State v. Benedict

158 Conn.App. 599

119 A.3d 1245

STATE of Connecticut

v.Adam BENEDICT.

No. 32484.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 10, 2015.

Decided July 21, 2015.

William J. Ward, with whom, on the brief, was William F. Gallagher, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).

Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David S. Shepack, state's attorney, and David R. Shannon, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

SHELDON, MULLINS and SCHALLER, Js.

Opinion

SCHALLER, J.

This case returns to this court following a remand from our Supreme Court. The defendant, Adam Benedict, was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–73a (a)(6).¹ In State v. Benedict, 136 Conn.App. 36, 50, 43 A.3d 772 (2012), rev'd, 313 Conn. 494, 98 A.3d 42 (2014), we reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial as a result of our conclusion that the trial court had “deprived the defendant of any meaningful opportunity to gain the benefit of an inference adverse to the complainant's credibility based on the pendency of her criminal charge.”² We further concluded that the state had failed to establish that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 51, 43 A.3d 772. Finally, we determined, in anticipation of the same issue again arising on retrial, that the court had abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the defendant's login identification for a social media website (login identification). Id., at 54, 43 A.3d 772.

Our Supreme Court reversed our determination that the defendant's right to confrontation had been violated.

State v. Benedict, 313 Conn. 494, 510, 98 A.3d 42 2014 ). It remanded the case back to this court with instruction to consider the defendant's other claims on appeal, including whether the defendant had established harm as a result of the erroneous admission of the login identification.³ Id., at 515, 98 A.3d 42.

In this appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial by denying his challenge for cause to a venireperson and his request for a continuance to investigate and potentially to challenge the jury array, and (2) he suffered harm as a result of the court's erroneous ruling regarding the login identification. We are not persuaded by the defendant's claims and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Our Supreme Court set forth the following facts in its opinion. “At all relevant times, the complainant was a seventeen year old senior at Litchfield High School, and the defendant was a substitute teacher and athletic coach at that school. The defendant first contacted the complainant outside of school in January or February, 2007. A week or two later, the defendant called the complainant while she was visiting a friend's residence and offered to pick her up. The complainant agreed. When the defendant and his friend arrived at the ... residence [where the complainant was visiting], the defendant appeared to be intoxicated. After the defendant's friend drove the defendant and the complainant to the defendant's residence, the friend departed. Upon entering the defendant's residence, the complainant followed him into his bedroom, where he kissed her, took off her shirt, kissed her chest and sucked on her breasts. Then the defendant, still clothed, rubbed his genital region against the complainant's leg and requested that she allow him to ejaculate on her breasts or face. Thereafter, the defendant exposed his penis and requested that the complainant perform fellatio on him. When the complainant refused, the defendant returned his penis to his pants and continued rubbing his genital region against her leg until he ejaculated. After changing his clothing, the defendant lay down on the bed with the complainant, kissed her, squeezed her breasts and fell asleep. The complainant remained at the defendant's residence until the following morning.

“After her graduation from high school, in June or July, 2007, the complainant, accompanied by her boyfriend and another female complainant, went to the state police barracks in Litchfield to file a complaint against the defendant. On the basis of that complaint, the defendant was later arrested and charged with three counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of § 53a–73a (a)(6).⁴ Two counts related to separate alleged incidents involving sexual contact between the defendant and the complainant, and one count related to a third alleged incident involving sexual contact between the defendant and the other female complainant.” (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 497–98, 98 A.3d 42. Following his conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to one year incarceration, execution suspended after ninety days, and three years of probation with special conditions. State v. Benedict, supra, 136 Conn.App. at 40, 43 A.3d 772. The defendant's appeal followed.

As instructed by our Supreme Court, we now consider the defendant's claim that his constitutional rights to a fair trial were violated as a result of the trial court's denials of his challenge for cause to a venireperson and his request for a continuance to challenge the jury array. We also address the defendant's claim that the improper admission of his login identification into evidence constituted harmful error. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly violated his state and federal constitutional rights⁵ to a fair trial by denying his challenge for cause to a venireperson and his request for a continuance to challenge the jury array. As to the former claim, the defendant argues that the court should have excused J.J., a police officer who had a connection with the law enforcement agency that had investigated the defendant sufficient to constitute a principal challenge, on the basis of which the disqualification of J.J. was required.⁶ As to the latter claim, the defendant contends that the court abused its discretion by denying a continuance so that he could have investigated whether a disproportionate number of the members of the array had connections to law enforcement agencies. We disagree with both claims.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth certain relevant legal principles that guide the resolution of the defendant's two claims regarding the makeup of the jury.

“Our jurisprudence on the issue of the right to an impartial jury is well settled. Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.... The modern jury is regarded as an institution in our justice system that determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instructions on the law by the court.... [Article first, § 8, and the sixth amendment require] that a criminal defendant be given a fair trial before an ... unprejudiced jury....” (Footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roman, 262 Conn. 718, 725–26, 817 A.2d 100 (2003) ; see also State v. Kamel, 115 Conn.App. 338, 343, 972 A.2d 780 (2009). Put another way, “[t]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.” (Internal quotation mark omitted.) State v. Ziel, 197 Conn. 60, 64, 495 A.2d 1050 (1985). Guided by these principles, we turn to the defendant's specific claims.

A

The defendant first claims that the court should have excused J.J., a police officer who had a connection with the law enforcement agency that had investigated the defendant sufficient to constitute a principal challenge. He further contends that because a principal challenge existed, the disqualification of J.J. was presumed.⁷ The state counters that the defendant failed to sustain his burden of proving that a sufficiently close relationship existed to support the principal challenge. We agree with the state.

The following facts are necessary for our resolution of this claim. Near the end of the first day of jury selection, and after the defendant had used his final preemptory challenge,⁸ J.J. appeared for voir dire examination. He testified that he was employed as a police officer in Southbury and indicated that he could not think of any reason that he could not be fair and impartial in this criminal case. He informed the court that he had been a police officer for almost four years and that prior to that he had worked in sales.

The prosecutor then questioned J.J. and asked if municipal police officers did “not like” state police troopers and if he had a bias against state troopers. J.J. responded: “No. I don't think so. Also, in Southbury, my boss ... is a state trooper.”⁹ J.J. then indicated that in Southbury, there were twenty-six police officers and one state trooper.

Defense counsel then questioned J.J., and the following colloquy ensued:

“Q. I wasn't nervous until I saw that you were a police officer. That doesn't give me some reason to be nervous, now? I mean, you understand we're the defendant in this case. My client's been arrested by the state police and you work, or your immediate boss works for the state police. I guess the question is, do I have a reason to be nervous? I mean, you work for the state police. You said that. Is that correct?

“A. I work under the state police. Yes.

“Q. Right.

“A. That's correct.

“Q. And it was a state police that arrested him.

“A. Okay.

“Q. So, I mean. Is he sitting at any disadvantage at all with you because of that as we sit here?

“A. I say, no. He's not.

“Q. Absolutely not?

“A. No.

“Q. All right.

“A. I have no opinion about this whatsoever.

“Q. Okay.

“A. I have no opinion about anything I've heard so far.”

J.J. indicated that he would not give any state trooper who testified any more credibility than the...