State v. Anderson

931 N.W.2d 640

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Steven Jeffrey ANDERSON, Appellant.

A18-1491

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed June 17, 2019

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Kurt B. Glaser, Lexington City Attorney, Catherine A. Crane, Assistant City Attorney, Smith & Glaser, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Paul P. Sarratori, Mesenbourg & Sarratori Law Offices, P.A., Coon Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.

BRATVOLD, Judge

Appellant Steven Jeffrey Anderson challenges his judgment of conviction of second-degree driving while impaired (DWI), under Minn. Stat. § 169A.25, subd. 1(b) (2016), which required the state to prove one aggravating factor in addition to proving that Anderson refused to submit to chemical testing under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2016). Anderson argues that his DWI conviction must be overturned for two reasons. First, Anderson contends that the district court erred in denying his probable-cause challenge to the complaint because his prior license revocation does not satisfy the aggravating-factor element for second-degree DWI. He argues the relevant DWI statute requires that, to be used as an aggravating factor, his prior license revocation must be "present" at the time that the current DWI "violation was committed." Minn. Stat. § 169A.25, subd. 1(b). Second, Anderson argues that his prior license revocation was not present because his revocation was pending judicial review at the time he committed the DWI violation, therefore, his due-process rights were violated.

We conclude that Anderson’s prior license revocation was effective at the time the commissioner notified him of the revocation in October 2016, and, therefore, the prior license revocation was present at the time of his DWI offense. And because Anderson had an opportunity for judicial review of his prior license revocation before the state served him with the DWI complaint, Anderson’s due-process rights were not violated. Thus, we affirm.

FACTS

Law enforcement arrested Anderson for DWI on two separate dates in late 2016. The first arrest occurred on October 2, 2016 (2016 license revocation). About a week after the arrest, the commissioner of public safety notified Anderson that it had administratively revoked his license under Minnesota’s implied-consent law for one year. No criminal charges resulted from this arrest. Anderson timely filed a petition for judicial review of the 2016 license revocation. In April 2017, Anderson waived his right to further judicial review of the 2016 license revocation at a hearing and the district court sustained the revocation.

The second arrest occurred on Sunday, December 18, 2016 (2016 DWI). Two officers in a marked squad car were on patrol on Restwood Road in the City of Lexington when a male flagged them down and informed them that Anderson "was drunk and about to leave" a bar in the area. The male described Anderson’s car as a silver Mercedes and told the officers where the car was parked. The officers found the Mercedes, checked its license plate, and learned that its registered owner was Anderson, who had a limited license that prohibited him from driving on Sundays.

The officers parked under a streetlight outside the bar and soon observed a man exit the bar and enter the Mercedes. When the Mercedes drove past them, one of the officers noted that the front windows were "almost completely black" and he "could not see into the cabin at all." Based on his experience, the officer believed that the front windows were illegally tinted. After following the vehicle, the officer also noticed that Anderson’s rear license plate lights were "very dim." The officers activated their emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop, and the Mercedes "stop[ped] in the middle of the road" before pulling over to the shoulder.

The officers approached the Mercedes, identified Anderson, and noted that he had "bloodshot, watery" eyes and a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. The officers informed Anderson that he was violating the terms of his limited license. Anderson initially denied "drinking anything" but later admitted that he had "a few beers." The officers asked Anderson to perform field sobriety tests, which he agreed to and performed poorly. The officers then administered a preliminary breath test, but Anderson failed to provide a proper sample.

The officers arrested Anderson, transported him to the Centennial Lakes Police Department, and read him the implied-consent advisory. After making a phone call, Anderson agreed to take a breath test, but blew "around the mouthpiece" and otherwise prevented officers from obtaining a proper sample, which the officers deemed to be a refusal. Anderson’s license "was again revoked—this time for two years."

The state did not charge Anderson until August 7, 2017—about four months after he waived judicial review. The state served Anderson with a complaint that had two DWI counts: count one was for second-degree DWI (test refusal) under Minn. Stat. § 169A.25, subd. 1(b), and count two was for third-degree DWI (operating motor vehicle while impaired) under Minn. Stat. § 169A.26, subd. 1(a) (2016).¹ Each count alleged as the aggravating factor Anderson’s 2016 license revocation.

Anderson moved to dismiss counts one and two, arguing that the state lacked probable cause because there was "insufficient evidence" to prove enhancement of the offense. Anderson also contended that the state had violated his due-process rights by using the 2016 license revocation as an aggravating factor to support the 2016 DWI charges. The state opposed the motion.

After a contested omnibus hearing, the district court denied Anderson’s motion to dismiss. The state and Anderson then agreed to stipulate to evidence for a court trial, while maintaining Anderson’s not-guilty plea to preserve the pretrial issue for appellate review under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The parties agreed that the pretrial issue of whether the 2016 license revocation could be used as an aggravating factor for the 2016 DWI was dispositive of Anderson’s case.

The district court found Anderson guilty of second- and third-degree DWI. In July 2018, the district court sentenced Anderson on count one (second-degree test refusal) to 365 days in jail, with 335 days stayed for six years. No sentence was imposed on count two. Anderson appeals.²

ISSUE

Was Anderson’s 2016 license revocation "present" at the time he committed the 2016 DWI and, therefore, sufficient to sustain his conviction for second-degree DWI?

ANALYSIS

I. Anderson’s 2016 license revocation was "present" as an aggravating factor at the time he committed the 2016 DWI.

At the outset, we clarify the issue on appeal. Anderson frames his argument as a challenge to the district court’s pretrial ruling on probable cause based on the language of the DWI statute. A conviction of second-degree DWI requires the state to prove that a defendant refused to submit to a chemical test and that "one aggravating factor was present when the violation was committed." Minn. Stat. § 169A.25, subd. 1(b). The district court denied Anderson’s probable-cause challenge and framed the issue as "whether the revocation needs to be reviewed at the time of the offense to be used as an aggravating factor or whether the State has authority to delay charging and wait[ ] until there is a qualified impaired driving record." We agree with the district court’s framing of the issue because Anderson disputes whether his 2016 license revocation was "present" when he committed his 2016 DWI.³ When a district court dismisses a probable-cause challenge based on its assessment of the elements of an offense, statutory construction, or another legal issue, this raises a question of law for appeal. See State v. Tice , 686 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004).

Anderson makes two arguments. First, he contends that a prior license revocation must be judicially reviewed, or the driver have the opportunity for such review, before it is "present" as an aggravating factor for any subsequent DWI. Second, he asserts that the state violated his due-process rights when it used the 2016 license revocation as an aggravating factor.

We address each of Anderson’s arguments in turn.

A. A prior license revocation is "present" as an aggravating factor to enhance a subsequent DWI offense after a driver receives notice of the prior license revocation.

Applying a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Lopez , 778 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Minn. 2010). This court also reviews matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Id. When interpreting statutes, this court’s role is to "ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." State v. Rogers , 925 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018) ). The first step in ascertaining the legislature’s intent is to "determine whether the statutory language is ambiguous." Id. "A statute is ambiguous when it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." Id. (quotation omitted). If a statute is unambiguous, this court will "enforce the plain meaning of the statute and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law." Dupey v. State , 868 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 2015).

To determine whether Anderson’s 2016 license revocation was present as an aggravating factor when the 2016 DWI was committed, we consider when a license revocation is effective. Chapter 169A provides that a license revocation "becomes effective at the time the commissioner or a peace officer acting on behalf of the commissioner notifies the person of the intention to revoke ... and of revocation." Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 6 (2018). A person who receives a notice of license revocation may petition for judicial review "[w]ithin 60 days" of receiving notice. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2(a) (2018). But ...