State v. Agundez-Martinez

540 P.3d 1205

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,

v.Jose Adrian AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ, Appellant.

No. CR-23-0053-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed January 10, 2024

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alexander W. Samuels (argued), Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General, Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Joshua C. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Dori L. Zavala, Zavala Law Offices, LLC, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Jose Adrian Agundez-Martinez

Gary Kula, Maricopa County Public Defender, Mikel Steinfeld, Zachary Stern, Deputy Public Defenders, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Maricopa County Public Defender's Office

Molly Brizgys (argued), Mitchell Stein Carey Chapman, PC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney, Nicholas Klingerman, Quinton S. Gregory, Deputy County Attorneys, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Maricopa County Attorney's Office

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER authored the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, BEENE, MONTGOMERY, KING and BERCH (RETIRED) joined.^* JUSTICE MONTGOMERY authored a separate opinion.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 Since 1931, we have held that the state may prosecute adults for criminal offenses they committed as juveniles. See Burrows v. State , 38 Ariz. 99, 111, 297 P. 1029 (1931), vacated on other grounds by State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282, 320 P.2d 467 (1958) ; McBeth v. Rose , 111 Ariz. 399, 403, 531 P.2d 156, 160 (1975). In 1996, voters passed Proposition 102, known as the "Juvenile Justice Initiative." As relevant here, Proposition 102 amended our constitution by (1) removing the superior court's exclusive authority over juveniles who engage in unlawful conduct and instead empowering the legislature and the people to "enact substantive and procedural laws" concerning such juveniles; (2) requiring the state to prosecute as adults all juveniles fifteen years of age or older who commit violent felony offenses or who are chronic felony offenders; and (3) directing that every juvenile convicted of a crime as an adult or held responsible for unlawful conduct as a juvenile make prompt restitution to any victims for injury or loss. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, § 22; State v. Davolt , 207 Ariz. 191, 214 ¶ 100, 84 P.3d 456, 479 (2004). The following year, the legislature enacted laws implementing Proposition 102. See 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 220 (1st Reg. Sess.).

¶2 The issue before us is whether the legislation implementing Proposition 102 now prohibits the state from prosecuting adults for crimes committed when they were juveniles. We conclude it does not.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Jose Agundez-Martinez sexually assaulted and abused three young children on separate occasions from 2006 through 2008 when he was between the ages of ten and twelve years. The State learned of these acts after Agundez-Martinez's eighteenth birthday. A grand jury indicted Agundez-Martinez, who was then twenty-three years old, with two counts of sexual conduct with a minor and three counts of child molestation. (One of the latter charges was later amended to attempted child molestation.) The State alleged that the offenses were dangerous crimes against children ("DCAC"), which statutorily triggered mandatory, enhanced sentences if the trier-of-fact found Agundez-Martinez guilty. See A.R.S. § 13-705.¶4 Agundez-Martinez moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. He argued the juvenile court possessed exclusive jurisdiction over him for felony acts he committed as a juvenile unless, after a hearing, the court transferred jurisdiction to the criminal division of the superior court. See A.R.S. § 8-327(A)–(B). And because the juvenile court lost jurisdiction when Agundez-Martinez turned eighteen, he argued it could no longer hold that hearing and transfer jurisdiction, thereby depriving the superior court of its only mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction. The superior court denied the motion, reasoning that once Agundez-Martinez reached adulthood, the prosecutor had discretion whether to file charges in adult court, and because Agundez-Martinez was in fact an adult, the court possessed jurisdiction over the prosecution.

¶5 A jury subsequently convicted Agundez-Martinez on all counts. Pursuant to the mandatory sentencing scheme for DCAC offenses, the court sentenced Agundez-Martinez to consecutive, mitigated prison terms on all counts, which totaled fifty-one years.

¶6 The court of appeals vacated Agundez-Martinez's convictions and sentences and ordered his release. State v. Agundez-Martinez , 254 Ariz. 452, 454 ¶ 1, 524 P.3d 832, 834 (App. 2023). It reasoned that the statutes implementing Proposition 102 provide that unlawful conduct committed by a juvenile younger than fourteen years is only a delinquent act and not a criminal offense. See id. at 458 ¶ 25, 524 P.3d at 838. And "[b]ecause delinquent acts may only be prosecuted in juvenile court or transferred to adult criminal court via A.R.S. § 8-327," the court concluded that "the State cannot prosecute Agundez-Martinez for these offenses now that he has reached adulthood." See id. at 458–59 ¶ 26, 524 P.3d at 838–39.

