State v. Anthony V.

321 A.3d 403

227 Conn.App. 281

STATE of Connecticut

v.ANTHONY V.^*

(AC 45621)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 11, 2024

Officially Released August 13, 2024

Denis J. O’Malley III, assistant public defender, with whom was Kevin Semataska, deputy assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Danielle Koch, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney, and Lisa D’Angelo and Adrienne Russo, assistant state’s attorneys, for the appellee (state).

Clark, Seeley and Palmer, Js.

PALMER, J.

₂₈₃The defendant, Anthony V., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-55a¹ and 53a-55 (a) (3).² The defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the court’s failure to instruct the jury on general intent constituted plain error. Although we disagree with the defendant’s claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we agree with his claim of instructional error under the plain error doctrine. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Shortly before midnight on Saturday, October 17, 2020, New Haven police officers responded to a call reporting that an individual had been shot in a local apartment. When the police arrived at the apartment, they discovered the defendant, who resided there, in a small bathroom,³ with blood all over the floor, performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on the victim. The victim, who resided with the defendant and planned to marry him, had suffered a ₂₈₄gunshot wound to the head and was pronounced dead at the scene by medical personnel. A handgun belonging to the defendant was found on the bathroom floor and seized by the police.

The defendant consented to three police interviews, all of which were videotaped and, along with the interview transcripts, admitted as full exhibits at trial. In his interview statements,⁴ the defendant consistently maintained that the victim’s death was the result of a tragic accident. More specifically, the defendant stated that, just before bedtime, the victim was using the toilet in the bathroom adjacent to the couple’s bedroom, with the door open, when the defendant decided to wipe down the loaded revolver that he kept in a box in the bedroom and cleaned off periodically to remove any accumulated dust and oil. Aware that there were napkins in the bathroom that he could use to do so—the couple had run out of toilet paper—the defendant, loaded revolver in hand, walked toward the bathroom to retrieve a napkin. While approaching the bathroom, his eyes were focused on the revolver, which he was trying, unsuccessfully, to render safe by disabling its discharge mechanism.⁵ As he started to enter the bathroom, he tripped on the doorjamb and fell forward, toward the victim, who was seated on the toilet only a few feet away. Although still in possession of the revolver as he fell, the defendant could not control it, and the barrel of the gun inadvertently struck the side of the victim’s head, and the gun accidentally discharged, killing the victim.

At trial, the state advanced a markedly different theory with respect to the events leading up to the victim’s ₂₈₅death. Although the state did not claim that the defendant intended to shoot the victim, the prosecutor asserted in closing argument that the evidence established that the defendant entered the bathroom with the loaded revolver and intentionally pressed the muzzle of the revolver forcefully against the victim’s head, just behind her left ear. According to the prosecutor, the defendant’s conduct in placing the revolver to the victim’s head likely was the result of "another one of [the] alcohol and drug fueled arguments" between the defendant and the victim. The prosecutor further argued that the defendant’s reckless conduct evinced his extreme indifference to the victim’s life by subjecting her to a grave risk of death and thereby causing her death when he unintentionally pulled the trigger and discharged the revolver.⁶

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years, execution suspended after eighteen years, followed by three years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

[1, 2] The defendant first claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm because the evidence does not support the state’s theory that he intentionally placed the loaded revolver against the victim’s head.⁷ The defendant contends, instead, that ₂₈₆the evidence demonstrates that the "cause of the gun coming up against [the victim’s] head was not a volitional act" by the defendant but, rather, "a tragic, calamitous accident." We are not persuaded.⁸

[3] We first set forth the well established legal principles that govern our consideration of the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. "In reviewing ₂₈₇the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. …

[4, 5] "In particular, before this court may overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, it must conclude that no reasonable jury could arrive at the conclusion the jury did. … Although the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense … each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. …

[6] "If it is reasonable and logical for the [jury] to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the [jury] is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in ₂₈₈determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Waters, 214 Conn. App. 294, 301–302, 280 A.3d 601, cert denied, 345 Conn. 914, 284 A.3d 25 (2022).

[7–10] "Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. … It is not one fact … but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. … In evaluating evidence, the [jury] is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. … The [jury] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence [that] it deems to be reasonable and logical. …

[11–13] "Additionally, given the nature of this appeal, it is important to underscore that there is a fine line between the making of reasonable inferences and engaging in speculation—the jury is allowed to do the former. … However, [t]he line between permissible inference and impermissible speculation is not always easy to discern. When we infer, we derive a con- clusion from proven facts because such considerations as experience, or history, or science have demonstrated that there is a likely correlation between those facts and the conclusion. If that correlation is sufficiently compelling, the inference is reasonable. But if the correlation between the facts and the conclusion is slight, or if a different conclusion is more closely correlated with the facts than the chosen conclusion, the inference is less reasonable. At some point, the link between the facts and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it speculation. When that point is reached is, frankly, a matter of judgment.…

[14, 15] ₂₈₉[P]roof of a material fact by inference from circumstantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact. … Thus, in determining whether the evidence supports a particular inference, we ask whether that inference is so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. … In other words, an inference need not be compelled by the evidence; rather, the evidence need only be reasonably susceptible of such an inference." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Richards, 196 Conn. App. 387, 396–97, 229 A.3d 1157 (2020), aff'd, 339 Conn. 628, 261 A.3d 1165, cert. denied, — U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 431, 211 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2021).

[16, 17] Finally, "proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt … nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. … On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury’s] verdict of guilty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kenneth B., 223 Conn. App. 270, 274, 308 A3d 82, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 952, 308 A.3d 1038 (2024).

[18] Of course, the elements of the offense of which...