State v. Bland

The State, Respondent, v. Terrance L. Bland, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002406

No. 2020-UP-218

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

July 22, 2020

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

Heard June 3, 2020

Appeal From Greenwood County William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of Greenwood, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM

Terrance L. Bland appeals his convictions for first-degree burglary three counts of second-degree assault and battery, and discharging a firearm into a dwelling. The burglary charge stemmed from Bland's entrance into his sister's home where he assaulted her boyfriend, Xavier Harris. The assault and battery and firearm charges related to Bland's shooting into his sister's home the following day, after he discovered arrest warrants for burglary and assault and battery had been issued for him. On appeal, Bland argues the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict on his first-degree-burglary charge because the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence he entered a dwelling without consent and (2) ruling a search warrant was not needed for gunshot residue (GSR) testing and even if a warrant was necessary, finding the officers obtained a valid search warrant to test Bland for GSR. We affirm.

1. The trial court properly denied Bland's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree burglary because viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the State presented sufficient evidence Bland entered his sister's, Okeava Bland's, home without consent. See State v. Curtis, 356 S.C. 622, 633, 591 S.E.2d 600, 605 (2004) ("On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State."); id. at 633-34, 591 S.E.2d at 605 ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the Court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."). The State presented evidence Bland entered Okeava's home without her consent as (1) Okeava admitted Bland came to her home uninvited the night of the burglary (2) Okeava admitted she did not say anything to Bland when he came in, so she did not give him express consent to enter her home; and (3) Deputy Robertson, one of the responding officers, testified Okeava told him Bland's visit was "unwanted," and he wrote in his incident report that Okeava told him Bland appeared "uninvited" at her home the night of the burglary. See id. at 633 591 S.E.2d at 605 ("In reviewing a motion for directed verdict, the trial [court] is concerned with the existence of the evidence, not with its weight.").

We acknowledge evidence presented at the trial could support the conclusion Okeava consented to Bland's entry into her home. Okeava and Bland testified Bland visited Okeava's home three to four times a week with or without an express invitation, and on the night in question, Okeava opened the door and let Bland into her home. However, even if Okeava gave Bland her consent, the State presented sufficient evidence Bland gained Okeava's consent "through deceit, trickery, artifice, or misrepresentation." State v. Dixon, 337 S.C. 455, 459, 523 S.E.2d 784 786 (Ct. App. 1999). Much like the defendant in Dixon, Bland entered the home as he normally did, by knocking and having Okeava open the door for him, but his intentions were not to visit with his sister and niece but to confront and fight Harris. Bland testified he went to Okeava's home to confront Harris, and after entering the home, he immediately went to where Harris was sleeping and confronted him. See id. (finding the trial court properly denied the motion for a directed verdict because the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant gained consent to enter the home through "through deceit, trickery, artifice, or misrepresentation," by coming to a past acquaintance's home and...