State v. Begay

549 P.3d 93

2024 UT App 63

STATE of Utah, Appellee,

v.Sylvestor Pete BEGAY, Appellant.

No. 20230228-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed May 2, 2024

First District Court, Brigham City Department, The Honorable Brandon J. Maynard, No. 211100268

Brady G. Stuart, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City, and Connor Nelson, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and Ryan D. Tenney concurred.

Opinion

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 In 2021, Sylvester Pete Begay was charged with two sex crimes that the State asserted he had committed in 1996 or 1997. Specifically, the State accused Begay—who was then twenty-two—of raping and sexually abusing a girl (Laura¹) who was then thirteen. Begay filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the statute of limitations had long since expired. The district court denied Begay’s motion, and Begay asked for permission—which we granted—to take an interlocutory appeal of that decision.

¶2 The statute of limitations question in this case turns on whether a "report of the offense" was made to local law enforcement in January 1998, when Laura’s friend (Friend) informed a local police officer (Officer) that Begay had been "having sex" with Laura. Under the circumstances presented, we conclude that Friend’s report was indeed a "report of the offense to a law enforcement agency" that operated to start the running of the statute of limitations. From this conclusion, it follows that the limitations period expired in 2002, well before the statute was amended (in 2008) to abolish any limitations period for these categories of crimes, and well before these charges were filed (in 2021). We therefore reverse the district court’s order denying Begay's motion to dismiss, and we remand the case with instructions to dismiss the charges.

BACKGROUND

Events That Occurred in the 1990s

¶3 In January 1998, Friend—who was then fourteen—met with Officer and stated that she wanted to "press charges against someone that [had] raped" her. She told Officer that Begay—a person that she "hung out with" a lot and who she believed was twenty-six at the time of the interview—had "fingered" her and then "un[did] his pants" and "started having sex" with her, despite her having told him "no" and that she was "not ready." Although Officer did not specifically ask Friend what she meant by "having sex," Officer apparently understood that term to include vaginal intercourse: as follow-up questions, she asked Friend if Begay "use[d] a condom," whether "he ejaculated," and whether Friend had "started bleeding," and she advised Friend to take "a pregnancy test."

¶4 At the end of the interview, Officer asked Friend whether there were "other girls that [Begay] might have been having sex with." In response, Friend stated that she knew one such person but that she didn’t "know if [she could] tell" Officer about that without "breaking confidentiality." Officer then stated as follows:

Actually, if she’s under the age of eighteen and you know that someone has been sexually abused, you’re obligated by law to report them…. The therapist said either you can report it or I can report it because it’s got to be reported because it is against the law. Especially if the person is under the age of fourteen. That makes it an even more serious thing.

(Emphasis added.)

¶5 At this point, the transcript of the interview ends. But at an evidentiary hearing in this case, Friend testified that she supplied Officer with the name of the other girl—Laura—with whom Begay had been having sex. Friend then relayed to Officer that Begay had been doing "the same things" to Laura that he’d been doing to her, and that Laura had "also had sex" with Begay. Officer’s notes from the interview include Laura’s full name and birthdate, indicating that Officer also knew that—depending on the exact date of Laura’s encounters with Begay-Laura would have been at most fourteen, and perhaps only thirteen, when the alleged conduct occurred. But there is no indication in the record that Friend gave Officer any date—estimated or not—on which Begay purportedly had sexual contact with Laura. There is also no indication in the record that Friend told Officer how she knew about the contact between Begay and Laura, although Friend testified later, at the evidentiary hearing, that she learned about it from Laura directly; she explained that, when she and Laura were assigned to "in-school suspension" together, Laura learned that Begay had sexually assaulted Friend, and Laura "kind of comfort[ed]" Friend by "letting [Friend] know that the same thing had happened to her."

