State v. Bonilla

317 Conn. 758

120 A.3d 481

STATE of Connecticut

v.Thomas F. BONILLA.

No. 19056.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 21, 2014.

Decided Aug. 18, 2015.

Daniel J. Foster, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state's attorney, and Terence D. Mariani, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

ROBINSON, J.

The defendant, Thomas F. Bonilla, appeals¹ from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of murder as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–8(a)² and 53a–54a(a),³ and one count of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54c.⁴ On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of murder as an accessory; and (2) the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the defense of duress, which is defined in General Statutes § 53a–14.⁵ We disagree with both claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history. On the evening of April 10, 1998, the defendant and his brothers, Noel Bermudez and Victor Santiago, were celebrating their reunion after a long period apart. The brothers' celebration initially entailed driving around Waterbury, drinking liquor, and snorting heroin. At some point during the evening, the defendant noticed that Bermudez was carrying a gun—which did not surprise him, because Bermudez always carried a gun.

Eventually, Santiago suggested that the brothers should rob Freddy Morales, the owner of a bar in Waterbury. In proposing this robbery to his brothers, Santiago explained that he had been stalking Morales, and believed that Morales would be carrying lots of money after closing up his bar that night. The defendant knew that Santiago had a long-standing grudge against Morales because, a few years prior, Morales had shot Santiago during a fight at that same bar. Santiago still bore scars from that shooting on his neck. Although the defendant expressed some reluctance, he ultimately went along with this plan “because of how [his] family rolls....”

Santiago drove his brothers to the street where Morales lived. Bermudez and the defendant exited the car, and then waited nearby for Morales to return home from his bar. Approximately fifteen minutes later, they saw Morales. Bermudez sneaked up behind Morales on foot, while the defendant stayed back about “ten to fifteen feet ... to look out in case something went wrong.” Bermudez then demanded that Morales give up his money, pointed a gun at his chest, and shot him twice. After Bermudez grabbed a bank bag from the coat Morales was wearing, he and the defendant took off running to the getaway car, and Santiago drove them away. By the time emergency personnel responded to the scene of the shooting, Morales was dead.

Immediately after the shooting, the three brothers went to Santiago's house. Santiago's wife, Damaris Algarin–Santiago, came downstairs and saw the three brothers sorting through a pile of cash and checks on her coffee table. Bermudez told Algarin–Santiago that he had shot Morales, which the defendant quickly followed upon by threatening Algarin–Santiago, stating, “if you say anything ... I'm going to kill you and kill your mother.” The defendant asked Algarin–Santiago to deposit the stolen checks in her banking account, but Algarin–Santiago refused, and so one of the brothers burned the checks. The brothers continued destroying evidence by burning their clothes and cleaning the getaway car. Thereafter, Santiago and Algarin–Santiago left the house, and Santiago disposed of the disassembled murder weapon in three different locations. The night concluded when Santiago and Algarin–Santiago returned home and the brothers concocted an alibi.

The murder remained unsolved for more than a decade. By April, 2010, however, Santiago and Algarin–Santiago were estranged, and the latter gave information about the murder to the police. On April 11, 2010, the police arrested the defendant for his involvement with the murder. The defendant then gave a detailed statement about the murder to the police.

The state charged the defendant, in a two count substitute information, with murder as an accessory and felony murder.⁶ The case was tried to a jury. At trial, after the state rested, the court denied the defendant's oral motion for a directed verdict. The defendant then rested his case without presenting any evidence. On May 10, 2012, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. During a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court initially stated that it would sentence the defendant to sixty years imprisonment for each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. At the state's request, however, the court stated that it would instead merge the convictions and attach one sentence of sixty years imprisonment to the felony murder count, and rendered judgment accordingly. This direct appeal followed.

I

We begin with the defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of murder as an accessory. Specifically, the defendant argues that, contrary to the requirements of §§ 53a–8(a) and 53a–54a(a), “[t]here [was] no evidence that [he] had any intent or conscious objective to cause the death of ... Morales.” The defendant contends that, “[e]ven if personal animus made ... Morales a more attractive victim for this crime in Santiago's mind,” it does not necessarily follow that the brothers all shared the specific intent to kill Morales during the robbery.⁷ Citing State v. Bennett, 307 Conn. 758, 774, 59 A.3d 221 (2013), in which this court recently concluded that there was insufficient evidence that a participant in a burglary shared his coparticipant's intent to cause the death of a victim, the defendant asserts that the circumstances of the present case are even less egregious. In particular, he contends that, unlike the defendant in Bennett, there was no evidence adduced at trial that he participated substantially in the events surrounding the murder or carried a weapon to the scene of the crime. In response, the state argues that evidence was indeed presented at trial regarding the defendant's intimate involvement before, during, and after the shooting, and that the jury reasonably could have inferred from that evidence that the defendant shared the intent to cause the death of Morales.⁸ Distinguishing Bennett, the state also asserts that, in the present case, there was evidence of a shared fraternal motive to kill Morales that was independent of the predicate crime of robbery, namely, to retaliate against Morales for his having shot Santiago in the neck.

We agree with the state, and conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant shared the intent to cause the death of Morales.

“In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and then determine whether from the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the trier of fact reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 763, 59 A.3d 221. Although “the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense ... each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be [proven] beyond a reasonable doubt.... If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt....

“Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct.... It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.... In evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence.... The [finder of fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Crespo, 317 Conn. 1, 16–17, 115 A.3d 447 (2015).

The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only with regard to the intent element of his murder as an accessory conviction. See footnotes 2 and 3 of this opinion. We note that, “[t]o be guilty as an accessory one must share the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with the perpetrator of the crime....” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sargeant, 288 Conn. 673, 680, 954 A.2d 839 (2008). In accordance with our murder statute, a conviction of murder as an accessory thus requires, inter alia, that the accessory shared the perpetrator's “intent to cause the death of another person....” General Statutes § 53a–54a(a). “A person acts ‘intentionally’ with respect to a result ... described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result....” General Statutes § 53a–3(11).

As we have observed on multiple occasions, “[t]he state of mind of one accused of a crime is often the most significant and, at the same time, the most elusive element of the crime charged.... Because it is practically impossible to know what someone is thinking or intending at any given moment, absent an outright...