State v. Allen

593 S.W.3d 145

STATE of Tennessee

v.Carl ALLEN a/k/a Artie Perkins

No. W2017-01118-SC-R11-CD

Supreme Court of Tennessee, AT JACKSON.

November 6, 2019 Session

FILED January 29, 2020

Monica A. Timmerman, Bartlett, Tennessee, for the appellant, Carl Allen a/k/a Artie Perkins.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; and Dianna Baker Shew, Senior Assistant Attorney General for the appellee, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation.

Cornelia A. Clark, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J., and Sharon G. Lee, Holly Kirby, and Roger A. Page, JJ., joined.

Cornelia A. Clark, J.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the criminal court had authority to grant motions filed by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") and to modify an order dismissing criminal prosecutions several years after the order became final. Carl Allen ("Mr. Allen") was indicted in November 2010 and February 2011 for violating certain reporting provisions of the Tennessee Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act ("the Registration Act") applicable to violent sexual offenders. By a written order filed on February 3, 2012, the criminal court granted Mr. Allen’s motion to dismiss the indictments based on its determination that Mr. Allen’s 1995 Florida sexual battery conviction required him to comply only with the Registration Act’s reporting provisions relating to sexual offenders and not those relating to violent sexual offenders. The State did not appeal the February 3, 2012 order; therefore, it became final thirty days after entry. Almost three years later, in December 2014, the TBI returned to the criminal court and filed a motion to intervene in the dismissed criminal cases, citing Rule 24.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and a motion for relief from the February 3, 2012 order, citing Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The TBI argued that, in expressing the basis of its decision to dismiss the indictments, the criminal court exercised civil jurisdiction by ruling on Mr. Allen’s offender classification under the Registration Act. The TBI asserted that the criminal court lacked authority to determine Mr. Allen’s offender classification and that the portion of its February 3, 2012 order doing so was void and should be vacated. The criminal court agreed with the TBI’s arguments, and by a May 3, 2017 order, partially vacated its February 3, 2012 order. Mr. Allen appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed his appeal without ruling on the merits after concluding that Mr. Allen had no right of appeal in these circumstances. State v. Allen, No. W2017-01118-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 6595352, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2018), appeal granted, (Tenn. May 24, 2019). We hold, as the TBI now concedes, that Mr. Allen had a right to appeal from the criminal court’s May 3, 2017 order that partially vacated its February 3, 2012 order. We also hold that the criminal court was not exercising civil jurisdiction in its February 3, 2012 order when it granted Mr. Allen’s motion to dismiss the criminal indictments. We further conclude that the criminal court had no authority to modify or partially vacate its February 3, 2012 order, except to correct clerical errors, oversights, or omissions in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Because the criminal court exceeded the authority Rule 36 provides, we vacate the May 3, 2017 order and confirm that the February 3, 2012 order remains intact and final.

I. Background¹

In 1994, Tennessee enacted the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act of 1994 ("the 1994 Act").² See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-101 to -108 (Supp. 1994). The 1994 Act required persons convicted of sexual offenses to register with the TBI. Id. § 40-39-103. The 1994 Act tasked the TBI with creating and distributing registration forms to local law enforcement agencies, id. § 40-39-105(a), with monitoring sexual offenders, id. § 40-39-104(a), and with maintaining Tennessee’s sexual offender registry, id. § 40-39-106. The 1994 Act applied not only to persons convicted of sexual offenses in Tennessee but also to persons convicted of sexual offenses in other jurisdictions who were present in Tennessee. Id. §§ 40-39-102(2), -103(a).

On February 15, 1995, Mr. Allen³ entered a nolo contendere plea in Pinellas County, Florida to sexual battery. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.011(1)(h) (Supp. 1994).⁴ He received a ten-year sentence but was released early and relocated to Tennessee.

By a July 11, 2001 letter, the TBI notified Mr. Allen of his statutory obligation to register in Tennessee pursuant to the 1994 Act. It is undisputed in this appeal that Mr. Allen complied and registered as the TBI instructed.

