State v. Block

396 Mont. 478

448 P.3d 505

2019 MT 180

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Jeremy William BLOCK, Defendant and Appellant.

DA 17-0742

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: June 12, 2019

Decided: August 6, 2019

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, James Reavis, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Doud, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Susan L. Weber, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Jeremy William Block (Block) appeals his conviction of two counts of incest, in violation of § 45-5-507, MCA, following jury trial in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County. We affirm, and consider the following issue:

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Block’s for-cause challenge of a prospective juror during voir dire?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On August 10, 2015, Block was charged with two counts of felony incest due to repeated sexual contact with his stepdaughter, K.O. K.O. was born in 1997 and is the daughter of Larah and Zach. Larah and Zach divorced in 2005 before K.O. turned nine. In May 2009, Larah met Block, when Block was 34 years old and K.O. was 11. In July or August 2009, Block moved into Larah’s home, and the two were married in January 2010. When K.O. was 13 or 14 years old, Block began making sexual advances toward her and provided her with his prescription medications and alcohol. When K.O. was 14, Block raped her, and continued to sexually abuse her until she was 17. This abuse was so frequent that K.O. could not estimate the number of times it occurred. K.O. eventually became addicted to opioids and alcohol as a result of Block providing them to her. During this period of abuse, K.O. became very distanced from Zach and ceased visiting or communicating with him for years. K.O. testified that Block told her Zach and Larah did not care about K.O. and wanted nothing to do with her. K.O. moved in with her grandparents around April 2015, when she was 17, and told them that Block had been sexually abusing her, leading to the filing of charges.

¶3 Block pled not guilty to the incest charges and his case proceeded to trial on August 21, 2017. During voir dire, the prospective jurors were asked whether they knew the victim or any of her family members. Juror Stewart responded that he knew Zach, resulting in the following colloquy:

Juror Stewart: Zach [ ]. If it’s the same one that I’m thinking of, I—I know Zach [ ], but I don’t know if it’s the same one. Because if it is—their family is in—out in the audience here, and I knew him, you know. If it’s the same Zach [ ]. She’s nodding it is. So I know them in the audience. I’ve known him since he was little, first born.

The State: Okay. What effect do you think that might have if he comes in and testifies for the State, you know?

Juror Stewart: I think I could be honest. But I just—I wasn’t sure. I had to stop and think Zach [ ]. And it is the same one I know.

The State: How do you know him?

Juror Stewart: I know his parents. And we’ve been friends for a long time. He grew up with my kids. They were born—you know, my kids and him, they were born at the same time. We did a lot of stuff together, you know, as families, church and camping, and all that kind of stuff so—

The State: Well, do you really think you can be fair? I mean—

Juror Stewart: With his parents and stuff, and watching, I don’t know. It would be kind of hard, I think. I mean, just because of the relationship that we’ve had for quite a while.

The State: Right. And that’s what we’re trying to find out here, so we can deal with this up front, and not have to find out half-way through the trial. And—

Juror Stewart: Right.

The State: And I have a problem. So, I mean, it’s—it’s your call.

You tell us. Can you be fair? Can you be fair to the Defendant if testimony comes in against him through [Zach]?

Juror Stewart: I don’t think I really could because the relationship we’ve had in the past. Especially—I don’t know, family sitting out—and having interaction with his family afterwards. I don’t know.

The court: I’m not—I’m not really following the line of questions. This is a fact witness who’s going to be testifying. He’s not talking about that he knows the Defendant; right? You don’t know the Defendant, do you?

Juror Stewart: No. I know the witness, Zach. I know the witness.

The court: So he’s a fact witness. I don’t know the nature of what his testimony is going to be. The issue becomes, because you know him, would you give his testimony greater weight than another witness’s testimony just because you know him?

Juror Stewart: Putting it that way, no. I would be okay. I wouldn’t give him more weight than—

The court: Would you give it less weight?

Juror Stewart: No, putting it that way.

The court: So this fact witness who’s going to testify that you know, is your familiarity with him, or your relationship with him, going to in any way affect your ability to consider the evidence, to hear the evidence, to listen to my instructions, and render a verdict? I’m just not sure how your knowledge of him would make you biased to one party or the other in this particular case.

