State v. Archuleta

536 P.3d 528

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Carolyn ARCHULETA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. A-1-CA-40466

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: July 19, 2023

Certiorari Denied, September 27, 2023, No. S-1-SC-40059

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General, Emily C. Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee

MEDINA, Judge.

{1} The State appeals the district court's order dismissing the charges against Defendant Carolyn Archuleta without prejudice after finding Defendant was incompetent to proceed to trial but not dangerous under the New Mexico Mental Illness Code (NMMIC), NMSA 1978, Section 31-9-1.2(B) (1999) and Rule 5-602.2(D) NMRA. The State argues that the district court erred when determining that the New Mexico Rules of Evidence applied to the dangerousness hearing and excluded the State's evidence of other criminal complaints to establish dangerousness. Unpersuaded, we hold that the district court correctly held that the New Mexico Rules of Evidence apply to dangerousness hearings under Section 31-9-1.2 and Rule 5-602.2. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} A criminal information charged Defendant with battery upon a peace officer, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-24 (1971), and assault upon a peace officer, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-21(A)(1) (1971). Defendant was released under the condition that she report to pretrial services. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with another count of battery upon a peace officer. The State moved to revoke Defendant's conditions of release based on the new charge and Defendant's failure to comply with pretrial services in the present case. The district court denied the motion, but did amend Defendant's conditions of release. Pretrial services later requested a noncompliance hearing. Defendant moved for a competency evaluation to determine if she was competent to stand trial. The district court granted the motion, ordered a competency evaluation and revoked Defendant's conditions of release. The district court later released Defendant to the custody of her son pending the results of the competency evaluation.

{3} Upon completion and receipt of Defendant's competency evaluation, and with the State and Defendant's stipulation, the district court accepted the results finding Defendant incompetent to proceed.

{4} Under the NMMIC, after a finding of incompetency, the district court may dismiss the case without prejudice if it "does not find that the defendant is dangerous." Section 31-9-1.2(A). "[D]angerous means that, if released, the defendant presents a serious threat of inflicting great bodily harm on another or violating [NMSA 1978,] Section 30-9-11 [(2009) (criminal sexual penetration)] or [ NMSA 1978, Section] 30-9-13 [(2003) (criminal sexual contact of a minor)]." Section 31-9-1.2 (D). However, if a defendant is found to be both incompetent and dangerous, the defendant may be involuntarily committed pending further proceedings. See § 31-9-1.2(B). The procedure for a dangerousness hearing and following proceedings are outlined in Rule 5-602.2—proceedings after a finding of incompetency. See Rule 5-602.2(D), (F).

{5} The State filed a notice of intent to raise dangerousness and filed a witness list for the dangerousness hearing. The first dangerousness hearing was vacated and rescheduled in order to provide Defendant additional time to conduct pretrial interviews. During this time, Defendant was charged in a third case with two counts of indecent exposure, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-14.3(A)(1) (1996) ; and two counts of assault, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-3-1(A) (1963).

{6} At the dangerousness hearing, the State attempted to introduce into evidence copies of Defendant's three criminal complaints and a printout of Defendant's criminal history. The State also notified the district court that it would not be calling witnesses to testify. Defendant objected to the use of the State's exhibits, pointing out that the criminal complaints consisted of hearsay statements from officers that incorporated the hearsay statements of witnesses not present to testify in court. According to Defendant, the complaints constituted hearsay with no foundation in sworn testimony, and therefore introducing the criminal complaints into evidence violated the New Mexico Rules of Evidence. See Rule 11-802 NMRA (stating that hearsay is not admissible except as provided by a rule or statute). The State argued that the Rules of Evidence did not apply to competency or dangerousness hearings because a dangerousness hearing is a preliminary determination to involuntary commitment. Because the Rules of Evidence do not apply to some other preliminary determinations, the State argued, the Rules of Evidence should not apply at a dangerousness hearing.