In 2004, the General Assembly replaced the 1994 Act with the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004. See Act of June 8, 2004, ch. 921, 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 2106 (now codified as Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-201 to -215 (2019)).⁵ The Registration Act divides sexual offenders into two categories—sexual offenders and violent sexual offenders. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-202(19), (30). It defines "sexual offender" as "a person who has been convicted in this state of committing a sexual offense or has another qualifying conviction." Id. § 40-39-202(19). It defines "sexual offense" by enumerating Tennessee criminal offenses and citing to the Tennessee code sections defining these offenses. Id. § 40-39-202(20). Sexual battery as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-505 is listed as a "sexual offense." Id. § 40-39-202(20)(A)(i).

The Registration Act defines the second category—violent sexual offender—as "a person who has been convicted in this state of committing a violent sexual offense or has another qualifying conviction." Id. § 40-39-202(30). It defines "violent sexual offense" by enumerating Tennessee criminal offenses and citing to the Tennessee code sections defining them. Id. § 40-39-202(31). It lists rape as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-503 as a violent sexual offense. Id. § 40-39-202(31)(B).

The Registration Act, like the 1994 Act, applies to persons, like Mr. Allen, who reside in Tennessee but who have been convicted of "an offense committed in another jurisdiction that would be classified as a sexual offense or a violent sexual offense if committed in this state." Id. §§ 40-39-202(1), 40-39-203(c). Nevertheless, the Registration Act provides little guidance on how to determine whether offenses committed in other jurisdictions are to be classified as a sexual offense or violent sexual offense for purposes of classifying such offenders as either sexual or violent sexual offenders. See Id. § 40-39-202(1) (stating only that the Registration Act applies to "a conviction ... for an offense committed in another jurisdiction ... that would be classified as a sexual offense or a violent sexual offense if committed in [Tennessee]" but providing no method of determining how the conviction would be classified in Tennessee); id. § 40-39-207(g)(2)(B)⁶ (stating in another expressly limited provision that a " ‘[p]rior conviction’ includes convictions under the laws of any other state, government or country that, if committed in this state, would constitute a sexual offense"); id. (stating that "[i]f an offense in a jurisdiction other than this [S]tate is not identified as a sexual offense in this [S]tate, it shall be considered a prior conviction if the elements of the offense are the same as the elements for a sexual offense").

Additionally, the Registration Act is not clear on which entity should undertake the task of initially classifying persons with out-of-state convictions. The Registration Act changed the 1994 Act by transferring much of the responsibility for registering and monitoring sexual offenders and violent sexual offenders from the TBI to local entities–"registering agenc[ies]"⁷ and "designated law enforcement agenc[ies]."⁸ Under the Registration Act, the TBI remains responsible for designing, printing, and distributing registration forms, id. § 40-39-205(a), maintaining the SOR—"the TBI’s centralized record system of offender registration, verification and tracking information," id. §§ 40-39-202(22), -204, -206, and serving as the "central repository for all original TBI registration forms and any other forms" required by or deemed necessary for the enforcement of the Registration Act, id. § 40-39-204(d). But the Registration Act charges "the offender’s designated registering agency, its representatives and designees, including any district attorney general’s criminal investigator" with "the duty" of verifying "the accuracy and completeness of all information contained in the offender’s SOR." Id. § 40-39-205(b).

To ensure that information in the SOR remains accurate and complete, the Registration Act requires sexual offenders to report in person once each year to their designated law enforcement agencies and update the required information, including fingerprints, palm prints, and photographs. Id. § 40-39-204(c). Violent sexual offenders must report in person to their designated law enforcement agencies four times each calendar year—in March, June, September, and December—to update this same information. Id. § 40-39-204(b)(1). "Whenever there is a factual basis to believe that an offender has not complied" with the Registration Act, "the TBI shall make the information available through the SOR to the district attorney general, designated law enforcement agencies and the probation officer, parole officer or other public officer or employee assigned responsibility for the offender’s supervised release." Id. § 40-39-206(b). Sexual offenders and violent sexual offenders who fail to register or report timely, or fail in other ways to comply with the Registration Act, may be charged with a Class E felony criminal...