Juror Stewart: I think I could be fair, but I’m just letting you know that that’s how I know him. And I did know his parents very well and stuff, so I’m just letting you know. Okay.

¶4 Block’s counsel then had the opportunity to question the prospective jurors, including Juror Stewart, resulting in the following colloquy:

Defense counsel: Mr. Stewart, I need to ask you some questions. How are you doing today?

Juror Stewart: Fine.

Defense counsel: Okay. Earlier today, much earlier today, you said that you actually knew Zachary [ ]?

Juror Stewart: Yes.

Defense counsel: And how long have you known him?

Juror Stewart: Well, I’ve lost track of him. I knew him probably from 30 years ago, plus, because that’s when our—his parents and my wife, we had our children together, and we went to church together. We went camping together. So—but I have not probably seen him for—maybe not recognize him if I saw him, you know, for, oh, a good 20 years or so. But—

Defense counsel: So can I assume then that you have not met his daughter?

Juror Stewart: No, I have not.

Defense counsel: And have you heard anything at all about this case?

Juror Stewart: No, I have not.

Defense counsel: Do you have opinions as to [Zach] that you are bringing here to this courthouse today?

Juror Stewart: No. It’s been so long that, no.

Defense counsel: All right. And if you were a defendant, would you want somebody on the jury that knew the witnesses?

Juror Stewart: I guess it would depend on how long they have been apart. But I don’t know if I would or not. That might be kind of iffy for me.

Defense counsel: Okay. Now, if you were—if you were the defendant, would you want yourself as a juror?

Juror Stewart: Boy, in this case, I think I could because it has been so long, you know, and that I have even seen him, or whatever. But it might—it might influence if I knew, you know, that the other person was—that knew me—and was going to be, you know, making a decision on my future.

¶5 Following this exchange, Block moved to dismiss Juror Stewart from the jury for cause. The State objected, arguing Juror Stewart testified that he and Zach had no contact for approximately 20 years, he hadn’t met K.O., and he thought he could be fair and impartial. The District Court denied Block’s for-cause challenge of Juror Stewart on the basis that the standard for removal under § 46-16-115, MCA, had not been met. Block used a preemptory challenge to remove Juror Stewart and exhausted all additional preemptory challenges. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Block on both counts of incest.

¶6 Block appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 "We review district court denials of challenges of prospective jurors for cause for an abuse of discretion." State v. Johnson , 2019 MT 68, ¶ 7, 395 Mont. 169, 437 P.3d 147. "In the context of challenges for cause, a court abuses its discretion if it fails to excuse a prospective juror whose actual bias is discovered during voir dire." State v. Heath , 2004 MT 58, ¶ 7, 320 Mont. 211, 89 P.3d 947. If a defendant subsequently uses a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror who was challenged for cause, and ultimately exhausts all afforded peremptory challenges, "the erroneous denial of a challenge of a prospective juror for cause is a structural error requiring automatic reversal." Johnson , ¶ 7.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Block contends that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his challenge for cause, arguing Juror Stewart’s responses during voir dire demonstrated he could not act "with entire impartiality in this case" because he knew one of the witnesses.

¶9 "A criminal defendant’s fundamental right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by the United States and Montana Constitutions." State v. Russell , 2018 MT 26, ¶ 12, 390 Mont. 253, 411 P.3d 1260 ; U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Mont. Const. art. II, § 24 ; State v. Allen , 2010 MT 214, ¶ 25, 357 Mont. 495, 241 P.3d 1045 ; State v. Hausauer , 2006 MT 336, ¶ 20, 335 Mont. 137, 149 P.3d 895 ; Johnson , ¶ 9. Accordingly, a defendant may challenge a prospective juror for cause if the juror demonstrates a "state of mind" regarding the case or either party "that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality" concerning the parties and material matters in the case. Section 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA ; Johnson , ¶ 9. "In determining whether to grant a challenge for cause, the court must examine both the statutory language and the totality of the circumstances." State v. Taylor , 2009 MT 161, ¶ 20, 350 Mont. 447, 208 P.3d 422. The dispositive question is "whether the totality of the juror’s statements and referenced circumstances raise a serious question or doubt about his or her willingness or ability to...