State v. Battley

1

STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JAQUAN XAVIER BATTLEY

No. 2022 KA 0940

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, First Circuit

July 6, 2023

On Appeal from the 18th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Pointe Coupee State of Louisiana Trial Court No 83,371-F Honorable J. Kevin Kimball, Judge Presiding

Antonio M. "Tony" Clayton District Attorney Chad A Aguillard Kristen Canezaro Assistant District Attorneys New Roads, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellant, State of Louisiana

Terri Russo Lacy Assistant District Attorney Port Allen, Louisiana Meghan Harwell Bitoun New Orleans, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/ Appellee, Jaquan Xavier Battley

BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.

PENZATO, J.

The defendant, Jaquan Battley, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder (count I), a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1); and illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities (count II), a violation of La. R.S. 14:94(A). The State dismissed count II prior to the closing of trial. Following a jury trial on count I, the defendant was found guilty as charged by unanimous verdict. He was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He now appeals, raising five assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On July 8,2019, Aniyah Taylor drove her boyfriend, the victim, Sir James Davis (Mr. Davis), to St. Ann Street in New Roads, Louisiana, to purchase marijuana from "Billy." Prior to making the purchase, Mr. Davis went to the trunk of the vehicle to get jumper cables to help another person at the scene. Thereafter, Kameron Webb approached Mr. Davis and said, "N--s be tripping." Mr. Davis ignored Webb. As Mr. Davis was returning to Ms. Taylor's car, Webb followed him, stating "1 want my one," meaning Webb wanted to fight with Mr. Davis. Mr. Davis told Webb he had come to get his "smoke," not to fight him. Webb responded by chasing Mr. Davis back to Ms. Taylor's car, and Mr. Davis and Ms. Taylor left without further incident. On the drive back to his home in Morganza, Louisiana, Mr. Davis telephoned "Billy" and told him to tell Webb to "keep the same energy."^[1]

Approximately thirty minutes later, Mr. Davis' sister, Alajanae Davis, drove herself, Ms. Taylor, and Mr. Davis back to New Roads to buy marijuana from "Chip" at a business known as the "Chinese store." When Alajanae pulled into the parking lot of the Chinese store, the defendant walked out of the store, past the driver's-side door of her vehicle, and towards the road. Webb walked into the parking lot of the Chinese store and communicated with the defendant. The defendant then approached Mr. Davis, who was sitting in the passenger side of the car, and the defendant pulled out a gun. Mr. Davis fell to the ground, and he and the defendant wrestled over the gun. The defendant fired at Mr. Davis, striking him four times. Mr. Davis returned fire with his own gun. Following the shooting, Webb and the defendant ran away in the same direction. Mr. Davis died as a result of the gunshot wounds.

BATSON CHALLENGE

In assignment of error number one, the defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to find that the State deliberately used peremptory challenges to exclude prospective black jurors from serving on the juiy in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Batson v Kentucky. He argues that while the State's reasons for striking potential juror Leslie Frederick were facially race-neutral, the reasons were revealed to be merely a pretext, and the trial court's acceptance of these explanations constituted a prohibited "rubber stamp" approval.

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1721-1724, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court adopted a three-step analysis to determine whether the constitutional rights of a defendant or prospective jurors have been infringed by impermissible discriminatory practices. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. State v. Jackson, 2016-1565 (La.App. 1st Cir. 10/12/17), 232 So.3d 628, 632, writ denied, 2017-1944 (La. 5/25/18), 243 So.3d 566.

To establish a prima facie case, the defendant must show: (1) the defendant is a member of a cognizable group; (2) the challenge was peremptory rather than for cause; and (3) relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecutor struck the venire person on account of his being a member of that cognizable group. State v. Nelson, 2010-1724 (La. 3/13/12), 85 So.3d 21, 29. Without an inference that the prospective jurors were stricken because they are members of the targeted group, the defendant is unable to make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and his Batson challenge expires at the threshold. Jackson, 232 So.3d at 632.

The trial court may effectively collapse the first two stages of the Batson procedure, whether or not the defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and may then perform the critical third step of weighing the defendant's proof and the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons to determine discriminatory intent. A trial judge may take into account not only whether a pattern of strikes against a suspect class of persons has emerged during voir dire, but also whether the opposing party's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. Jackson, 232 So.3d at 632.

The State, in presenting race-neutral reasons for its excusal of prospective jurors, need not present an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible; unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the State's explanation after review of the entire record, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. For a Batson challenge to succeed, it is not enough that a discriminatory result be evidenced; rather, that result must ultimately be traced to a prohibited discriminatory purpose. Thus, the sole focus of the Batson inquiry is upon the intent of the opposing party at the time he exercised his peremptory strikes. A reviewing court owes the trial court's evaluations of discriminatory intent great deference and should not reverse them unless they are clearly erroneous. Jackson, 232 So.3d at 632-33.

Mr. Frederick was on the first panel of prospective jurors. After the State exercised a peremptory challenge against Mr. Frederick, a black male, the defense objected under Batson. The defense argued that Mr. Frederick provided no positive or negative information during voir dire and was being struck solely because he was black.^[2] The defense noted, at that stage of voir dire, the State had exercised five peremptory challenges - one against a white male and four against black people^[3]

With regard to Mr. Frederick, the State indicated that when the panel was asked if anyone thought that the defendant did something wrong just because he was arrested, Mr. Frederick raised his hand. According to the State, it was challenging Mr. Frederick because it wanted the defendant to have a fair trial. The trial court noted, under Batson, the defense first had to establish that the State was excluding jurors on the basis of race. The trial court questioned if that burden had been met, but moved on to whether or not the State had set forth a race-neutral reason for its challenge against Mr. Frederick. The trial court asked the State if it had any other reason to strike Mr. Frederick. The State added that Mr. Frederick indicated he knew the district attorney. The trial court concluded that, while it was uncertain a prima facie case of discrimination had been shown, the State had offered race-neutral reasons, and thus, it would deny the Batson challenge.

On appeal, the defendant notes the record is silent as to whether Mr. Frederick raised his hand as set forth by the State at voir dire. The defendant further points out that it was a different prospective juror, not Mr. Frederick, who stated he knew the district attorney, and thus, the trial court erred in accepting the State's race-neutral reason for striking Mr. Frederick. The defense, however, did not correct the record in either respect at the time of the State's assertions. If the State was mistaken about Mr. Frederick raising his hand or knowing the district attorney, the defense was obligated to object and correct the record. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 841; State v. Williams, 524 So.2d 746 (La. 1988) (per curiam) ("The Batson decision suggested that the trial judge, if the objections are well founded, can correct the error either by denying the peremptory challenge and reinstating the challenged jurors or by dismissing the venire and selecting a new jury. This suggestion indicates that the ruling on the objections must be made at some time before the completion of the jury panel." [Footnotes omitted.]).

The mere invocation of Batson when minority prospective jurors are peremptorily challenged in the trial of a minority defendant does not present sufficient evidence to lead to an inference of purposeful discrimination. State v Draughn, 20051825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, cert, denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007). All of the black jurors struck by the State were done so for raceneutral reasons. Ms. Maloid was considered for a hardship excuse due to her medical...