State v. Beganovic

1

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Irfan Beganovic, Appellant.

No. A21-0477, A21-0480

Supreme Court of Minnesota

June 14, 2023

Court of Appeals Thissen, J. Office of Appellate Courts

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul Minnesota, for appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. The term "unlawfully" in the first-degree arson statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (2022), creates an element requiring the State to prove a fire was started without authorization.

2. The evidence in this case was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fire was started unlawfully.

3. Unobjected-to failure to instruct the jury on the element of unlawfulness was not reversible error.

OPINION

THISSEN, Justice.

This case asks the court to clarify whether the State must prove that a person charged with first-degree arson acted "unlawfully" when setting fire to a dwelling. Minn Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (2022). Contrary to the court of appeals, we conclude that the use of "unlawfully" in section 609.561, subdivision 1, creates an element of the crime of first-degree arson that the State must prove. But we nonetheless affirm the conviction because we conclude that the State met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Beganovic acted unlawfully in setting fire to his house and that the unobjected-to failure to instruct the jury on the element was not reversible error. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals but on different grounds.

FACTS

In the early morning of June 1, 2018, appellant Irfan Beganovic's house burned down. Beganovic called 911 at approximately 1:30 a.m. to report the fire. Following the fire he filed an insurance claim, prompting an investigation by his insurance company. Beganovic did not claim that he started the fire, either on the day of the fire or when he filed his insurance claim.

At the same time, a fire marshal conducted a separate investigation. Both investigators independently reached the conclusion that the fire was started intentionally. They based their conclusion on the fire's multiple points of origin, as well as ruling out any other causes (such as faulty appliances or wiring).

The State charged Beganovic with first-degree arson under section 609.561, subdivision 1. Under this statute, a person is criminally liable if he "unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building that is used as a dwelling at the time the act is committed ...." Minn. Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1. Beganovic pleaded not guilty and the case proceeded to a jury trial in November 2020.

At trial, investigators testified to their conclusions that the fire was intentionally started. The investigators told the jury that, based on their training and experience, the appliances in the house could not have started the fire. Beganovic's wife and daughter both testified that they were sleeping on the couches in the living room on the night of the fire. Although Beganovic's daughter unexpectedly testified during trial that she started the fire by smoking a cigarette, the deputy fire marshal and fire investigators explained that the daughter's claim would not explain the other two origin points of the fire. Beganovic continued to contend that the fire was started by faulty appliances or wiring. He also stated that his family was inside the house at the time the fire started. On the day of the fire and when he later filed his insurance claim, Beganovic never claimed that he started the fire or that the burning of his house was lawful because he was authorized to do so. The jury found Beganovic guilty.

Beganovic appealed, arguing that the word "unlawfully" in the first-degree arson statute creates an element of the offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Beganovic, because the State presented no evidence to show that the burning of his house was "unlawful," the State failed to establish all elements of the crime of first-degree arson. State v. Beganovic, 974 N.W.2d 278, 283-84 (Minn.App. 2022).

The court of appeals rejected Beganovic's argument. The court of appeals read Minn. Stat. § 609.561 (2022) (the arson statute) and Minn. Stat. § 609.564 (2022) (the permit statute)^[1] together such that "unlawful" means that a defendant did not have a permit, license, or other written authorization to start the fire from a public authority as specifically provided in section 609.564. Beganovic, 974 N.W.2d at 284-85. The court of appeals held that Beganovic had the burden of proving that he had a permit, license, or other written authorization to start the fire. Id. at 285. The court of appeals reasoned that the burden of proof rested with Beganovic because the act of destroying a house by fire or explosives is "ordinarily dangerous to society." Id. at 284-85 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Beganovic did not show that he was permitted to burn down his house, the court of appeals held that sufficient evidence supported his conviction. Id. at 286.

ANALYSIS

We are asked to decide whether the State met its burden under the first-degree arson statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.561. The statute provides that "[w]hoever unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building that is used as a dwelling at the time the act is committed . . . commits arson in the first degree ...." Minn. Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1.

To resolve this dispute, we first assess the meaning of the word "unlawfully" as used in section 609.561 subdivision 1, to determine whether "unlawfully" is an element of first-degree arson or a defense. Second, because we conclude that "unlawfully" is an element of first-degree arson, we analyze whether the prosecution met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Beganovic acted unlawfully. Finally, we address whether failing to instruct the jury that the State was required to prove Beganovic acted unlawfully was reversible error.

Beganovic's argument is essentially that the evidence provided at trial is insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he "unlawfully" burned down his house. When a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on the interpretation of a statute, we review that interpretation de novo. State v. Bowen, 921 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 2019).

I.

A.

Before we reach the question of whether "unlawfully" is an element of first-degree arson, we must determine what the term "unlawfully" means in section 609.561. This is a question of statutory interpretation, which requires us "to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). To do so, we first examine the plain meaning of the text-the word's plain and ordinary meaning-and we may consult dictionary definitions as part of that inquiry. Buzzell v. Walz, 974 N.W.2d 256, 262 (Minn. 2022).

Unlawful is defined as "[n]ot authorized by law . . . [c]riminally punishable . . . [i]nvolving moral turpitude." Unlawful, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Of these various formulations, "not authorized by law" is the most apt. See Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 902 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that the sense of unlawful as "unauthorized by law" is most common and the senses of unlawful as criminally punishable and involving moral turpitude "so complicate matters in using this term that they lessen its utility"). Criminally punishable is redundant as the statute itself creates a criminal punishment. Moral turpitude seems inappropriate: partly because it is awkward for section 609.561 to read "whoever [with moral turpitude] by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building that is used as a dwelling" and partly because we have not decided if arson is an act of moral turpitude. Cf. In re Conley, 248 N.W. 41, 42 (Minn. 1933) (concluding that a violation of Minnesota law is not a de facto act of moral turpitude). Therefore, "unlawfully" in section 609.561 could reasonably be read broadly to mean a fire not authorized by law.

Furthermore, the term "unlawfully" is not modified or limited in any way, which suggests that the term is to be read broadly. We will not read into the statute any modifying or limiting language. Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 931 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Minn. 2019) (noting that we cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted).

The approach taken by the court of appeals and urged upon us by the parties does just that; it adds language to section 609.561 that modifies or limits the term "unlawfully" used by the Legislature. Following the court of appeals, the parties in their briefing before us advance the argument that we should limit the term "unlawfully" in the first-degree arson statute to mean fires set without the authorization contemplated by section 609.564. In other words, the only way to prove a fire was or was not set "unlawfully" (regardless of who has the burden of proof) is to show that the defendant had one of the specific types of authorization set forth in section 609.564.^[2] To be clear, we agree that possession of a validly issued license or permit or written permission as described in section 609.564 is one way to show that a defendant's act was not unlawful; we do not agree that it is the exclusive way.

To reach the conclusion that the term "unlawfully" exclusively means that a defendant did not have a license permit, or written permission to start the...