State v. Blanchard

337 Ga.App. 130

786 S.E.2d 513

The STATE

v.BLANCHARD.

No. A16A0086.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 18, 2016.

Lee Darragh, Dist. Atty., Jennifer Eve Geller, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Appellant.

Philip Paul Pilgrim Jr., for Appellee.

DILLARD, Judge.

Wendy Blanchard was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol less safe (“DUI”), driving with a suspended license, and an open-container violation. After her arrest, Blanchard moved to suppress statements that she made to the arresting officer, and following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. In doing so, the court also found that the arresting officer lacked sufficient probable cause to arrest Blanchard for DUI. The State appeals,¹ challenging the trial court's finding that there was insufficient probable cause to support Blanchard's arrest. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling,² the evidence shows that on July 23, 2014, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Ethan Taffar, an officer with the Dawson County Sheriff's Office, was driving his patrol car when he saw Blanchard's vehicle, which was a few cars ahead of him, merge into the “gore area” of the highway. Taffar then pulled up behind her because it appeared that she was having car trouble, and he wanted to ask if she needed assistance. When Taffar asked her if everything was alright, Blanchard told him that she had run out of gas, and he offered to drive her to a nearby gas station. Once Blanchard was in his patrol car, Taffar asked to see her license, but Blanchard stated that she did not have it with her. Taffar then asked for her name and date of birth, and she gave him the name “ Gloria Williams.” But when Taffar told Blanchard that he could not find that person in the relevant database, Blanchard promptly provided her real name and date of birth, explaining that she initially thought that he wanted to know the name of the person who owned the car. Taffar then ran a check on Blanchard and discovered that she had a suspended license. As a result, he exited the vehicle, went around the car to Blanchard's door, and arrested her for driving with a suspended license.

Next, Taffar made arrangements for Blanchard's vehicle to be towed before transporting her to a detention center. During the transport, Taffar asked Blanchard if she had any contraband in her purse. Blanchard said no at first, but then admitted that she had a large plastic cup in her purse with a mixture of vodka and Kool–Aid. When Taffar asked Blanchard how much alcohol she had consumed that day, she responded that “she had a few before she left her house and then she was mixing [a drink] while she was going down the road to drink when she got home.”

After they arrived at the detention center, Taffar read Blanchard her Miranda rights.³ And it was at this point that Taffar first noticed Blanchard's “eyes were bloodshot and watery and that there was a slight odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from her person....” Taffar continued questioning Blanchard about her alcohol consumption that day, and she indicated that she had “one and a half” drinks before she left her house that morning.⁴ Blanchard also took a preliminary breath test, which was positive for alcohol.

Thereafter, Blanchard was charged, via accusation, with DUI, driving with a suspended license, and having an open container of alcohol in her vehicle. In May 2015, Blanchard filed a motion to suppress all statements that she made to Taffar, arguing, inter alia, that she was unlawfully interrogated before being advised of her Miranda rights and that her “warrantless stop, detention, search and interrogation” by law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment of the United State Constitution.⁵ Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Blanchard's motion, finding that any statements she made after being detained, but before she was Mirandized, were inadmissible. The court also found that, although Taffar acted appropriately given his level of training, he lacked probable cause to arrest Blanchard for DUI because there was no evidence that her driving ability was impaired by alcohol consumption. This appeal by the State follows.⁶

In its sole enumeration of error, the State argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was insufficient probable cause to support Blanchard's arrest for DUI. We disagree.

To begin with, we note that in reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence “most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment, and the trial court's findings on disputed facts and credibility of the witnesses are adopted unless they are clearly erroneous.”⁷ Further, because the trial court sits as the trier of fact, its findings are “analogous to a jury verdict and will not be disturbed if any evidence supports them.”⁸ That said, we owe no deference to the “way in which the court below resolved questions of law.”⁹ With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to the State's contention that there was sufficient probable cause to support Blanchard's DUI arrest.

