State v. Arreola-Varela

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIO ARREOLA-VARELA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-38215

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

June 7, 2021

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

Daylene A. Marsh, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

B. Douglas Wood III, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

Steven Forsberg, Assistant Appellate Defender

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

B. ZAMORA, Judge.

{1} Defendant Mario Arreola-Varela broke into his estranged wife's home, in direct violation of a restraining order, resulting in a conviction of breaking and entering, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-14-8(A) (1981). On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence related to the restraining order, denying his request for a continuance of the trial, and denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} Mayra Ortega-Mustas and her friend Mario Marias-Cano, were at a nightclub, when Defendant, Mayra's husband, entered the club and walked towards Mayra. An argument ensued between Mayra and Defendant, prompting the club's staff to escort Defendant out of the establishment. Later that night, Mario and Mayra drove back to Mayra's home and were conversing in the living room, when they heard a noise coming from the back door. Startled, Mayra ran towards the back door and saw Defendant attempting to enter the home. However, because the steps were missing from the back door entrance, and because Defendant may have been intoxicated, he was unable to enter. A few moments later, Mario heard a noise that sounded as if someone kicked the front door and then saw Defendant enter the home through the front door. According to Mario, Defendant moved "towards the bedroom" while brandishing a knife and threatening to harm Mario. In response to this threat, Mario punched Defendant in the face, causing Defendant to drop the knife.

{3} In response to this incident, the police were dispatched to Mayra's home and Sheriff's Deputy Nikki Large was the first officer to arrive. Upon arrival, she observed that Defendant appeared "highly intoxicated" and was "bleeding from his face and his hand." Deputy Large observed the "doorframe had been broken near the locking mechanism" and saw pieces of the doorframe near the entryway. Deputy Large observed Defendant speaking to another officer and testified that Defendant nodded affirmatively when asked if he had broken the door.

{4} On the date of this incident, there was an active restraining order in place prohibiting Defendant from going within "25 yards" of Mayra as well as within "100 yards" of her home. The State charged Defendant with breaking and entering, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and violation of a restraining order prohibiting domestic violence. Prior to trial, the State dismissed Defendant's charge of violating a restraining order prohibiting domestic violence. A jury convicted Defendant of breaking and entering and acquitted him of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Admission of Restraining Order

{5} Defendant argues the district court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence a temporary restraining order, which preceded entry of an active permanent restraining order (PRO), and exhibits related thereto (collectively, the exhibits).¹ He argues the exhibits were inadmissible because (1) they were improper character evidence under Rule 11-404(B) NMRA, and the Petition contained allegations of domestic abuse that were more prejudicial than probative under Rule 11-403 NMRA, (2) the allegations contained in the exhibits were inadmissible hearsay, and (3) admissionof the exhibits violated Defendant's right to confrontation. We address each argument in turn.

A. Rule 11-404(B) and Rule 11-403

{6} Defendant contends that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the exhibits under Rule 11-404(B)(2) because the exhibits had no "alternative purpose other than to show [Defendant's] propensity to act violently" and because the Petition, which contained allegations of domestic abuse, was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 11-403. We disagree.

{7} "As a general rule, the admission of evidence is entrusted to the discretion of the district court, and rulings of the district judge will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMCA-088, ¶ 17, 150 N.M. 505, 263 P.3d 282 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court's ruling is "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case." State v. Woodward, 1995-NMSC-074, ¶ 6, 121 N.M. 1, 908 P.2d 231 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by State v. Montoya, 2014-NMSC-032, 333 P.3d 935. An abuse of discretion will only be reversible error if "the error was prejudicial rather than harmless." State v. Jett, 1991-NMSC-011, ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 309, 805 P.2d 78 (citation omitted).

{8} Generally, character evidence, which includes evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts, is inadmissible to prove a defendant acted in accordance with those acts. Rule 11-404(A)(1), (B)(1). However, this evidence "may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Rule 11-404(B)(2). Evidence probative of a material element at issue is also admissible under Rule 11-404(B). See Gutierrez, 2011-NMCA-088, ¶ 18. For instance, this Court has previously held that a district court properly admitted restraining order evidence, under Rule 11-404(B), when it was relevant to a material element of a criminal offense. See Gutierrez, 2011-NMCA-088 ¶ 21. In Gutierrez, we concluded that admission of a restraining order was relevant to a material element of the aggravated stalking statute when the defendant violated the restraining order in his encounter with the victim. See id.

{9} In this case, to convict Defendant of breaking and entering, the State needed to prove, in relevant part, an "unauthorized entry of any . . . dwelling[.]" Section 30-14-8(A). Here, as in Gutierrez, the State sought to admit the TRO to show Defendant knew that he was prohibited from having contact with Mayra and, therefore, unauthorized to enter her home. 2011-NMCA-088 ¶ 21. As in Gutierrez, we conclude the TRO is relevant to a material element of the criminal offense with which Defendant was charged. The fact that Defendant was prohibited from having contact with Mayra and prohibited from being within 100 yards of her home is probative of Defendant's knowledge that his entry was "unauthorized." See id.{10} Nevertheless, Defendant argues the PRO was irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 11-404(B)(2) because he was not properly served with the PRO, which was entered as a default order since he was absent from the hearing at the time the order was issued. Defendant argues he lacked knowledge and/or notice of the PRO and the provisions contained therein and accordingly contends it has no probative value. Defendant's argument is unavailing. The State produced a return of service signed by Defendant showing that he was served with the TRO and order to appear. The TRO explicitly notified Defendant of the date, time, and location of the hearing scheduled to determine whether the PRO would be issued against him. The TRO advised Defendant of the consequences should he fail to appear for the scheduled hearing, stating, "an extended order may be entered by default against [Defendant] and a bench warrant may be issued for [Defendant's] arrest." Defendant failed to appear for the hearing following the entry of the TRO, resulting in the district court's issuance of the PRO by default. Because Defendant had notice that the district court could extend the no contact provisions beyond the original time listed in the TRO, and because the provisions of the TRO put Defendant on notice that he was prohibited from contacting Mayra, the TRO was relevant to Defendant's knowledge that he was prohibited from entering Mayra's home. Any arguments to the contrary go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, and ultimately, it is the function of the jury to weigh the evidence. See State v. Martin, 1984-NMSC-077, ¶ 25, 101 N.M. 595, 686 P.2d 937. Accordingly, there was a legitimate, non-character purpose for the admission of the exhibits under Rule 11-404(B), and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such evidence.

{11} We next address Defendant's argument that the allegations of domestic abuse set forth in the Petition were more prejudicial than probative under Rule 11-403 and should not have been admitted into evidence. Defendant's argument under Rule 11-403 is only developed with respect to the allegations of domestic abuse set forth in the Petition. We therefore confine our analysis accordingly.

{12} Under Rule 11-403 a court "may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice[.]" Assuming without deciding that the allegations of domestic abuse in the Petition were inadmissible under Rule 11-403, we nonetheless conclude that any error that resulted was harmless. In determining the "likely effect of the error, courts should evaluate all of the circumstances surrounding the error. This requires an examination of the error itself, which depending...