State v. Barnett

537 P.3d 212

STATE of Utah, Appellant,

v.Kolby Ryan BARNETT, Appellee.

No. 20220636

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard May 15, 2023

Filed September 21, 2023

Attorneys¹

Troy S. Rawlings, Cnty. Att'y, Jeffrey G. Thomson, Deputy Cnty. Att'y, Farmington, for appellant

Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Sara Pfrommer, Cherise M. Bacalski, Bountiful, Todd Utzinger, Farmington, for appellee

Associate Chief Justice Pearce authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Petersen, Justice Hagen, and Justice Pohlman joined.

Associate Chief Justice Pearce, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Kolby Ryan Barnett was already serving probation when he was arrested and charged with felony crimes in Salt Lake and Davis counties. At Barnett's Davis County bail hearing, the State argued that article I, section 8(1) of the Utah Constitution mandates that a judge deny bail to a defendant charged with a felony if that defendant is already serving probation on a felony conviction. The district court rejected the State's constitutional interpretation and set bail.

¶2 Article I, section 8(1) guarantees a right to bail in most circumstances, but it outlines three instances where bail is not guaranteed. We conclude that the people of Utah did not intend to constitutionally strip judges of the ability to grant bail in those three circumstances. In other words, an alleged "double felony defendant" like Barnett is not guaranteed bail, but the constitution does not forbid the district court from setting bail. We are not asked to review the district court's bail decision on the merits, and so we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Barnett was serving probation for a felony conviction when both Salt Lake and Davis counties charged him with several new felonies. At his Davis County bail hearing, the State opposed Barnett's pre-trial release.

¶4 Relying on article I, section 8(1) of the Utah Constitution (Bail Provision), the State argued that the district court was constitutionally prohibited from granting Barnett bail. Part of that provision reads: "All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except ... persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to support the new felony charge." UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (1)(b).²

¶5 There was no dispute that Barnett was a "person[ ] charged with a ... felony while on probation or parole." Id. Nor was there any dispute that substantial evidence supported the new charges. The question before the district court boiled down to what the Utah Constitution means when it provides: "All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except" those falling into certain categories. The State argued that this meant a district court was prohibited from setting bail for anyone to whom the exceptions applied.

¶6 Barnett argued "shall be bailable except" meant that though the person charged was not guaranteed bail, a district court could still grant it. The district court accepted Barnett's interpretation and set bail.

¶7 The State seeks interlocutory review. The State argues that the district court erred when it concluded it had discretion to grant Barnett bail. The State further contends that the district court misconstrued the Bail Provision's plain language to reach its result. Lastly, the State argues that the district court should have looked to the original public meaning of the Bail Provision and that if it had, the district court would have learned that the people of Utah understood they were removing a judge's discretion to grant bail to certain categories of defendants.³

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 "We review constitutional interpretation issues for correctness, granting no deference to the district court." Richards v. Cox , 2019 UT 57, ¶ 7, 450 P.3d 1074.

ANALYSIS

¶9 The district court interpreted the Bail Provision to guarantee bail in most instances. It further concluded that the Bail Provision does not guarantee bail in the three outlined exceptions. But the district court also concluded that the provision does not forbid the court from granting bail in those circumstances. The State argues that the district court misread the plain language to reach this conclusion. The State posits that the district court "advanced a present-day, plain-language-only construction" of the constitution. The State predicts that if the district court had properly focused on the original public meaning of the Bail Provision, it would have decided that the people of Utah intended to prohibit bail in certain circumstances.

¶10 When we interpret the Utah Constitution, the "text's plain language may begin and end the analysis." South Salt Lake City v. Maese , 2019 UT 58, ¶ 23, 450 P.3d 1092. But unlike other forms of analysis, "constitutional inquiry does not require us to find a textual ambiguity before we turn to ... sources" outside the text. Id. Parties can present courts with evidence that the plain language would have been understood differently by those who put that language into the constitution. This means that while "the text is generally the best place to look for understanding, historical sources can be essential to our effort to discern and confirm the original public meaning of the language."⁴ Id.

¶11 Before we turn to the State's arguments, it is helpful to understand the evolution of the language the district court interpreted. The original Bail Provision read: "All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption strong." UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (1896).

¶12 Voters expanded the exception in 1973 to include defendants in Barnett's circumstance. After the amendment, the constitution read:

All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption strong or where a person is accused of the commission of a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous felony charge, and where the proof is evident or the presumption strong.

UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (1973).

¶13 In 1988, the voters overhauled the Bail Provision. Voters changed "All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties" to "All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except." Compare UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (1973)with UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (1) (1989). The voters also added a new exception to the bail guarantee by giving the Legislature the ability to statutorily designate crimes for which a court could deny bail. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (1)(c).

¶14 The voters additionally changed the Bail Provision's structure by separating and individually lettering each of the three exceptions. After passage, the provision reads:

(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except:

(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is substantial evidence to support the charge; or

(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to support the new felony charge; or

(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is substantial evidence to support the charge and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person would constitute a substantial danger to any other person or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on bail.

UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (1).

¶15 The State presents two arguments. The State first focuses on the language "shall be bailable except." The State claims that "bailable" means able to be bailed and that double felony defendants are "excepted" from being able to be bailed. This prompts the State to argue that the district court erred because the Bail Provision's plain language means that judges do not have discretion to grant bail to double felony defendants.

¶16 The State also claims that a form of the phrase "shall be bailable except" was present in the original constitution. And that historically, that language had meant that anyone meeting the exception was not eligible for bail. The State contends that this meaning would have been apparent to the people of Utah in 1895 when they put it into the original constitution. The State also argues that the voters who amended the Bail Provision in 1973 and 1988 would have shared that understanding. This permits the State to argue that "shall be bailable except" meant the same thing in 1988 that it meant in 1895 and that it carries that meaning today.

¶17 We disagree. The Bail Provision's plain language provides that a defendant is guaranteed bail in all but a few circumstances and that in those instances, the district court may still grant bail. This conclusion does not change when we look at what the people of Utah would have understood the Bail Provision to mean in 1988.

I. THE BAIL PROVISION'S PLAIN LANGUAGE GUARANTEES BAIL TO MOST DEFENDANTS BUT PROVIDES THAT A COURT MAY DENY IT TO OTHERS

¶18 The State claims that the district court erred in its analysis of the Bail Provision's plain language. The State posits that the district court's interpretation "neither mirrors nor gives effect to all of Subsection 8(1)’s actual and precise terms."

¶19 The State's plain language argument first focuses on the term "bailable." The State contends that the suffix "able" "has long meant ‘capable of, fit for, or worthy of.’ " (Quoting -able , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/able (last visited July 16, 2023)). The State argues that the word "bailable" therefore means "capable, fit, worthy, competent, or qualified for ‘bail.’ " If a person is bailable, then "bail ‘may be’ granted." In other words, if a person is bailable, the court is "authorized" to grant them bail.

¶20 The State further argues that bail may not be granted to double felony defendants because the term "bailable" is followed by the...