¶6 Four days after her 1998 interview with Friend, Officer interviewed Begay. During this interview, Begay acknowledged laving sex with Friend but claimed she had been "a willing partner." Toward the end of the interview, Officer asked Begay if he had "gone out with other girls" Friend’s age, and Begay admitted that he "ha[d] once." Officer asked if that was with Laura, and Begay acknowledged that it was. Officer then directly asked Begay if he "had sex with" Laura, and Begay claimed that he had not. A few minutes later, Officer asked again about Laura, telling Begay that Friend had already informed Officer that Begay "may have had sex with [Laura] also" but that she had not "been able to get hold of [Laura] yet" to ask her about it directly. Officer then asked, "What is [Laura] going to tell me when I do talk to her? Is she going to tell me that you did or you didn’t [have sex]?" Begay again denied having sex with Laura, telling Officer that, if asked, Laura would "[s]ay that [he] did not have sex with her."

¶7 Neither Officer nor any other law enforcement agent talked with Laura at that time. And while the State—in 1998—charged Begay with crimes related to his actions with Friend, it did not—until 2021—charge Begay with any crimes related to Laura.

Recent Events

¶8 In 2021, Laura contacted police "to report a rape that occurred 25 years ago." In her report, she explained that when she was thirteen years old, Begay—who was twenty-two at the time—had "penetrated her vaginally with his penis" when he had "taken her to the park near the tennis courts in his car." She had resisted, telling him, "I don’t think we should do this, like I don’t think it’s safe, I don’t wanna do this." And this was not their only sexual encounter; Laura also claimed that Begay had "penetrat[ed] her vagina with his fingers" on a later occasion "at his adopted parent’s home."

¶9 After receiving Laura’s report, officers interviewed Begay again, and this time he told a different story regarding Laura: he acknowledged that he had "sexual intercourse" with Laura some twenty-five years ago, but he claimed it had been "consensual."

¶10 The State then charged Begay with one count of rape of a child and one count of sexual abuse of a child, asserting that the events in question had occurred between January 1996 and January 1997, before Laura had turned fourteen. Later, Begay filed a motion asking the court to dismiss the charges, asserting that the statute of limitations that applied at the time—a four-year statute triggered by a "report of the offense to a law enforcement agency," see Utah Code § 76-1-303.5 (1996)—had begun to run in January 1998 at the time of Friend’s interview with Officer, and had therefore expired in 2002.

¶11 The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Five witnesses testified, including Friend, Laura, and Officer, all of whom testified about the 1990s events described above. Friend also clarified that her intention in going to law enforcement in January 1998 was not necessarily to report a crime committed against Laura but "to report a crime against [her]self." And Officer acknowledged that, in her view, "if someone comes to the police station and they tell [an officer] about a crime that they’re aware of," then it is "a report that’s been made."

¶12 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court made an oral ruling denying Begay’s motion to dismiss. At the outset, the court commented that the question was "very close." But it ruled that Friend’s statement to Officer was not a "report of the offense" to law enforcement because, in the court’s view, Friend’s statement "lack[ed] the specificity so that it would … actually communicate information bearing on the elements of a crime." Begay’s attorney asked the court to "clarify" why a "report … that [Laura] had had sex with" Begay wouldn’t qualify as a "report," and the court responded, "Because sex also doesn’t always mean sex .… We had a President of the United States that made that very clear … and so everyone has different definitions." On that basis, the court concluded that Friend’s report "lack[ed] specificity."

¶13 The court later memorialized its oral ruling in a written order stating simply that it "adopts the factual and legal findings stated on the record at the conclusion of the oral arguments." Begay sought permission to appeal this order, which we granted.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1–3] ¶14 Begay appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the charges on statute-of-limitations grounds. As a general matter, "[w]hether the [district] court applied the proper statute of limitations is a matter of law that we review for correctness." State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, ¶ 15, 108 P.3d 710. And to the extent that the question turns on statutory interpretation, we review the district court’s decision for correctness. See State v. Toombs, 2016 UT App 188, ¶ 18, 380 P.3d 390 (stating that interpretation of the phrase "report of the offense" is a "legal exercise, which we review for correctness" (quotation simplified)), cert. denied, 390 P.3d 724 (Utah 2017). But to the extent that the court made factual findings "concerning events relevant to the application of the statute of limitations," we apply a more deferential standard, and "we will not disturb" such factual findings "unless clearly...