State v. Brandley

The State of Texas, Appellant v. Isaac Wesley Brandley, Appellee

No. 03-19-00602-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin

August 6, 2021

Do Not Publish

FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF COMAL COUNTY NO. 2016CR1824, THE HONORABLE CHARLES A. STEPHENS II, JUDGE PRESIDING

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Baker and Triana

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

In February 2016, appellee Isaac Wesley Brandley was arrested for assault causing injury/family violence and released on bond. In August 2019, the trial court granted Brandley's Motion to Set Aside the Information based on violations of his right to a speedy trial. The State of Texas then filed this appeal. We affirm the trial court's order granting Brandley's motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial. Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). "A speedy trial protects three interests of the defendant: freedom from oppressive pretrial incarceration, mitigation of the anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and avoidance of impairment to the accused's defense." Cantu v State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The right to a speedy trial "attaches once a person becomes an 'accused'-that is, once he is arrested or charged," and we review a trial court's decision on a speedy-trial claim "'on an ad hoc basis' by weighing and then balancing the four Barker v. Wingo factors: 1) length of the delay, 2) reason for the delay, 3) assertion of the right, and 4) prejudice to the accused." Id. (quoting Barker v Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972)). "The Barker test is triggered by a delay that is unreasonable enough to be 'presumptively prejudicial '" id. at 281 (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992)), and although there is "no set time element that triggers the analysis," id., courts generally "deem delay approaching one year to be "unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry," Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1).

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a defendant's speedy-trial claim, "we apply a bifurcated standard of review: an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components, and a de novo standard for the legal components." Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648. We weigh the strength of each Barker factor and "balance[e] their relative weights in light of 'the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). No one factor is a "necessary or sufficient condition" to finding a speedy-trial violation, and the four related factors "must be considered together along with any other relevant circumstances." Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). We apply the balancing test-which, while necessarily involving fact findings and legal conclusions, is a "purely legal question"-"with common sense and sensitivity to ensure that charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant's actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial has been infringed." Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281. We defer not only to the trial court's resolution of disputed facts but also to its "right to draw reasonable inferences from those facts." Id. at 282. The trial court may disbelieve any evidence so long as there is a reasonable and articulable basis for doing so, including completely disregarding uncontroverted testimony based on the court's evaluation of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor, and "all of the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to" the court's ruling. Id. When, as in this case, the trial court grants a motion to dismiss, we presume that the court resolved all disputed fact issues in favor of the defendant and defer to any findings of fact that the record supports. See id.

The State has the burden of justifying the delay, while the defendant must show his assertion of the right and prejudice. Id. at 280. "[T]he greater the State's bad faith or official negligence and the longer its actions delay a trial, the less a defendant must show actual prejudice or prove diligence in asserting his right to a speedy trial." Id. at 280-81. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right to a speedy trial "is closely related to the other three factors," and his "assertion of his speedy-trial right (or his failure to assert it) is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right." Id. at 282-83. Filing for dismissal instead of a speedy trial generally weakens a speedy-trial claim because it "shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one." Id. In considering prejudice, we bear in mind the interests protected by the right to a speedy trial: "(1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) to minimize the accused's anxiety and concern, and (3) to limit the possibility that the accused's defense will be impaired." Id. at 285.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

2016-2017

Brandley was arrested February 10, 2016, and released on bond the next day. On December 16, 2016, he was charged by information with misdemeanor Assault Causing Bodily Injury, Family Violence see Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1), and counsel was appointed in March 2017. In April 2017, Brandley filed a waiver of arraignment stating that he was entering a plea of not guilty that included a statement that he "requests a speedy trial."

2018

The case was first set for trial on June 12, 2018. In May 2018, Brandley filed a motion in limine and a Request for Notice of State's Intention to Use Evidence of Extraneous Offenses at Trial. Also in May, the parties agreed to reset the case to a July 17, 2018 jury trial setting. In June, the State informed Brandley of prior convictions it intended to use, and in early July, it filed a notice of its intention to use certain prior convictions to enhance the range of punishment. On July 9, Brandley filed a motion for continuance, stating that counsel was still investigating, was "waiting for records to be released," and was scheduled to attend continuing legal education July 12 and 13 and would be unable to adequately prepare for trial. The following day, counsel asked that an investigator be appointed to find two potential witnesses, and the court granted the request. On October 29, Brandley filed a motion in limine and a motion seeking to bar the State from mentioning "non-jurisdictional enhancement counts," and on October 30, the parties appeared at a docket call and stated that they were ready for trial. The case did not proceed to trial, and the record does not reflect the reason for that, but Brandley and his attorney signed a form resetting the case for a March 19, 2019 trial date.

2019

On March 14, 2019, the State filed a motion for continuance stating that the complainant and her daughter had not appeared for a scheduled meeting with the prosecutor and were not returning phone calls. The State asserted that the witnesses' uncooperativeness might be due to Brandley's "wrongful actions" and said that it intended to file a motion for forfeiture by wrongdoing seeking to be allowed to "admit prior statements of these witnesses." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.49 (party to criminal case who "wrongfully procures the unavailability" of witness forfeits right to object to admission of evidence or statements based on witness's unavailability). On March 18, Brandley sent the State a letter requesting "all Brady information applicable in this case," including any statements by the complainant "regarding her involvement in this case and past cases involving [Brandley] that may be exculpatory or mitigating," any statements by the complainant "indicating that she did not want to testify or participate in this or previous proceedings," any evidence that the complainant "has made similar allegations against others that did not result in arrests or prosecution," and any evidence that the complainant "may not have been truthful or credible in past statements."^[1] The prosecutor responded the next day, stating she "was not aware of any exculpatory or mitigating statements made by the victim in relation to her involvement in this case or any other against" Brandley other than a 2015 charge that resulted in a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), which the prosecutor sent to Brandley's attorney. The prosecutor also complained that Brandley's requests for information about other allegations or for information indicating that the complainant may not have been truthful were seeking information "regarding specific incidents of conduct that would be absolutely inadmissible for any purpose."^[2] The prosecutor stated that she did not have evidence "that would indicate that the victim may not have been truthful or credible," nor was she "aware of any similar allegations against others that did not result in arrest or prosecution."

On March 19, 2019, the case was called, and Brandley's attorney announced not ready, asking for a continuance because she had "received exculpatory evidence yesterday."^[3]Counsel explained that she had just "received a Non-Prosecution Affidavit that her complainant in this case had signed in a previous case against my client acknowledging that she was mutually at fault in an assault she previously accused my client of committing. That is absolutely exculpatory and I received it yesterday. This was never turned over by the State to me." Counsel further stated she had spoken to the complainant, who told counsel that she "did not remember everything in this case." The complainant also said she had informed the State that "she didn't want to prosecute this case" but "had been told that if she didn't cooperate with them that she would be held...