{7} The district court agreed with Defendant, finding that the "New Mexico Rules of Evidence apply to all criminal proceedings under Rule 11-1101(B) NMRA." The district court relied as well on the statement in NMSA 1978, Section 31-9-1.5(A) (1999), which allows the admission of hearsay evidence solely on "secondary matters to establish chain of custody, district court records, and business records," to conclude that "the rules of evidence apply in dangerousness hearings." The district court also found that, because a dangerousness finding could result in confinement for "the maximum jurisdiction of the charges," the finding of dangerousness requires greater due process protections for the defendant than are permissible in other proceedings. The district court therefore excluded the State's proposed evidence. Because the State did not produce any other evidence or call any witnesses, and none of the crimes Defendant was charged with committing involved great bodily harm or criminal sexual penetration or contact, the district court found the State failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant was dangerous and dismissed the matter without prejudice pursuant to Section 31-9-1.2(A). This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

{8} The State's appeal raises an issue of first impression, requiring that we determine whether the Rules of Evidence apply to a dangerousness hearing under Section 31-9-1.2 and Rule 5-602.2. This appeal presents questions of statutory and rule interpretation, which we review de novo. See State v. Stephen F. , 2006-NMSC-030, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 24, 139 P.3d 184 ; State v. Warford , 2022-NMCA-034, ¶ 21, 514 P.3d 31.

{9} "Our primary goal when interpreting statutory language is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Warford , 2022-NMCA-034, ¶ 22, 514 P.3d 31 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). "The plain language of the statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent, so we look first to the words the Legislature used and their ordinary meaning." State v. Gutierrez , 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 30, 142 N.M. 1, 162 P.3d 156. "Under the plain meaning rule, when a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." State v. Hubble , 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In applying the plain meaning rule, we additionally consider the "context surrounding a particular statute, such as its history, its apparent object, and other [related] statutes." State v. Cleve , 1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 8, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. "Finally, in giving effect to the plain meaning of the rule, we take care to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result." State v. Ayon , 2022-NMCA-003, ¶ 7, 503 P.3d 405, cert. granted (S-1-SC-38937, Jan. 11, 2022). "In interpreting procedural rules, we apply the same canons of construction as applied to statutes and, therefore, interpret the rules in accordance with their plain meaning" to determine the intent of our Supreme Court. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{10} We begin with the language of the Rules of Evidence. Rule 11-1101(A)-(B) states that the Rules of Evidence apply in all "criminal cases and proceedings" before the district court. However, Rule 11-1101(D) specifies it does not apply to the following:

(1) the court's determination, under Rule 11-104(A) NMRA, on a preliminary question of fact governing admissibility;

(2) grand jury proceedings, and

(3) miscellaneous proceedings, such as

(a) extradition or rendition,

(b) issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant,

(c) sentencing by the court without a jury,

(d) granting or revoking probation or supervised release,

(e) considering whether to release on bail or otherwise,

(f) dispositional hearings in children's court proceedings, and

(g) the following abuse and neglect proceedings:

(i) issuing an ex parte custody order;

(ii) custody hearings;

(iii) permanency hearings; and

(iv) judicial review proceedings.

{11} There is no dispute that a competency and dangerousness hearing is a criminal proceeding under Section 31-9-1.2. See State v. Rotherham , 1996-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 15-17, 122 N.M. 246, 923 P.2d 1131 (describing the competency and commitment process under the NMMIC as a criminal commitment in contrast to the state's ability to bring civil commitment proceedings if the state fails to prove its case under the NMMIC); State v. Webb , 1990-NMCA-077, ¶ 6, 111 N.M. 78, 801 P.2d 660 (stating that a determination of competency and dangerousness that results from a criminal complaint is a criminal matter). As such, under the plain language of Rule 11-1101(B), the Rules of Evidence apply unless a dangerousness hearing falls into one of the listed exceptions. See Rule 11-101 NMRA ("These rules govern proceedings in the courts of the State of New Mexico, to the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 11-1101.").

{12} The plain language of the exceptions listed in Rule 11-1101(D) do not include a dangerousness hearing...