State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez

367 Or. 614

482 P.3d 62

STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review,

v.Alex AGUIRRE-RODRIGUEZ, Respondent on Review.

CC 16CR60858 (SC S067446)

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and submitted September 25, 2020.

March 4, 2021

Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Matthew Blythe, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender.

Ashley L. Vaughn, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

Rosalind M. Lee, Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.

En Banc

NELSON, J.

In this criminal case, defendant pleaded guilty to several crimes that resulted in damage to the victim's truck. After the state presented evidence of a repair bill paid by the victim's insurer, the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution for the full amount of that bill, pursuant to ORS 137.106. Defendant appealed, arguing that the restitution award was not supported by sufficient evidence to prove that the amount charged had been reasonable. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and reversed. State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez , 301 Or. App. 42, 43, 455 P.3d 997 (2019). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the amount that the victim's insurer paid for repairs was reasonable. The trial court therefore did not err in entering the restitution award.

The relevant facts are uncontested. While intoxicated, defendant drove into the victim's pickup truck, damaging the truck and injuring two people who were in the truck at the time of the collision. Defendant did not remain on the scene to exchange insurance information. For that conduct, defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants, two counts of fourth-degree assault, and one count of failing to perform the duties of a driver to injured persons.

After defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced, the state sought restitution for a total of $11,803.50, which included $10,404.80 that the victim's insurer had paid to repair the victim's truck. To support that latter amount, the state submitted the following evidence: (1) the Kelley Blue Book value of the truck, assuming excellent condition ($9,761); (2) photographs of the damage to the truck after the collision; (3) a detailed repair estimate from the autobody shop that performed the repairs ($10,904.80); and (4) evidence that the insurer had paid that full amount, less the victim's $500 insurance deductible. The repair estimate provided by the autobody shop prior to the insurance company's authorization to perform the repairs was detailed and included (1) a list of parts necessary to complete the repairs ($6,915.50); (2) paint supplies to touch up the damage to the truck ($450.00); and (3) labor costs ($3,539.30). The hourly labor rates were further broken down and ranged from $52 per hour for "body" and "paint" labor, to $75 per hour for "mechanical" labor. The estimate was prepared using (1) a third-party publication, the Motor Crash Estimating Guide, to evaluate the damage and cost of repairs; and (2) CCC One Estimating, a software program that allowed the autobody repair shop to directly order repair parts from local suppliers.

Before the trial court, defendant argued that the state's evidence was insufficient to establish that the amount sought for the repairs was reasonable, as required by the restitution statute, ORS 137.106. The trial court then reviewed that evidence, noting that it had "observed the vehicle and its condition, and its injuries, its damages. And certainly, this is documentation for what you have included in the amount of restitution." Upon evaluating the evidence presented, including the submitted Kelley Blue Book estimated value, the trial court found that "[i]t was worth just about what it cost them to fix it."¹ The trial court rejected defendant's argument that additional evidence was necessary to establish that the cost of repairs was reasonable, commenting that, "I don't think we need an expert to find that that makes it reasonable per se ." The trial court then imposed the full amount of restitution sought by the state, including the amount for the repairs paid by the victim's insurer.

Defendant appealed, challenging the $10,404.80 restitution award for the repair costs paid by the victim's insurer. At issue on appeal, and again before this court, was whether the evidence that the victim's insurer had paid the bill was sufficient to establish that the cost of repairs was reasonable. The Court of Appeals noted, correctly, that the state bore the burden of presenting affirmative evidence to prove that the cost of repairs was reasonable. Aguirre-Rodriguez , 301 Or. App. at 45, 455 P.3d 997. Pointing to its decision in State v. J. M. E. , 299 Or. App. 483, 487, 451 P.3d 1018 (2019), that court then explained that, to establish reasonableness, the state's evidence must demonstrate how the paid charges correspond to the relevant market. Aguirre-Rodriguez , 301 Or. App. at 45, 455 P.3d 997. The court then concluded that the state's evidence did not "provide any meaningful basis for assessing how those costs correspond to the relevant market" and, accordingly, reversed the trial court's judgment. Id. at 46-47, 455 P.3d 997.

We allowed the state's petition for review, and, because we conclude that the evidence that the state presented, when considered collectively, was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that the repair cost was reasonable, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

We begin with a general overview of the requirements of the restitution statute, ORS 137.106. Under Oregon law, restitution is to be awarded when a defendant has been convicted of a crime that results in economic damages to the victim and the state has presented evidence of those damages. ORS 137.106(1)(a). If proof of economic damages is established, then the trial court is required to enter a judgment imposing restitution for the amount of those damages. Id . According to the statutory definition of "economic damages," that amount must be based on the reasonable costs of repair or replacement of the damaged property. See ORS 137.103(2)(a) ("economic damages" in restitution statutes carries same meaning as set out in ORS 31.710, with an exception that does not apply here); ORS 31.710(2)(a) (defining "[e]conomic damages" as including "reasonable costs incurred for repair or for replacement of damaged property").

As a procedural matter, the restitution statute places the burden of establishing the amount of economic damages on the state. See ORS 137.106(1)(a) ("When a person is convicted of a crime * * * that has resulted in economic damages, the district attorney shall investigate and present to the court * * * evidence of the nature and amount of the damages."). The defendant may rebut the evidence presented by the state and, if desired, present evidence about why the proposed restitution amount should not be imposed—including evidence that the amount of the economic damages is not reasonable. See State v. Hart , 329 Or. 140, 147, 985 P.2d 1260 (1999) (noting that the defendant has an opportunity to object to the state's proposed restitution amount). The court then evaluates the circumstances of the case, determines the amount of economic damages, and enters a judgment that reflects that decision. See ORS 137.106 (outlining the procedure for determining the nature and amount of economic damages to be awarded in a restitution proceeding).

On review, neither party disputes that defendant's criminal conduct resulted in economic damages to the victim's truck; rather, the issue is whether the state's evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the costs of repair were reasonable. We address that question—which we have not previously addressed in the context of the restitution statutes—below. First, however, we consider the other contexts in which this court has previously discussed whether evidence of a paid bill, standing alone, reflects the reasonable costs of the product or service.

In Farris v. McCracken , 253 Or. 273, 453 P.2d 932 (1969), a case dealing with enforcement of a mechanic's lien filed after nonpayment of a disputed contractor's bill, this court considered whether evidence of the contractor's paid bill was sufficient to establish that the costs paid by the contractor were not excessive. In that case, the plaintiff—the lien claimant—presented evidence consisting almost entirely of his own alleged costs without providing any explanation of the basis of the charged amount. Farris , 253 Or. at 274-75, 453 P.2d 932. After examining the claim on de novo review, this court concluded that, "[t]o say that the contractor paid a given amount for an item of labor or material, without explanation, does not, of itself, prove that the amount paid was justified." Id. at 276, 453 P.2d 932.

In this case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that "[t]he fact that a charge is billed, standing alone, says nothing about whether that charge is reasonable" absent "some sense of the relevant market." Aguirre-Rodriguez , 301 Or. App. at 44, 455 P.3d 997. That court relied on Farris , which, in its view, "made this [same] point." Id. As explained in greater detail below, however, this case does not present the same facts as in Farris , because, here, the state presented evidence beyond just the paid repair bill that provided an explanation for the basis of the charges made to restore the victim's truck. Although the proposition in Farris —that evidence of payment of a...