State v. Bharrat

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GANESH BHARRAT

AC 31734

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

September 13, 2010

Officially released May 24, 2011

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(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Mullarkey, J.)

Adele V. Patterson, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, Michael W. Riley, assistant state's attorney, and Sandra L. Tullius, former senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

HARPER, J. The defendant, Ganesh Bharrat, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1) and larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124 (a) (1).¹The defendant claims (1) that the trial court improperly failed to deliver an instruction on the defense of diminished capacity; (2) that the court's instruction concerning evidence of intoxication, as it related to the crime of murder, was deficient; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed felony murder; and (4) that the court improperly expanded the offense of felony murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found that, on December 24, 2005, the defendant met the victim, Jose Morales, in a bar. After conversing with the victim, the defendant accompanied the victim to the victim's apartment in Hartford. Later that evening, after the victim had fallen asleep, the defendant entered the victim's bedroom and stabbed the victim numerous times with a knife, thereby causing his death. The defendant left the victim's apartment with the keys to the victim's automobile as well as the victim's wallet and cellular telephone. The defendant drove away from the scene in the victim's automobile, later renting the automobile to Henry Garcia. The defendant used the victim's cellular telephone and, later, stashed the victim's wallet and house keys in the apartment where he had been living at the time of the crimes. Later, police discovered the murder weapon and the bloodstained clothing worn by the defendant at the time of the murder, both of which contained the victim's genetic material, in the defendant's apartment. By means of statements that the defendant made to the police, he fully implicated himself in the victim's murder. Referring to the victim's death, the defendant stated to the police, ''He got what he deserved. I did what I had to do.'' Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

First, the defendant claims that the court improperly failed to deliver an instruction on the defense of diminished capacity. We disagree.

The record reflects that the defendant submitted an amended request to charge in which he asked the court to deliver a diminished capacity instruction with regard to the crime of murder.² Prior to delivering its charge, the court, concluding that the evidence did not support the requested instruction, indicated that it would not deliver the instruction. The defendant's attorney stated that the evidence of the defendant's state of mind sup-ported the instruction and took an exception to this ruling. In its charge, the court delivered general instructions concerning specific and general intent. Thereafter, the court delivered an instruction concerning the offense of murder: ''A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person. For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Element one, intent to cause death. The first element is that the defendant specifically intended to cause the death of another person. There is no particular length of time necessary for the defendant to have formed the specific intent to kill. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result when his conscious objective is to cause such result. And I refer you back to the specific intent instruction. . . .

''[The] second element is that the defendant, acting with the intent to cause [the] death of another person, caused the death of Jose Morales. This means that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the victim's death. You must find it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose Morales died as a result of the actions of the defendant.

''In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intend[ed] to cause the death of another person and . . . with that intent the defendant caused the death of Jose Morales. If you find unanimously, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the state has proven all of the element[s] of murder, including identity, and disproved beyond a reasonable doubt intoxication,³ then you will find the defendant guilty of murder. If you unanimously find the state has not proven an element . . . then you will find the defendant not guilty.'' At the conclusion of the court's charge, the defendant's attorney renewed his objection.

The defendant contends that the evidence supported the requested instruction and, thus, that the court's refusal to deliver the instruction was in error.⁴ ''If [a] defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction. . . . The defendant's right to such an instruction is founded on the principles of due process. . . . Before an instruction is warranted, however, [a] defendant bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to inject [the defense] into the case. . . . Conversely, the court has a duty not to submit to the jury, in its charge, any issue upon which the evidence would not reasonably support a finding.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lynch, 287 Conn. 464, 470-71, 948 A.2d 1026 (2008). It is of no consequence if the evidentiary foundation for the request to charge is ''weak or incredible,'' and we must consider the evi-dence in ''the light most favorable to supporting the defendant's request to charge.'' State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270, 283, 623 A.2d 42 (1993).

''[E]vidence [regarding a defendant's mental capacity] is admitted not for the purpose of exempting a defendant from criminal responsibility, but as bearing upon the question of whether he possessed, at the time he committed the act, the necessary specific intent, the proof of which was required to obtain a conviction.'' State v. Hines, 187 Conn. 199, 204, 445 A.2d 314 (1982). ''To warrant consideration of diminished capacity . . . the defendant must have presented evidence which might have raised a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the specified mental state.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pagano, 23 Conn. App. 447, 450, 581 A.2d 1058, cert. denied, 217 Conn. 802, 583 A.2d 132 (1990).

''To establish a violation of § 53a-54a, the crime of murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to cause the death of another person . . . cause[d] the death of such person or of a third person . . . . [T]he specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of murder. To act intentionally, the defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of the victim.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aviles, 107 Conn. App. 209, 217, 944 A.2d 994, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 922, 951 A.2d 570 (2008).

We turn to a discussion of the evidence upon which the defendant relies to demonstrate that there was an evidentiary foundation for his requested instruction. The defendant draws our attention to the testimony of Timothy Shaw, a Hartford police detective at the time of his investigation of the victim's murder. Shaw testified that prior to his arrest, the defendant voluntarily participated in an interview at the Hartford police department. During the early part of the interview, the defendant stated that ''at some times he would see people killed'' and that these killings he envisioned occurred ''first by shooting and then by stabbings.'' When asked if he believed he was capable of killing anyone, the defendant replied that ''he wasn't sure.'' Shaw testified that the defendant did not appear to exhibit any mental disorder at the time of the interview and that the...