¶7 To avoid unnecessary delay if this Court disagreed with its analysis, the court of appeals also addressed Agundez-Martinez's Eighth Amendment challenges to his sentences. See id. at 454 ¶ 2, 524 P.3d at 834. First, it concluded that sentencing a defendant as an adult for offenses committed as a preadolescent juvenile only because he was an adult at the time of prosecution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 464 ¶¶ 56–57, 524 P.3d at 844. The court therefore held that if this Court affirms Agundez-Martinez's convictions, his sentences should be vacated and the matter remanded to the superior court to determine whether another, legitimate reason exists to punish Agundez-Martinez as an adult. Id. ¶ 57. If not, the superior court must order his release. Id.

¶8 Second, the court of appeals found that sentencing Agundez-Martinez to fifty-one years in prison as required by the DCAC sentencing statute ( § 13-705 ) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 465 ¶ 62, 524 P.3d at 845. The court therefore held that if the superior court finds Agundez-Martinez eligible for a criminal sentence, his convictions should be modified to be non-dangerous, non-DCAC offenses, and the superior court should then resentence him. See id. at 466 ¶ 66, 524 P.3d at 846.

¶9 The State petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ primary holding that Agundez-Martinez's convictions and sentences must be vacated because he only committed delinquent acts and the State therefore lacked statutory authority to prosecute him as an adult. We accepted review because the petition raises important issues of statewide interest that are likely to recur. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶10 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Patel , 251 Ariz. 131, 134 ¶ 10, 486 P.3d 188, 191 (2021). In doing so, we apply the plain text of the provision if it is unambiguous. See Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co. , 255 Ariz. 409, 411 ¶ 8, 532 P.3d 1145, 1147 (2023). If it is ambiguous, we interpret the text using secondary interpretive principles, like examining the provision's "subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose." See id. (quoting Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n v. Brain , 234 Ariz. 322, 325 ¶ 11, 322 P.3d 139, 142 (2014) ).

A. Before Proposition 102, The State Was Authorized To Prosecute Adults For Crimes They Committed When They Were Juveniles.

¶11 Before December 6, 1996, Proposition 102's effective date, the superior court possessed exclusive jurisdiction to hold children accountable for committing unlawful acts. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 15 (1996); A.R.S. § 8-202(A) (1994). Pursuant to that authority, the juvenile court could adjudicate a juvenile delinquent or, after conducting a transfer hearing, waive its jurisdiction and transfer the juvenile for criminal prosecution as an adult. See State v. Marks , 186 Ariz. 139, 142, 920 P.2d 19, 22 (App. 1996) ; Ariz. R. Juv. P. 13 – 14 (1996); see also A.R.S. § 8-201(21) (defining "juvenile court" as a division of the superior court). Although the juvenile statutes were amended through the years, the superior court's exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile crime—either in the superior court generally or its juvenile division—remained constant from statehood until December 6, 1996. Compare Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 6 (1910), with Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 15 (1996).

¶12 This Court has twice addressed whether the pre-1996 juvenile jurisdiction provisions permitted the state to prosecute adults for crimes committed when they were juveniles. In Burrows , the state charged a nineteen-year-old man with a murder committed when he was a juvenile. 38 Ariz. at 101, 106, 297 P. 1029. At issue was whether he could be prosecuted, tried, and sentenced as an adult. Id. at 106–07, 297 P. 1029. The Court concluded that Arizona's juvenile laws affect "the treatment and not the capacity of the offender." Id. at 110, 297 P. 1029. Thus, it found that these laws did not establish an age below which a juvenile could never be held accountable as an adult for criminal conduct. See id. at 111, 297 P. 1029. Instead, they "provide[d] a special method of treatment for minors under the age of eighteen who have violated the criminal law, and, even with such children, [left] the application of the juvenile or criminal code to the discretion of the trial court." Id. ; see also Gammons v. Berlat , 144 Ariz. 148, 151, 696 P.2d 700, 703 (1985) (citing Burrows in identifying the juvenile code's purpose). Because the defendant was an adult when charged, the Court determined that the juvenile laws did not...