delay was uncommonly long, requires courts to analyze

the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim." Labbee , 362 Ga. App. at 562 (2) (a), 869 S.E.2d 520 (citation and punctuation omitted). "[T]he delay that can be tolerated in a particular case depends to some extent on the complexity and seriousness of the charges in that case." Buckner , 292 Ga. at 393 (3) (a), 738 S.E.2d 65. Here, a pretrial delay of 45 months (33 months beyond the initial 12-month presumptively prejudicial delay period) is significant — particularly in light of the non-complex charges at issue — and the state court properly weighed this factor against the State.⁴ See Ruffin v. State , 284 Ga. 52, 57-59 (2) (b) (i), 663 S.E.2d 189 (2008) (pretrial delay of two years, three months, and two weeks in a murder case was "an exceptionally long time" and weighed against the State); Fleming v. State , 324 Ga. App. 481, 488 (3) (c) (ii), 749 S.E.2d 54 (2013) (29-month pretrial delay was "uncommonly long" and weighed against the State in a prosecution for battery and criminal damage to property); Weems v. State , 310 Ga. App. 590, 592 (2) (a), 714 S.E.2d 119 (2011) (40-month delay properly weighed against the State in a child molestation and sexual battery case); Teasley v. State , 307 Ga. App. 153, 158 (2) (a), 704 S.E.2d 248 (2010) (pretrial delay of three years and two months in a prosecution for cruelty to children weighed "heavily against the State").

(b) Reasons for Delay.

The second factor in the Barker - Doggett analysis requires the court to examine both the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the State. To evaluate the reasons for delay, the court assigns various degrees of weight to the different reasons provided by the prosecution and the defense respectively. While a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government, an unintentional delay, such as that caused by the mere negligence of the prosecuting attorneys or the overcrowded docket of the trial court, should be weighted less heavily.

Labbee , 362 Ga. App. at 563 (2) (b), 869 S.E.2d 520 (citations and punctuation omitted); see Porter , 288 Ga. at 527 (2) (c) (2), 705 S.E.2d 636 (delay that is not deliberate, but rather results from negligence and workloads, weighs only lightly against the State). "Of course, delay caused by the defense weighs against the defendant." Labbee , 362 Ga. App. at 563 (2) (b), 869 S.E.2d 520 (citation and punctuation omitted).

(i) Delay Caused by the Pandemic-Related Suspension of Jury Trials. "On March 14, 2020, ... citing the public health emergency presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, Supreme Court of Georgia Chief Justice Harold Melton issued an order declaring a...