State v. Brashier

695 S.W.3d 88

STATE of Missouri, Appellant,

v.Larry Daniel BRASHIER, Respondent.

WD 86602

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: APRIL 23, 2024

Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied July 9, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri, The Honorable Kevin Crane, Judge

Nathan Jeremy Aquino, Jefferson City, MO, Attorney for Appellant.

Katharine Patricia Curry, Columbia, MO, Attorney for Respondent.

Before Division Three: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge

The State appeals from the trial court’s interlocutory order granting Larry Brashier’s ("Brashier") motion to suppress statements he made during a police interrogation while Brashier was being treated in the emergency room for a self-inflicted gunshot wound. The State asserts that the trial court committed clear error because the written order granting the motion to suppress is inconsistent with the trial court’s oral statements during the suppression hearing as to whether Brashier was in custody at the time of the interrogation. Because the trial court’s written order controls, and because the State does not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the written order, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

On June 30, 2023, the State charged Brashier with the class C felony of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of section 571.070.¹ Brashier was accused of knowingly possessing a .40 caliber handgun on or about February 16, 2023, in Boone County, Missouri. The State alleged that Brashier was a prior offender and a persistent offender under section 558.016 because he had been convicted of two or more felonies at different times.

Brashier filed a motion to suppress statements he made to a Boone County Sheriff’s Department deputy ("Motion to Suppress"). The Motion to Suppress asserted that Brashier’s statements were obtained in violation of Brashier’s rights against self-incrimination, to counsel, and to due process of law. Specifically, the Motion to Suppress alleged that Brashier was in custody at the time he was interrogated, and had not been adequately advised of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Motion to Suppress further alleged that Brashier’s statements were not voluntarily made because of his mental and physical condition at the time he was interrogated.

During a hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the only witness who testified was Deputy J. H., the Boone County Sheriff’s Department deputy who interrogated Brashier. Deputy J. H. responded to a call regarding a self-inflicted gunshot wound involving Brashier. Deputy J. H. went to the hospital where Brashier was being treated within thirty minutes of receiving the call. Deputy J. H. knew at that time that Brashier was a convicted felon. Deputy J. H. questioned Brashier for approximately five to ten minutes. Deputy J. H. did not Mirandize Brashier. Deputy J. H. questioned Brashier in a room located in the hospital’s emergency department while nurses were present. During the questioning, Brashier was lying on a gurney, had "wires hooked to him," and was on some form of medication. Deputy J. H. stood less than six inches away from Brashier during the questioning. Deputy J. H. asked the nurses present whether Brashier was "out of it." Deputy J. H. described Brashier’s speech as "stuttering slightly" and "mumbling at points," but testified that Brashier’s answers "made sense." Deputy J. H. admitted on cross-examination that Brashier "just moan[ed]" during parts of the questioning.

In response to questioning, Brashier told Deputy J. H. that he shot himself with a .40 caliber firearm. Deputy J. H. testified that he ended his questioning of Brashier when medical personnel began "working on" Brashier. Deputy J. H. left the hospital without placing Brashier under arrest.

Following Deputy J. H.’s testimony, the trial court heard arguments from the parties. The trial court indicated its intent to grant the Motion to Suppress. The trial court orally stated that it did not believe that Brashier’s statements were involuntarily made, and that it did not believe that Brashier was in "police custody" at the time he was questioned, but believed that Deputy J. H. should have read Brashier the Miranda warnings prior to asking Brashier questions because he was in the hospital being treated for a gunshot wound and was "not going anywhere." The State asked the trial court to confirm that it did not believe Brashier was in "custody" at the time he was questioned, which the trial court did. No party asked the trial court to include express findings of fact or conclusions of law in its order determining the Motion to Suppress.

After the hearing, the trial court made the following docket entry: "Hearing held on Defendant’s motion to suppress Statements, State adduces Evidence and rests, Defendant adduces no evidence. Argument. Motion to suppress statements granted. TRD. KC/III (CD)" ("Order"). The Order did not state the reason or reasons for the trial court’s determination.

Section 547.200.1(4) authorizes the State to file an interlocutory appeal from an order or judgment that has the effect of suppressing a confession or admission. The State timely filed an interlocutory appeal from the Order pursuant to the procedures set forth in Rule 30.02².

Standard of Review

[1, 2] "The State has the burden at a suppression hearing to show by a preponderance of evidence that a motion to suppress should be denied and the evidence should be admitted." State v. Vandervort, 663 S.W.3d 520, 524 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (quoting State v Wright, 585 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019)). "In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court may believe or disbelieve all or any part of the testimony presented by the State, even if uncontradicted, and the court may find that the State failed to meet its burden of proof." State v. Selvy, 462 S.W.3d 756, 764 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (citing State v. Avent, 432 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014)).

[3–5] Our review of the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is limited to determining whether the ruling was clearly erroneous. State v. Alford, 603 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). A trial court’s ruling is clearly erroneous if we are "left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Id. (quoting State v Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Mo. banc 2016)). "Where, as here, the trial court makes no findings of fact in ruling on the motion to suppress, we presume the trial court found all facts in accordance with its ruling," and presume that the trial court found all evidence and inferences contrary to the ruling as not credible or entitled to little-to-no weight. Selvy, 462 S.W.3d at 764 (citing Avent, 432 S.W.3d at 252); see also State v. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d 803, 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (holding on review of the grant of a motion to suppress that where "the parties have not requested findings of fact or conclusions of law and none are entered, the trial court is presumed to have made findings in accordance with the decree entered") (quoting State v. Kampschroeder, 985 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999)).

Analysis

[6, 7] The State’s sole point on appeal asserts that the trial court erred in granting the Motion to Suppress because it "misapplied the law in that, the trial court found that [Brashier] was not in custody and Miranda warnings are only required when a defendant is in custody."³

[8, 9] The State’s point on appeal addresses one of the two bases for suppression raised by Brashier in his Motion to Suppress—whether Brashier’s statements to Deputy J. H. were subject to suppression because they were made without Brashier first being adequately advised of his constitutional rights by way of administration of the Miranda warnings. With respect to this basis for suppression, the State’s opening Brief correctly acknowledges that statements made to police during a custodial interrogation must be preceded by Miranda warnings in order for the statements to be admissible. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. And the State’s opening Brief correctly notes that an "officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches ‘only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him in custody.’ " Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam)).

[10–12] The State’s opening Brief is silent, however, with respect to the second basis for suppression raised by Brashier in his Motion to Suppress-that his statements were not voluntarily made because they were given under inherently coercive conditions in light of his physical and mental condition at the time he was questioned. "Involuntarily obtained confessions are barred from being admissible at trial by the Due Process Clause." State v. Hines, 648 S.W.3d 822, 829 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022) (citing State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193, 203 (Mo. banc 2011) (itself citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155), 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192 (1944)). "The test for whether a confession is voluntary is whether the totality of the circumstances created a physical or psychological coercion sufficient to deprive the defendant of a free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer the examiner’s questions." Id. (quoting Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d at 203).

[13] Here, the Order granting the Motion to Suppress simply states: "Hearing held on Defendant’s motion to suppress Statements, State adduces Evidence and rests, Defendant adduces no evidence. Argument. Motion to suppress statements granted. TRD. KC/III (CD)." The Order includes no findings suggesting a specific reason or reasons for the trial court’s decision to suppress Brashier’s statements. We are...