In Georgia, probable cause exists for an arrest when “the objective facts known to the officer establish a probability that the suspect has been engaged in illegal activity.”¹⁰ And a “probability” is less than a certainty, but “more than a mere suspicion or possibility.”¹¹ Accordingly, to arrest a suspect for DUI less safe to drive, an officer must have “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information that a suspect was actually in physical control of a moving vehicle, while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders [her] incapable of driving safely. Mere presence of alcohol is not the issue. ”¹² Further, as we have recently explained, “the mere fact that a suspect admits to having consumed alcohol before driving does not provide the probable cause necessary to support an arrest for DUI.”¹³ Indeed, impaired driving ability depends solely upon “an individual's response to alcohol[,] [and] [b]ecause individual responses to alcohol vary, the presence of alcohol, in a defendant's body, by itself, does not support an inference that the defendant was an impaired driver.”¹⁴

In arguing that there was sufficient probable cause for Taffar to reasonably believe that Blanchard was an impaired driver, the State references the following evidence: “Blanchard smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot, watery eyes, admitted to drinking before driving, admitted to mixing a drink while driving, had an open container of alcohol in her vehicle, demonstrated slight confusion, held on to the patrol vehicle door as she exited, and tested positive on the [preliminary breath] test.” But regardless of whether this evidence, if believed by the trial court, could be adequate to provide probable cause for Blanchard's DUI arrest, the law does not require a trial judge to “believe the testimony of a witness or to find probable cause automatically whenever certain words are spoken.”¹⁵

And here, the trial court summarized its factual findings as follows:

[Blanchard] admitted that she had consumed alcohol the night before and “earlier that morning.” It was at that point that [ ] Taffar first noted a ‘slight odor’ of an alcoholic beverage. No odor was detected during the initial encounter nor during their discussion in the patrol vehicle on the way to the detention center. .... Taffar also stated that [Blanchard] had slightly bloodshot and watery eyes but admitted on cross[-]examination that she had been crying and the appearance of her eyes [was] consistent with that emotion. Finally, ... Taffar asked [Blanchard] to submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT). [Blanchard] took the test and it registered positive for alcohol. No field sobriety evaluations were conducted. The only evidence on the record to support [Blanchard's] arrest for DUI is [her] admission, a slight odor, and a positive result on the PBT.

This Court finds that ... Taffar acted appropriately; however, at the time he was not field sobriety trained and lacked the necessary training to conduct a thorough investigation.^[16] Based on the manifestations noted above, there was no evidence offered to prove that [Blanchard's] ability to drive was impaired due to alcohol consumption.... No other manifestations existed that would lead to the belief that [Blanchard] was impaired.

As detailed below, these findings were supported by the evidence.

At the suppression hearing, Taffar testified that, during his interactions with Blanchard, she “walked properly” without stumbling, merged into the “gore area” at a safe speed, exhibited no “erratic or less safe driving behavior,” exhibited no major or minor motor skill issues, and was polite and responsive to his questions. In fact, there was nothing in Blanchard's behavior that led Taffar “to believe that she was impaired in any way.” Moreover, it was undisputed that Taffar first approached Blanchard to assist her with car trouble, not because he had seen her driving in a manner that would suggest she was impaired. Further, the video of Blanchard's transport to the detention center confirms that she answered all of Taffar's questions promptly and clearly. And while Taffar testified that Blanchard's eyes were bloodshot and watery, and that he was able to smell the “slight” odor of alcohol emanating from her, he nevertheless confirmed that he did not make these observations upon first encountering Blanchard or when they were in a confined space together in the patrol car with the safety panel to the backseat open. In fact, Taffar did not observe that Blanchard's eyes were bloodshot or smell any odor of an alcoholic beverage on her until after they arrived at the detention center, which was nearly 45 minutes after he first encountered her.

The State argues that Taffar's testimony that Blanchard's eyes were bloodshot and watery, that he smelled the odor of alcohol, and that Blanchard admitted to drinking alcohol before driving,...