State v. Armstrong

312 A.3d 545

2024 VT 5

STATE of Vermont

v.Michael A. ARMSTRONG

No. 23-AP-050

Supreme Court of Vermont.

October Term, 2023

February 16, 2024

On Appeal from Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, Katherine A. Hayes, J.

David W. Gartenstein, Windham County Deputy State’s Attorney, Brattleboro, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sara Kagle, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Springfield, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Cohen and Waples, JJ., and Morrissey, Supr. J., Specially Assigned

REIBER, C.J.

¶ 1. The State of Vermont appeals the superior court’s dismissal of charges against defendant Michael Armstrong on speedy-trial grounds. It has been more than nineteen years since the charges against defendant were first brought and more than fifteen years since defendant was adjudicated incompetent to stand trial. The trial court dismissed the charges, finding that the State had failed in its obligation to reevaluate defendant’s competency, thereby violating defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Because we conclude that the sole reason for delay—defendant’s incompetency—is not attributable to the State, and because of the Legislature’s mandate precluding a trial while incompetent under 13 V.S.A. § 4817(b), we reverse and remand.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2. The trial court made the following findings. Defendant was initially charged on February 26, 2004, with four felonies—two counts of aggravated sexual assault under 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(8), one count of aggravated sexual assault under 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(9), and one count of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under 13 V.S.A. § 2602. The aggravated sexual assault charges carry a mandatory-minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum of life imprisonment. 13 V.S.A. § 3253(b). With the charges pending, defendant was released to the custody of his mother after approximately two weeks in jail.

¶ 3. Over the following three years, the case proceeded toward trial in a manner that the trial court described as "longer than ideal, [but] within normal parameters given the seriousness of the charges." Initial proceedings centered on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of statements made to police, which was ultimately denied in February 2006. Defendant then moved to extend the discovery period to conduct depositions of the complaining witness and a doctor. In August 2006, defendant’s first attorney moved to withdraw from the case. The court subsequently granted two extensions until January 2007 to accommodate new defense counsel. In February 2007, both parties agreed to continue the trial until May to complete depositions. At no time was an issue regarding defendant’s competency raised.

¶ 4. In May 2007, as the parties were selecting a jury for the case, defense counsel for the first time moved the court for an evaluation of defendant’s competency. The court granted the motion and held competency hearings over the next several months. On April 24, 2008, the court issued an order finding defendant incompetent to stand trial, concluding that due to "defects in the defendant’s ability to understand abstract concepts and to engage in complex reasoning … he cannot consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding."

¶ 5. The court then scheduled commitment hearings, and in January 2009, issued an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that defendant had committed the charged offenses and was a danger to others. Pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 4823, the court placed defendant indefinitely in the custody of the Commissioner of Disabilities, Aging, and Independent Living (DAIL). On appeal, this Court affirmed the commitment order over arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that there was insufficient evidence to find defendant posed a danger to others. See In re M.A., 2011 VT 9, 189 Vt. 354, 22 A.3d 410.

¶ 6. Following this Court’s denial of his appeal, defendant spent the next three years—from March 2011 to June 2014—in DAIL custody, with no action on his case. Defendant’s attorney passed away in November 2012, leaving defendant unrepresented.

¶ 7. In June 2014, the court on its own motion scheduled a status conference, where it ordered briefing on whether the case should be dismissed. The court appointed new counsel for defendant, and on the court’s suggestion, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that there was no evidence that he was "not still currently and indefinitely incompetent" and noting that it had been more than ten years since his arraignment. The State filed an opposition, arguing that defendant’s placement with DAIL was subject to annual review and might therefore come to an end, enabling the State to bring the case to trial. After a hearing, at which defendant’s psychotherapist testified that in DAIL custody defendant would still be receiving twenty-four-hour supervision for an indefinite period, the court ordered supplemental briefing. However, for reasons not stated in the record, neither party filed any additional memoranda, and the court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss.

¶ 8. There followed no action in the case for more than six years. In November 2021, Vermont Legal Aid entered an appearance on behalf of defendant and filed a new motion to dismiss. In the motion, defendant requested dismissal pursuant to Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b)(2), arguing that continued prosecution violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and denied due process and equal protection rights recognized in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972). The court denied the motion without prejudice and ordered a new competency evaluation. The competency evaluation was completed in June 2022 and found that defendant was competent to stand trial. But the court concluded that the evaluation was legally insufficient because it was conducted by a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist, as mandated by the then-current version of 13 V.S.A. § 4814.¹ The court ordered the Department of Mental Health (DMH) to conduct an evaluation by a psychiatrist, but due to internal delays, no evaluation occurred. On August 22, 2022, defendant brought a third motion to dismiss, arguing that the delayed prosecution violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

[1] ¶ 9. In its ruling on the third motion, the trial court recognized the test for speedy-trial claims as set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which requires courts to balance four factors: the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. To trigger the four-factor test, a defendant must first show that the length of delay is sufficient to qualify as "presumptively prejudicial." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992).

¶ 10. Applying the Barker test, the court first found that the length of delay was "extraordinary, even egregious," and was more than sufficient to trigger the four-factor analysis. Next, the court found that although some periods of delay were neutral or attributable to defendant, there were at least ten years of delay that were solely the fault of the State. The State, it said, had an obligation to move the case toward trial by reevaluating defendant’s competency and failed to do so. Third, the court found that defendant had sufficiently asserted his right to a speedy trial by filing motions to dismiss in 2014, 2021, and 2022. Finally, the court found that defendant had suffered actual prejudice from the death of counsel in 2012 and presumptive prejudice due to the extraordinary length of delay. Weighing the four factors, the court concluded that the State violated defendant’s right to a speedy trial and dismissed the charges. The State appealed.

II. Speedy-Trial Analysis

[2] ¶ 11. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The court and both parties correctly recognize that we evaluate speedy-trial claims under the four-factor balancing test set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. See State v. Young, 2023 VT 10, ¶ 9, 217 Vt. —292 A.3d 689 (applying test). These factors must be considered along with the relevant circumstances of the case, and no factor by itself is "necessary or sufficient to find a deprivation of the speedy trial right." State v. Lafaso, 2021 VT 4, ¶ 11, 214 Vt. 123, 251 A.3d 935.

[3] ¶ 12. Because speedy-trial claims involve both factual and legal determinations, we apply "a mixed standard of review." State v. Reynolds, 2014 VT 16, ¶ 9, 196 Vt. 113, 95 A.3d 973. "As the trial court is in the best position to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, we use a clearly erroneous standard to review underlying facts found by the court." State v. Burke, 2012 VT 50, ¶ 14, 192 Vt. 99, 54 A.3d 500. However, the "ultimate legal question" of whether the trial court’s findings and the underlying facts demonstrate a violation of the right to a speedy trial is reviewed de novo. State v. Brillon, 2008 VT 35, ¶ 14, 183 Vt. 475, 955 A.2d 1108, rev’d on other grounds by Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (2009).

A. Length of Delay

[4–6] ¶ 13. The first factor, the length of delay, is "actually a double enquiry." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Defendants must first show that the "interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay." Id. at 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (quotation omitted). If this showing is made, then courts must consider "as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim." Id. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686. The permissible length of delay is...