State v. Agron

323 Conn. 629

148 A.3d 1052

STATE of Connecticut

v.Angel AGRON

SC 19499

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 20, 2016

Officially released November 22, 2016

Paul A. Catalano, for the plaintiff in error (3–D Bail Bonds, Inc.).

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin T. Kane, chief state's attorney, Michael Dearington, former state's attorney, and Leah Hawley, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the defendant in error (state).

Rogers, C.J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.

EVELEIGH, J.

This case is before us on a writ of error brought by the plaintiff in error, 3–D Bail Bonds, Inc. (plaintiff), who claims that the trial court improperly denied its motion seeking relief from its obligation on a surety bail bond (bond) pursuant to General Statutes § 54–65c, which the trial court had ordered forfeited after the principal on that bond, Angel Agron, who is the criminal defendant in the underlying case, failed to appear for a scheduled court date. The defendant in error, the state of Connecticut, responds that the trial court properly denied the motion, claiming that the plaintiff had not satisfied the requirements of § 54–65c because Agron was not “detained” for purposes of § 54–65c when he was personally confronted by fugitive recovery bail enforcement agents in Puerto Rico, and the state refused to extradite him to Connecticut. We conclude that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion and, therefore, dismiss the writ of error.

The record reveals the following relevant facts. In 2006, Agron was arrested and charged with several offenses.¹ The trial court set bail on these charges in an amount totaling $20,000. The plaintiff executed a bond in that amount and Agron was subsequently released from custody.

Agron failed to appear for a scheduled court date on June 23, 2014, and the trial court ordered the total amount of the bond forfeited. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54–65a (a), the court ordered a six month stay of execution of the forfeiture. Upon being notified of Agron's failure to appear, the plaintiff initiated an investigation that revealed that Agron fled to Puerto Rico and remained there. On December 17, 2014, Agron was personally confronted by bail enforcement agents in Puerto Rico. The state's attorney, however, declined to initiate extradition proceedings.

On December 21, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion with the trial court to release the plaintiff from its obligation on the bond pursuant to § 54–65c. In support of its motion, the plaintiff filed an affidavit from one of its employees, Andrew J. Bloom, who attested that he spoke with the State's Attorney's Office and informed it that bail enforcement agents had personally confronted Agron. Bloom further averred that, although he requested an authorization for extradition, a representative of the state's attorney had declined his request. The plaintiff also submitted an affidavit in which Agron attested that he was “detained” in Puerto Rico by bail enforcement agents and made aware of his warrants for failure to appear in Connecticut. Agron further attested that he was told that the state was not authorizing extradition and that he was free to go. A photocopy of Agron's identification card and a photograph of him holding a Puerto Rican newspaper dated December 17, 2014, were also attached to the motion.

The trial court denied the motion and the plaintiff sought reconsideration. After considering briefs from both parties and conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court reasoned as follows: “[Agron] has not been proven to be in custody of the authorities in Puerto Rico; rather, bail enforcement agents made contact with him and he refused to consent to return. The [plaintiff] has not met the burden placed upon it by the statute, namely that [Agron] be detained or incarcerated.” (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff thereafter filed a writ of error.

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly denied its motion for relief from bond under § 54–65c because the trial court incorrectly interpreted the term “detained” as used in the statute. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the legislature intended the term “detained” to include action by a bail enforcement agent to capture the principal.² In response, the state asserts that for the purposes of § 54–65c, the term “detained” requires state action. Specifically, the state asserts that, to satisfy the “detained” requirements of § 54–65c, a surety holder must show that the principal is detained by the government of another state, territory or country, not simply the personal contact made by a bail enforcement agent. We agree with the state and conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff had not met the requirements of § 54–65c.

At the outset, we set forth the standard of review that applies to the plaintiff's claim. The question of whether § 54–65c affords relief for a surety holder upon demonstrating that the principal has been located and personally confronted by a bail enforcement agent presents a question of statutory construction.

“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v. Freedom of Information Commission, 310 Conn. 276, 283, 77 A.3d 121 (2013). The issue of statutory interpretation presented in this case is a question of law subject to plenary review. See id., at 282–83, 77 A.3d 121.

We begin with the text of the statute. Section 54–65c provides as follows: “A court shall vacate an order forfeiting a bail bond and release the professional bondsman, as defined in section 29–144, or the surety bail bond agent and the insurer, as both terms are defined in section 38a–660, if (1) the principal on the bail bond (A) is detained or incarcerated (i) in another state, territory or country, or (ii) by a federal agency, or (B) has been removed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and (2) the professional bondsman, the surety bail bond agent or the insurer provides satisfactory proof of such detention, incarceration or removal to the court and the state's attorney prosecuting the case, and (3) the state's attorney prosecuting the case declines to seek extradition of the principal.”

Resolution of the plaintiff's claim requires us to determine whether Agron was “detained” for purposes of § 54–65c when the bail enforcement agents personally located him and confronted him in Puerto Rico. “Detained” is not defined in § 54–65c. In accordance with General Statutes § 1–1 (a), we, therefore, look to the common usage of the word “detain” to discern the definition intended by the legislature in § 54–65c. See, e.g., Potvin v. Lincoln Service & Equipment Co. , 298 Conn. 620, 633, 6 A.3d 60 (2010). “In the absence of a definition of terms in the statute itself, [w]e may presume ... that the legislature intended [a word] to have its ordinary meaning in the English language, as gleaned from the context of its use.... Under such circumstances, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saturno , 322 Conn. 80, 90, 139 A.3d 629 (2016).

The term “detain” is defined with substantial similarity in a number of dictionaries. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (2002) defines “detain” as, inter alia, “to hold or keep in or as if in custody....” The American Heritage College Dictionary (4th Ed. 2007) similarly defines “detain” as, inter alia, “[t]o keep in custody or temporary confinement.” Finally, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th Ed. 2011) also defines “detain” as, inter alia, “[t]o keep in custody or confinement....” Applying the dictionary definition of “detain” supports that the legislature intended § 54–65c to require governmental action.

“When determining the legislature's intended meaning of a statutory word, it also is appropriate to consider the surrounding words pursuant to the canon of construction noscitur a sociis.³ McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety , 300 Conn. 144, 159, 12 A.3d 948 (2011).

By using this interpretive aid, the meaning of a statutory word may be indicated, controlled or made clear by the words with which it is associated in the statute. State v. Roque , 190 Conn. 143, 152, 460 A.2d 26 (1983).” (Footnote in original.) State v. LaFleur , 307 Conn. 115, 133, 51 A.3d 1048 (2012). In § 54–65c, the legislature chose to use the word “detained” in association with the term “incarcerated.” “Incarcerated” necessarily indicates confinement by government. See The American Heritage College Dictionary, supra (defining “incarcerate” as “[t]o put into jail”); Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra (defining “incarcerate” as “to put in prison: imprison”). A review of other statutes in which ...