State v. Avoletta

347 Conn. 629

298 A.3d 1211

STATE of Connecticut

v.Matthew AVOLETTA et al.

SC 20723

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 15, 2023

Officially Released August 22, 2023

Deborah G. Stevenson, for the appellants (defendants).

Michael K. Skold, deputy solicitor general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

ROBINSON, C. J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether No. 17-4, § 1, of the 2017 Special Acts (S.A. 17-4)¹ is an unconstitutional public emolument in violation of article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution.²

The defendants, Joanne Avoletta, Peter Avoletta, and Matthew Avoletta, appeal, upon our grant of their petition for certification,³ from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the state of Connecticut. See State v. Avoletta , 212 Conn. App. 309, 312, 339, 275 A.3d 716 (2022). On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that S.A. 17-4, pursuant to which the General Assembly extended the time limitation under General Statutes § 4-148⁴ for the defendants to bring their claim against the state for injuries arising from poor indoor air quality at certain public schools, constitutes an unconstitutional public emolument because it does not serve a legitimate public purpose. We disagree with the defendants and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history, much of which is aptly set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court.⁵ In May, 2007, "the defendants filed a claim with the [Claims] [C]ommissioner [commissioner], alleging that the state [had] failed to maintain the Torrington public schools in a safe and sanitary condition (2007 claim). Specifically, the defendants alleged that the middle and high school buildings contained water leaks, bacteria, mold, dampness, and poor indoor air quality, which caused and exacerbated Peter Avoletta's and Matthew Avoletta's respiratory diseases and conditions. As a result of the poor building conditions, Joanne Avoletta enrolled Peter Avoletta and Matthew Avoletta in private schools and filed a claim with the commissioner seeking reimbursement from the state for the tuition and costs of their private education. Because the defendants’ claim was not timely filed within the one year statute of limitations set forth in ... § 4-148 (a), the commissioner dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Avoletta , supra, 212 Conn. App. at 313, 275 A.3d 716.

"The defendants subsequently sought legislative review of the commissioner's decision pursuant to § 4-148 (b). In response, the General Assembly passed Substitute House Joint Resolution No. 11-34⁶ (joint resolution), which vacated the commissioner's ruling and authorized the defendants to file a damages claim against the state in the Superior Court. Pursuant to the joint resolution, the defendants commenced an action against the state [in May, 2012]. See Avoletta v. State , Docket No. HHD-CV-12-5036221-S, 2013 WL 2350751 (Conn. Super. May 6, 2013) .... The state subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. ...

"The [trial] court, Sheridan, J. , granted the state's motion to dismiss on the ground that the joint resolution was an unconstitutional public emolument [that violated] article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution. ... The court found that the defendants’ claim was untimely, noting that the defendants ‘were clearly aware of the school conditions far [longer] than [one] year before the ... 2007 filing with the ... commissioner.’ ... Accordingly, the court [concluded] that allowing the defendants ‘to file suit directly in this matter, when [the trial court had] determined that their action was untimely provides them a right unavailable to other parties. [Although] the legislature need not enact a special act when vacating the ... commissioner's dismissal of the matter, allowing a plaintiff with an untimely claim to circumvent § 4-148 (b) without any explanation or public purpose, constitutes a public emolument when the action is untimely.’ " (Citations omitted; footnote in original.) State v. Avoletta , supra, 212 Conn. App. at 313–14, 275 A.3d 716.

The defendants then appealed to the Appellate Court, which, in Avoletta v. State , 152 Conn. App. 177, 192–95, 98 A.3d 839, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 944, 102 A.3d 1116 (2014), "affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the defendants’ claim was time barred by the one year statute of limitations set forth in § 4-148 (a), and that the joint resolution had failed to identify any compelling equitable circumstances or a public purpose served by permitting the defendants to bring an untimely claim against the state. ... Accordingly, [the Appellate Court] held that the joint resolution was an unconstitutional public emolument." (Citations omitted.) State v. Avoletta , supra, 212 Conn. App. at 315, 275 A.3d 716.

