State v. Belcher

342 Conn. 1

268 A.3d 616

STATE of Connecticut

v.Keith BELCHER

SC 20531

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 11, 2021

Officially released January 21, 2022^**

Michael W. Brown, West Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Alexandra Harrington, deputy assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state's attorney, and Emily Dewey Trudeau, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.^*

MULLINS, J.

The defendant, Keith Belcher, a juvenile offender, appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence.¹ After his conviction, the defendant received a total effective sentence of sixty years of incarceration. He claims, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to correct on the basis of the court's conclusion that the sentencing court did not impose the sentence in an illegal manner by relying on materially false information.²

Our review of the record reveals that the defendant established that the sentencing court substantially relied on materially false information in imposing his sentence, specifically, on the court's view that the defendant was a "charter member" of a mythical group of teenage "superpredators." Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to correct. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and the case is remanded with direction to grant the defendant's motion and for resentencing.³

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. "The defendant was fourteen years of age when, on December 24, 1993, he and a companion approached the victim in front of her apartment in Bridgeport. The victim was unloading groceries from her car when the defendant approached her from behind, pulled out a gun and demanded that she give him her purse. When she informed the defendant that the purse was upstairs, he dragged her up to the apartment to retrieve it, all the time holding the gun on her." State v. Belcher , 51 Conn. App. 117, 119, 721 A.2d 899 (1998). While in the apartment, the defendant sexually assaulted the victim twice, attempted to do so a third time, and pistol-whipped her. See id., at 120, 721 A.2d 899.

Soon thereafter, based on the victim's identification of him from police photographs, the police arrested the defendant. Id. Proceedings against him were initiated in the docket for juvenile matters of the Superior Court. See id. Following a hearing, the court granted the state's motion to transfer the defendant's case to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. Id., at 120–21, 721 A.2d 899. The state charged the defendant with two counts each of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B) and sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), and with one count each of attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2) and § 53a-70 (a) (1), robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), and burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53a-101 (a) (1). See id., at 118–19, 121, 721 A.2d 899. The defendant was convicted on all seven counts. Id., at 121, 721 A.2d 899. The sentencing court imposed a total effective sentence of sixty years of incarceration.⁴

In the decades following the defendant's sentencing, juvenile sentencing law has undergone significant developments. These changes had their genesis in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005). In Roper , the court held that the execution of persons for crimes committed when they were children (under eighteen years of age) constitutes disproportionate punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the federal constitution. Id., at 564, 568, 575, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Children, the court explained, are different from adults for purposes of culpability and punishment, as certain characteristics of youth are, by their nature, mitigating. See id., at 569–70, 125 S. Ct. 1183. Children's " ‘lack of maturity,’ " " ‘underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ " vulnerability to peer pressure and other outside influences, as well as the transient nature of their personality traits, led the court to conclude that "juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders." Id.

Following Roper , decisions by this court and the United States Supreme Court have relied on these mitigating characteristics of youth to further define the constitutional limits of juvenile sentencing law. We recently summarized those limitations. "Under the federal constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, a juvenile offender cannot serve a sentence of imprisonment for life, or its functional equivalent, without the possibility of parole, unless his age and the hallmarks of adolescence have been considered as mitigating factors. Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 476–77, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) ; Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction , 317 Conn. 52, 60–61, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano , 577 U.S. 1202, 136 S. Ct. 1364, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016) ; State v. Riley , 315 Conn. 637, 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1202, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016)." State v. Williams-Bey , 333 Conn. 468, 470, 215 A.3d 711 (2019). Thus, "[t]o comport with federal constitutional requirements, the legislature passed No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84) ... [which] retroactively provided parole eligibility to juvenile offenders sentenced to more than ten years in prison." (Footnote omitted.) State v. McCleese , 333 Conn. 378, 383, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019). In addition, "[§] 2 of P.A. 15-84 ... requires a court to consider the Miller factors [which are the aforementioned hallmarks of youth] when imposing certain sentences [on] juvenile offenders." Id., at 400, 215 A.3d 1154.

Relying on those changes to juvenile sentencing law, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that (1) the sentencing court failed to consider his youth, as required by Miller and its progeny, including the decision of this court in State v. Riley , supra, 315 Conn. at 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (sentencing court must consider age related evidence in mitigation when deciding whether to irrevocably sentence juvenile offender to term of life imprisonment, or equivalent, without parole), (2) his sentence was disproportionate in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution, (3) his sentence was disproportionate in violation of article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution, and (4) his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the sentencing court relied on materially false information, namely, a baseless and subsequently discredited theory alleging the rise of teenage superpredators who would terrorize society.

After hearing argument on the motion, the trial court initially concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing pursuant to Riley . The court grounded its decision on its finding that the sentencing court had failed to give "mitigating effect to the defendant's young age and its hallmarks." Because the trial court's conclusion as to the defendant's Miller claim was dispositive, the court did not address the defendant's remaining three claims. Thereafter, the trial court stayed its order, pending the resolution of the appeals in State v. Boyd , 323 Conn. 816, 151 A.3d 355 (2016), and State v. Delgado , 323 Conn. 801, 151 A.3d 345 (2016). Boyd and Delgado addressed whether the parole eligibility retroactively conferred by P.A. 15-84 remedied a violation of the defendants’ federal constitutional rights, as explicated in Miller . See State v. Boyd , supra, at 820, 151 A.3d 355 ; State v. Delgado , supra, at 802–804, 151 A.3d 345. Answering that question in the affirmative, we held that the trial court properly dismissed those defendants’ motions to correct an illegal sentence for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Boyd , supra, at 820–21, 151 A.3d 355 ; State v. Delgado , supra, at 810–11, 816, 151 A.3d 345. Relying on those decisions, the trial court vacated its order granting the defendant a new sentencing hearing and dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant's claim that the sentencing court had failed to give mitigating effect to the defendant's youth in violation of Miller and Riley .⁵ The trial court also rejected the defendant's remaining three claims.⁶

The defendant appealed from the trial court's ruling to the Appellate Court. That court stayed the appeal, pending this court's disposition of State v. McCleese , supra, 333 Conn. 378, 215 A.3d 1154, and State v. Williams-Bey , supra, 333 Conn. 468, 215 A.3d 711.⁷ Following the official release of McCleese and Williams-Bey on August 23, 2019, and the decision of the Appellate Court lifting the stay, this appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

Relevant to the resolution of this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentencing court did not substantially rely on materially false information, in violation of his right to due process, in sentencing him to a total effective sentence of sixty years of incarceration. Specifically, the defendant claims that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the sentencing court relied on the erroneous and subsequently discredited theory of teenage superpredators in making its sentencing decision. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly,...