State v. Ashcraft

338 P.3d 247

2014 UT App 253

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.Chastity B. ASHCRAFT, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20130818–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Oct. 23, 2014.

Samuel P. Newton, Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes and Daniel W. Boyer, for Appellee.

Senior Judge PAMELA T. GREENWOOD authored this Memorandum Decision, in which Judges JAMES Z. DAVIS and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.¹

Memorandum Decision

GREENWOOD, Senior Judge:

¶ 1 Chastity B. Ashcraft appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after she pleaded guilty to one count of child abuse, a third degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–109(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2012). Ashcraft argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her to prison rather than probation. We affirm.

¶ 2 The State charged Ashcraft with child abuse based on allegations that her twenty-three month old son (Child) suffered brain injuries while under Ashcraft's custody and control. Although Ashcraft claimed that Child injured himself when he had a tantrum and threw himself from a standing position onto a carpeted floor, Ashcraft eventually pleaded guilty as charged.² In exchange for her plea, the State agreed to recommend reducing the degree of Ashcraft's conviction upon her successful completion of probation pursuant to Utah Code section 76–3–402(2). See id. § 76–3402(2) (providing a sentencing court discretion to reduce the degree of a conviction to the next lower degree after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation). The prosecutor indicated at the subsequent change of plea hearing that the offer was that the prosecution would “submit at sentencing,” i.e., stay silent. At the sentencing hearing, however, Ashcraft's counsel stated that she believed that only the section 402(2) recommendation was in the plea agreement. The prosecutor responded that “in making an agreement ... to not oppose a 4022 reduction, we are not also, unless we specifically put it [into] the agreement, recommending against prison” but that “we're not going so far as to recommend any sentence to the Court.” On the other hand, Ashcraft's counsel urged the court to grant probation and argued that, among other things, Ashcraft had been punished enough because her children had been removed from her custody. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Ashcraft to zero to five years in prison. Ashcraft appeals.

¶ 3 Ashcraft argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion in sentencing her to prison rather than granting her probation. “We review the trial court's imposition of sentence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Wimberly, 2013 UT App 160, ¶ 6, 305 P.3d 1072 ; see also State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 59, 191 P.3d 17 (“In general, a trial court's sentencing decision will not be overturned unless it exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally relevant factors, or the actions of the judge are so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). A trial court abuses its discretion “if the sentence is clearly excessive” or “if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.” State v. Moreau, 2011 UT App 109, ¶ 6, 255 P.3d 689 (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 4 On appeal, Ashcraft contends that in sentencing her to prison, the trial court failed to properly weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances existing in her case. In particular, Ashcraft first argues that the trial court based its decision to impose a prison sentence on a disputed scientific interpretation of evidence that Ashcraft “caused [Child's] injuries from a violent Shaken Baby Syndrome Attack.” Ashcraft further contends that the trial court mistakenly relied on shaken baby syndrome in its assessment of two aggravating factors, namely, the severity of the injury to Child and Ashcraft's failure to accept responsibility for the harm caused. Second, Ashcraft argues that the trial court failed to consider as a mitigating factor the impact that incarceration would have on Ashcraft's children.

¶ 5 “A defendant is not entitled to probation, but rather the [trial] court is empowered to place the defendant on probation if it thinks that will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the public interest.” State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, ¶ 23, 82 P.3d 1167 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a sentencing decision, we afford the trial court “wide latitude and discretion ..., recognizing that [it is] best situated to weigh the many intangibles of character, personality and attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling.” Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 58, 191 P.3d 17 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Consequently, the decision of whether to grant probation must of necessity rest within the discretion of the judge who hears the case.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Although courts must consider all legally relevant factors in making a sentencing decision, not all aggravating and mitigating factors are equally important, and [o]ne factor in mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale.” Id. ¶ 59 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, several mitigating circumstances claimed by a defendant may be outweighed by a few egregious aggravating factors.” Id.

¶ 6 In this case, the trial court considered the information provided at the sentencing hearing and in Adult Probation and Parole's (AP & P) presentence investigation report (PSI) before sentencing Ashcraft to prison.³ In explaining its decision, the trial court indicated that Ashcraft was “very abusive to [Child],” whose young age made him “very vulnerable.” The trial court further indicated that Child “still suffers from equilibrium problems and is being fitted for a helmet to protect his skull.” The trial court also explained that it would not grant probation to Ashcraft because she had not admitted that what she had done was wrong and because probation “is for people who admit their guilt, acknowledge the enormity of what they have done and want to be helped.” Based on these findings, the trial court sentenced Ashcraft to prison.

¶ 7 Ashcraft argues nonetheless that the trial court's assessment of aggravating factors improperly assumed that Child's symptoms indicated the presence of shaken baby syndrome because there is disagreement in the medical community about whether the syndrome is “a valid scientific diagnosis.” In making this argument, Ashcraft also suggests that she did not actually cause Child's injuries. However, Ashcraft places more significance on the trial court's brief reference to shaken baby syndrome than is warranted.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court requested and was provided with information about Child's current condition. The trial court then stated, “Frankly these symptoms are consistent with Shaken Baby's Syndrome or ... slamming the child's head on a very hard surface. This explanation about the baby falling on a ... carpeted floor is absurd.” When read in context, the trial court simply appears to have referred to shaken baby syndrome in order to explain that it was not convinced by Ashcraft's claim that Child caused his own injuries by throwing himself on the carpet. The trial court's statement that Child's symptoms are “consistent with” shaken baby syndrome or bashing Child's head against a hard surface seems to acknowledge the trial court's assessment that Child's injuries were not self-inflicted and that Ashcraft was responsible for causing those injuries.

¶ 8 Notably,...