State v. Bourgeois

320 So.3d 1047

STATE of Louisiana

v.James BOURGEOIS

No. 2020-K-00883

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 13, 2021

Rehearing Denied June 29, 2021

PER CURIAM:

Defendant, an elected member of the Lafourche Parish Council, was found guilty by a unanimous jury of filing or maintaining false public records, La. R.S. 14:133(A). The charge arose from the allegation that defendant had falsely asserted in his Parish Council election qualifying form that he was domiciled in Lafourche Parish. The trial court sentenced him to a suspended sentence of three years imprisonment at hard labor with two years of probation.

The court of appeal reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence because it found the evidence insufficient to prove that defendant falsely represented his domicile on his qualifying form. State v. Bourgeois , 2019-0426 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/17/20), 306 So.3d 465. The court found the evidence, when viewed according to the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), insufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude defendant changed his domicile from his residence in Lafourche Parish to his wife's home in Jefferson Parish, where he resided after they married in April 2014 until they separated in May 2018. Judge Welch dissented. Judge Welch found that the jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence presented that defendant had changed his domicile to Jefferson Parish when he attested that his domicile remained in Lafourche Parish. Judge Welch stated, "Based on the totality of the evidence presented at trial—the testimony of his family members, combined with the observations of law enforcement—when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the State introduced sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant filed an affidavit falsely attesting that he was domiciled in Lafourche Parish." Bourgeois , 2019-0426, p. 21, 306 So.3d at 479 (Welch, J., dissenting).

"In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) … [T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Captville , 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La. 1984).

The offense of filing false public records is defined by La. R.S. 14:133(A) as:

A. Filing false public records is the filing or depositing for record in any public office or with any public official, or the maintaining as required by law, regulation, or rule, with knowledge of its falsity, of any of the following:

(1) Any forged document.

(2) Any wrongfully altered document.

(3) Any document containing a false statement or false representation of a material fact.

There is no dispute that the election qualifying form is a public record and that defendant filed it. The sole question is whether the evidence, when viewed under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia , is sufficient to prove the form contained a false statement with regard to defendant's domicile.

The State contends that it presented substantial evidence showing defendant had abandoned his domicile in Lafourche Parish and established a new domicile in Jefferson Parish by the time he submitted his qualifying form. Defendant responds that his domicile was presumed to continue in Lafourche Parish unless there was positive and satisfactory proof that he had established a new domicile and had abandoned the former domicile. Therefore, defendant asserts that the State failed to rebut that presumption.

This court addressed the legal requirements of domicile in Landiak v. Richmond , 05-0758 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, stating:

The terms "residence" and "domicile" are legal terms that are not synonymous. The most oft-cited difference between the two concepts is that a person can have several residences, but only one domicile. Domicile is an issue of fact that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Civil Code art. 38 provides generally that "the domicile of each citizen is in the parish wherein he has his principal establishment." Concerning "principal establishment," Civil Code art. 38 states as follows:

The principal establishment is that in which he makes his habitual residence; if he resides alternately in several places, and nearly as much one as in another, and has not declared his intention in the manner hereafter prescribed, any one of the said places where he resides may be considered as his principal establishment, at the option of the persons whose interests are hereby affected.

Applying the above article, Louisiana case law has traditionally held that domicile consists of two elements, residence and intent to remain. When a party has not declared his intention in the manner prescribed by Civil Code art. 42, proof of a person's intention regarding domicile shall depend upon circumstances. Thus, determination of a party's intent to change his or her domicile must be based on the actual state of the facts, not simply on what the person declares them to be. The expressed intent of the party may be at variance with the intent as evidenced by conduct. Each case is unique and the courts attempt to arrive at the true intent, whether express or implied.

Every person has a domicile of origin that he retains until he acquires another. Because the case law recognizes a legal presumption against change of domicile, a party seeking to show that domicile has been changed must overcome that presumption by presenting positive and satisfactory proof of establishment of domicile as a matter of fact with the intention of remaining in the new place and of abandoning the former domicile. Of course, because domicile and residence are two different legal concepts the facts could indicate that one has abandoned the former domicile in favor of a new domicile even if the person continues to have a place of residence at the former domicile.

Landiak , 05-0758, pp. 9–10, 899 So.2d at 542–43 (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted; edited for consistency).

As noted in Judge Welch's dissent, the State presented evidence that defendant had abandoned his former domicile in Lafourche Parish and had established a new domicile in Jefferson Parish. Specifically, defendant registered a 2015 Dodge truck in his and his wife's names, listing their Jefferson Parish address. In addition, police surveillance captured defendant driving across the parish line at least 190 times, with defendant's route originating eastbound from Jefferson Parish and traveling into Lafourche Parish. A detective further testified that it appeared defendant was driving from Jefferson Parish to Lafourche Parish and switching vehicles before returning to Jefferson Parish.

The detective also obtained defendant's utility bills for the Lafourche Parish property pursuant to a warrant. These records showed that approximately one month before defendant's wedding in 2014, electricity usage at the Lafourche Parish property decreased to one-half of what it had been previously. Water consumption, in contrast, increased significantly between November 2015 and November 2016, and the water company had tried to contact defendant about a likely leak at the property.

Defendant reported a burglary at the Lafourche Parish property in August 2015, in which he claimed some of his guns had been stolen. Defendant was uncertain when the burglary occurred. The investigating officer testified that it did not appear that anyone was living in the residence, the grass was uncut, and the interior of the house was very dusty. Defendant told the investigating officer that "he wasn't living at the house for a while and was thinking about having it demolished." After the burglary, defendant moved the majority of his guns to the Jefferson Parish residence.

Defendant's children from a previous marriage moved to the Jefferson Parish home and attended school in Jefferson Parish. On the school application for defendant's son, defendant provided the Jefferson Parish address as his own. Defendant's ex-wife testified that the majority of their exchanges of custody occurred in Jefferson Parish and that their children spent holidays at the Jefferson Parish home. She further testified that their children refused to live in the Lafourche Parish property because of its "deplorable" condition.

Although testimony revealed that defendant occasionally slept at the Lafourche Parish residence, several witnesses testified that after the 2014 marriage, defendant spent a majority of his nights in Jefferson Parish. In his statement to the officer investigating the August 2015 burglary, defendant admitted that he had not been living in the Lafourche Parish home for an extended amount of time. Importantly, defendant told the investigating officer that he was considering having the Lafourche Parish home demolished.

Accordingly, defendant's daily routine before and at the time he filed his qualifying form supports the jury's conclusion that defendant intended to abandon his Lafourche Parish domicile in favor of living with his family in the Jefferson Parish home. Further, although Monica Bourgeois testified that he "never fully moved in[to]" the Jefferson Parish residence, other testimony and evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the Jefferson Parish home was defendant's new domicile, and he intended to abandon the former domicile. That is, defendant "surround[ed] himself with his family and the comforts of domestic life," as he regularly slept in Jefferson Parish, his children resided in Jefferson Parish when defendant exercised physical custody, and his children attended schools in Jefferson Parish during 2015 until 20...