State v. Alexander

851 S.E.2d 411

STATE of North Carolina

v.Christopher Issac ALEXANDER, Defendant.

No. COA19-847

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: October 20, 2020

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Nicholas R. Sanders, for the State.

Daniel J. Dolan, for Defendant-Appellant.

INMAN, Judge.

Defendant, who is Black, challenged during his criminal trial a prosecutor's peremptory strike of the only Black juror in the venire as racially motivated and prohibited by Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). Though the trial court heard thorough arguments and announced findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its ruling, it did not make a record adequately addressing the totality of circumstances presented to it as required by recent clarifying caselaw. As a result, we remand the matter for further proceedings addressing Defendant's Batson claim.

We also vacate three of the judgments to correct an error in the assessment of costs, and remand for the entry of judgments without costs should Defendant's Batson claim fail on remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was arrested in February 2017 on eight drug charges. The State's evidence at trial tended to show that Defendant sold cocaine to an undercover Yadkin County law enforcement officer on at least four different occasions during April and May of 2015.

In January of 2018, Defendant was indicted by a grand jury on four counts of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, four counts of selling and delivering cocaine, and one charge of attaining habitual felon status. The State filed a motion to join all the charges for trial on 5 July 2018, averring that "the offenses are based on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan." The trial court granted that motion without objection from Defendant during the pretrial motions hearing on 18 March 2019. Defendant pled not guilty to all charges, and the case proceeded to trial later that day.

Defendant is Black. Of the 34 people in the pool of prospective jurors, only one person, Mr. Robinson,¹ was Black. Jury selection was not transcribed, and no jurors were polled on their race or ethnicity.

Mr. Robinson was questioned after the State had accepted ten jurors and had stricken two jurors peremptorily. During voir dire , Mr. Robinson discussed his employment history and current employment status, his wife's classes from an online university that he could not identify, and a prior criminal charge for child abuse that was dismissed without a conviction. The prosecutor used a peremptory strike on Mr. Robinson. Defendant objected on Batson grounds.

In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Defendant's counsel asserted that the State's decision to strike the only Black prospective juror in the trial of a Black defendant constituted a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in jury selection under Batson . The State did not challenge Defendant's characterization of Mr. Robinson as Black, nor his assertion that a prima facie case of discrimination had been made. Instead, the prosecutor offered several "race neutral options or the reason [he] struck him."

The prosecutor noted Mr. Robinson's "tone of voice" and the "context" of his statements about his job history, which led the prosecutor to surmise that Mr. Robinson had been fired but "was reluctant to talk about it." Though the prosecutor could have confirmed this hunch through further questioning, he explained to the trial court that he declined to do so because he "didn't want to embarrass" Mr. Robinson. The prosecutor also "found troubling" Mr. Robinson's statement that he had been unemployed for a year, making him "the only juror we talked to so far that did not have a legitimate basis of employment and certainly the longest period of anybody we've talked to." The prosecutor said he was further concerned by Mr. Robinson's inability to identify which university his wife attended online. He then summarized his rationale:

[T]he gentleman struck me as someone who was just not a reasonable citizen basically. He has no job, he has no idea what his wife was doing, [the prosecutor] found him credible on his allegation of child abuse, [which was] the most serious criminal act that we've really dealt with any specificity from anybody on the panel.

Defendant argued that the State's proffered reasons for the peremptory strike were pretextual. He pointed out that Mr. Robinson had described "some type of deferred prosecution," and that the State had accepted a white juror who had a previous marijuana possession charge resolved through a deferred prosecution. He also disagreed with the State's characterization of Mr. Robinson's testimony, contending that Mr. Robinson said he was employed.² Further, Defendant argued that the prosecutor's statements about Mr. Robinson's "tone of voice ... may show some racial issues."

The prosecutor acknowledged the white juror's criminal history, but asserted that "he said he felt he had been treated fairly and implicitly admitted his guilt in that crime, and [the prosecutor] didn't get kind of the same reaction from Mr. Robinson which was the distinction there." Defendant then pointed out that "Mr. Robinson stated he felt like he was treated fairly and ... you have two jurors that have some type of criminal history, it sounds like they both were deferred proceedings that were later dismissed. They both stated that they felt that they had been treated fairly." Defendant also noted that, like his case, the white juror's "criminal problems or issues actually dealt with drugs, so ... that makes it even stronger as far as our argument is concerned."

The trial court found that Defendant did not prove purposeful discrimination and overruled his Batson objection. The trial court explained from the bench that it had heard all three steps of Defendant's Batson challenge before making the following oral ruling:

THE COURT: The Court has observed the manner and appearance of counsel and jurors during voir dire and has made all relevant determinations of credibility for purposes of this order.

In making these findings of fact, the Court has made determinations as to the race of various individuals. As to the jurors, any findings of race are based upon representations during the arguments of attorneys.

....

The Court finds that as to parties, lawyers, witness's finding of race are based upon statements of counsel. The Court finds that the Defendant in this case is black.

....

[I]t appears that there was only one person of the African-American race on the jury in the jury pool to the best of the Court's determination.

The Court finds that the only potential juror in the pool that appeared to be African-American was juror number 11, Mr. Sean Robinson.

The Court finds that upon questioning juror number 11, that the prosecutor elicited that juror number 11 worked at Lydall, until he had to make other arrangements and has been out of work for a year. That his wife was in school. That she was attending school on the computer. That he did not have any idea of what school she was attending. That the prosecutor found him credible on the child-abuse allegations, but that the prosecutor was troubled concerning his employment history and the fact that he had no idea where his wife was attending school or what school she was attending. The defense is concerned because this was the only African-American or appeared to be the only African-American person in the jury pool which would effectively be a 100 percent rejection rate of African-American jurors.

....

The Court finds that the State has used a disproportionate number of preemptory challenges to strike African-American jurors in this case, and that on its face, the State's acceptance rate of potential African-American jurors indicates the likelihood of discrimination in the jury selection process. So the Defendant would've made a prima facie showing based upon the percentage.

Upon the establishment of a prima facie showing of discrimination, the Court considers the racially neutral reasons offered by the State .... The reasons offered by the State were the employment history of [Mr. Robinson] and his answers and tone of voice concerning that history. The fact that his wife was in college, that he had no idea what school she was attending, and the troubling situation with the child abuse issues, although the prosecutor found them to be credible in his answers to that.

The Defendant was offered the opportunity to rebut those reasons and indicated, again, that the 100 percent rejection rate was troubling, and that another juror had previous drug charges and that he was not excused.

The Court does find the prosecutor to be credible in stating racially neutral reasons for the exercise of the [peremptory] challenge. In response to such reasons, defense counsel has not shown that the Prosecutor's explanations are [pretextual].

Based upon consideration of the presentations made by both sides and taking into account the various arguments presented, the Defendant has not proven purposeful discrimination in the jury selection process.

Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court concludes as a matter of law that because the Defendant may have a prima facie showing in the selection process, ... and that the reasons that the prosecutor stated were racially neutral, and the Court does find the Prosecutor to be credible in those reasonings.

So taken in the totality in connection with all the findings of fact, the Court does find that he had a ... sufficient racially neutral basis for the exercise of a [peremptory] challenge[ ] as to that juror. Therefore, the objection to the State's exercise of [peremptory] challenge as to potential juror number 11, Mr. Robinson ... is overruled and the [peremptory] challenge is allowed.

Jury selection then resumed. The jury ultimately convicted Defendan...