State v. Barnes

172 Ohio St.3d 63

222 N.E.3d 537

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,

v.BARNES, Appellant.

No. 2021-0670

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted April 12, 2022

Decided December 15, 2022

Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Frank Romeo Zeleznikar, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Milton & Charlotte Kramer Law Clinic, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Andrew S. Pollis, and Joseph Shell, for appellant.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and Mathura J. Sridharan, Deputy Solicitor General, urging dismissal of the appeal as having been improvidently accepted for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.

Stewart, J.{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal asks us to determine whether a defendant in a criminal case has a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw his guilty plea when, before sentencing, he discovers evidence that (1) his attorney withheld from him and (2) would have negated his decision to plead guilty had he known about it. We hold that he does. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's judgment denying appellant Terry Barnes Sr.’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} The underlying facts of this case, according to the transcripts of Barnes's hearings and the documents in the record, show that on September 10, 2017, Leah McLaurin confronted Barnes at a gas station on the east side of Cleveland, for unknown reasons. While in his vehicle at the gas pump, Barnes engaged in conversation with Leah, but Leah became hostile and Barnes left the gas station after getting gas. Later that same day, Barnes returned to the gas station. Leah was still there, and Barnes approached her to discuss the previous argument.

{¶ 3} Someone at the gas station called Leah's brother, Jeffrey McLaurin, and told Jeffrey that Barnes was arguing with Leah. Jeffrey arrived at the gas station with a gun. Jeffrey struck Barnes in the face with the gun, Barnes drew his gun in response, and the two men exchanged gunfire. Barnes was shot in his elbow as he fled. Two bystanders and Leah also sustained gunshot wounds. Leah died shortly after being shot.

{¶ 4} Authorities were unable to determine who fired the shot that killed Leah. Although the gas station had interior and exterior surveillance cameras that showed Barnes, Jeffrey, and an unidentified third person firing guns, the footage did not show who was responsible for causing Leah's death. The state provided the video footage to Barnes's defense counsel, but it was labeled "counsel only," as allowed by Crim.R. 16(C).¹

{¶ 5} Almost two weeks after the shooting, Barnes was indicted in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for one count of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) ; one count of voluntary manslaughter, in violation of R.C. 2903.03(A) ; three counts of felonious assault, all violations of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) ; and two counts of discharging a firearm on or near prohibited premises, violations of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3). All the charges carried one- and three-year firearm specifications under R.C. 2941.141(A) and 2941.145(A), respectively. Barnes pleaded not guilty during his arraignment.

{¶ 6} On September 19, 2019, Barnes accepted a plea deal from the state in which he pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter. In exchange for his guilty plea, the state amended the voluntary-manslaughter charge to involuntary manslaughter, a violation of R.C. 2903.04(B), and asked the trial court to nolle prosequi the remaining counts and to dismiss the firearm specifications. The trial court granted the state's requests, accepted Barnes's guilty plea, and scheduled Barnes's sentencing hearing for October 31, 2019.

{¶ 7} On the day that Barnes was supposed to be sentenced, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He asserted that he was not guilty and, citing 2018 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 228 (which amended R.C. 2901.05 and shifted the burden of proof on self-defense to the state), that he had acted in self-defense.² On November 6, Barnes filed a supplement to the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued that his counsel never allowed him to view the video footage from the gas station with audio. Because one of Barnes's attorneys was unaware of the counsel-only designation, Barnes was inadvertently given access to the footage the night before his sentencing hearing. Barnes believed that the video footage with audio would establish that Barnes did not shoot first, which would bolster Barnes's self-defense claim. The state filed a memorandum in opposition to Barnes's motion, asserting that the withdrawal of Barnes's guilty plea would prejudice the state and that Barnes had not offered a valid reason for the trial court to grant his motion to withdraw.

{¶ 8} The trial court held a hearing on the motion, and Barnes asserted that his attorneys did not review all the discovery with him, including a large portion of the video footage. The trial court stated that although Barnes had "represented to [the] Court that [he had] reviewed everything," because his attorneys did not show him all the discovery, the court would appoint new counsel for Barnes for the purpose of representing him at a new plea-withdrawal hearing. The court conducted a second hearing, at which Barnes called his former attorneys as witnesses. None of the former attorneys recalled showing Barnes video footage of the shooting with audio, and Barnes testified he believed that the audio offered proof that he did not shoot first. Barnes also stated that he would not have pleaded guilty had he seen the video footage with the audio prior to entering his plea.

{¶ 9} Before ruling on the motion, the trial court stated:

Before you proceed I do just want to remind you all that in considering this motion that I have to consider whether the prosecution would be prejudiced by a vacation of the plea, whether the accused was represented by highly competent counsel. There is no question about that. At all stages Mr. Barnes was represented by highly competent counsel.

I also need to consider whether the accused was given a Criminal Rule 11 hearing, which he was in this matter, and I have provided a copy of the transcript, and reviewed that entire transcript of this Rule 11 hearing.

I also have to consider whether there are specific reasons outlined for withdrawing the plea and I have to consider whether the accused understood the nature of the charges and possible penalties, and whether he has a complete defense to the crime or was not guilty. Those are the factors that I have to consider here today.

{¶ 10} After hearing final arguments from counsel and reviewing the video footage, the trial court ultimately determined that there was not a reasonable basis for Barnes to withdraw his guilty plea and denied his motion. After finding Barnes guilty, the court sentenced him to community-control sanctions for five years.

{¶ 11} Barnes appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court of appeals overruled Barnes's assignment of error and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that Barnes had failed to demonstrate a reasonable basis for withdrawing his guilty plea and that the trial court's judgment denying Barnes's motion was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.

The court also denied Barnes's application for reconsideration and en banc consideration.

{¶ 12} Barnes filed a discretionary appeal in this court, and we accepted his sole proposition of law:

A defendant has a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing upon learning of evidence that: (1) was previously withheld from the defendant; and (2) would have changed the defendant's decision to plead guilty. ( Crim.R. 32.1 and State v. Xie , 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992), construed and applied).

See 163 Ohio St.3d 1508, 2021-Ohio-2481, 170 N.E.3d 906.

Law and Analysis

{¶ 13} "A presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and liberally granted." Xie at 527, 584 N.E.2d 715. A defendant does not, however, have an "absolute right" to withdraw his or her plea, even when a motion to withdraw is made before sentencing. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Before ruling on a defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his plea, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for withdrawing the plea. Id. The determination whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the defendant's request to withdraw his plea is "within the sound discretion of the trial court." Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in making its ruling, its decision must be affirmed. Id. at 526, 584 N.E.2d 715.

{¶ 14} Crim.R. 32.1 states:

A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.

{¶ 15} "However, the rule itself gives no guidelines for a trial court to use when ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea." Xie , 62 Ohio St.3d at 526, 584 N.E.2d 715. Crim.R. 11 governs guilty pleas and guilty-plea colloquies and ensures that a defendant understands that by pleading guilty, he is waiving numerous constitutional rights. See, e.g. , State v. Ballard , 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 478, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981) ("We hold that a guilty plea is constitutionally infirm when the defendant is not informed in a reasonable manner at the time of entering his guilty plea of his rights to a trial by jury and to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination, and his right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his behalf"). Crim.R. 11(C) also ensures that when a...