In August, 2013, "the defendants filed a second claim with the commissioner ... seeking relief on two distinct grounds. First, the defendants sought to revive their 2007 claim for damages stemming from unsafe conditions at the Torrington public schools (Torrington schools claim). Second, the defendants alleged that they were harmed by the legislature's ‘gross negligence’ in failing to articulate a public purpose in the joint resolution and neglecting to appropriately follow the statutory procedure to authorize such a claim .... The state moved to dismiss both claims, arguing that [they] were barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and legislative immunity. The commissioner granted the state's motion to dismiss [in May, 2015].

"Following the commissioner's order, the defendants again appealed to the General Assembly for legislative review. [In June, 2017], the General Assembly passed [S.A. 17-4], authorizing the defendants to proceed before the commissioner ‘for injuries ... alleged to have accrued on September 15, 2006 ....’ The commissioner subsequently issued a scheduling order requiring that the parties engage in discovery, file dispositive motions, and participate in a hearing on the merits of the defendants’ claims.

"[In September, 2017], the state instituted the present action ... [in] the Superior Court, seeking a [judgment declaring] that [S.A. 17-4] constituted an unconstitutional public emolument in violation of article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution. ...

"[In May, 2018], the state filed a motion for summary judgment. In its accompanying memorandum of law, the state claimed that (1) [S.A. 17-4] constituted an unconstitutional public emolument, and (2) the defendants were collaterally estopped from arguing that their claims were timely or that there was a legitimate public purpose for permitting their untimely claims to proceed." (Footnotes omitted.) Id., at 315–17, 275 A.3d 716.

In October, 2019, "the court, Hon. Robert B. Shapiro , judge trial referee, heard argument on the state's motion for summary judgment [which it subsequently granted] .... [The court concluded] that the issue of whether the Torrington schools claim was timely filed was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because the claim previously was [found to be] untimely, the court clarified that the claim could ... proceed [only] via special legislation passed pursuant to § 4-148 (b). The court then ... determined that the defendants had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact [as to whether S.A. 17-4] served a legitimate public purpose ... [or as to whether S.A. 17-4] constituted an unconstitutional public emolument." Id., at 319, 275 A.3d 716.

The defendants subsequently appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly had granted the state's motion summary judgment on the ground that S.A. 17-4 was an unconstitutional public emolument. See id., at 320, 325, 275 A.3d 716. Relying on this court's decisions in Kelly v. University of Connecticut Health Center , 290 Conn. 245, 963 A.2d 1 (2009), and Kinney v. State , 285 Conn. 700, 941 A.2d 907 (2008), the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court correctly had determined that S.A. 17-4 does not serve a legitimate public purpose and, therefore, is an unconstitutional public emolument. See State v. Avoletta , supra, 212 Conn. App. at 325–28, 275 A.3d 716. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that S.A. 17-4 does not serve a legitimate public purpose and is an unconstitutional public emolument under the public emoluments clause of the state constitution. See Conn. Const., art. I, § 1. The defendants argue that the Appellate Court failed to consider whether the state met its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the General Assembly's "sole objective" in enacting S.A. 17-4 was to grant a personal gain or advantage to the defendants. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendants contend that "the legislature had multiple, valid public policy purposes in adopting" S.A. 17-4, namely, providing compensation for the defendants, ensuring a safe and healthy school setting for all children, holding government officials accountable, and ensuring that similar claims receive a full adjudication on the merits.

In response, the state argues that a special act that purports to authorize a party to present an untimely claim to the commissioner will have a legitimate public purpose only when the state bears responsibility for the untimely filing. Because no state actor caused the defendants’ procedural default, the state contends that the public purposes identified by the language of S.A. 17-4 and the defendants are not legitimate public purposes and, therefore, that S.A....