State v. O'Brien

175 N.H. 697

301 A.3d 370

The STATE of New Hampshire v. Leeann O'BRIEN

No. 2022-0081

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: February 9, 2023

Opinion Issued: April 26, 2023

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor general (Sam M. Gonyea, attorney, on the brief and orally), for the State.

Stephanie Hausman, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief, and Pamela E. Phelan, public defender, of Concord, orally, for the defendant.

DONOVAN, J.

The defendant, LeeAnn O'Brien, appeals her convictions, following a jury trial, of possession of a narcotic drug and control of a vehicle where a controlled drug was illegally kept. See RSA 318-B:2 (Supp. 2020) ; RSA 318-B:26, III(a) (Supp. 2022). On appeal, she argues that the Superior Court ( Kissinger, J.) erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search of her vehicle following a motor vehicle stop. We conclude that the officer unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop for a defective license plate light by requesting the defendant's consent to search her vehicle for drugs. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

I. Facts

The following facts are taken from the suppression hearing record and are undisputed, except as otherwise noted. On March 1, 2020, a Hooksett police officer patrolled an intersection adjacent to a gas station in Hooksett. The officer observed the defendant in the gas station parking lot inspecting the rear license plate on her vehicle. The officer waited for the defendant to pull onto the road, observed "that the [vehicle's] left plate light was out," and initiated a traffic stop. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that the right side of the plate light was illuminated and, because his own headlights were on, he could read the defendant's license plate.

The officer approached the driver's side of the vehicle, and the defendant, the sole occupant, rolled down her window. The officer immediately "noticed a strong odor of marijuana coming from the [vehicle]." The officer informed the defendant that her plate light was out and asked for her license and registration. The defendant provided the same and explained that she knew her license plate light was out because somebody just told her about it at the gas station. The officer then informed the defendant about his observation of the odor of marijuana and asked if there was any marijuana in the vehicle. The defendant assured the officer that there was no marijuana in the vehicle, but she admitted to smoking some earlier that day. Because the defendant was from Massachusetts, the officer explained that, although marijuana is "legal there," it is "not legal here in New Hampshire." He then asked the defendant for her consent "to search the [vehicle] and everything inside of it" to confirm that there were "no other drugs or marijuana inside the [vehicle]." At the suppression hearing, the officer admitted that he "didn't have any suspicion about any other drugs," nor any reason to believe that "[the defendant] was driving under the influence."

The defendant consented to the search and exited the vehicle. During the search, the officer inspected a purse he found in the back seat of the vehicle, in which he found the defendant's social security card and two wrappers containing an orange pill split in half. The officer identified the pill as suboxone. He then spoke with the defendant who acknowledged that the purse belonged to her and informed the officer that the orange pill was her brother's suboxone. Based upon these facts, the officer arrested the defendant.

Thereafter, the defendant was charged and indicted for possession of a narcotic drug and control of a vehicle where a controlled drug was illegally kept. Through counsel, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop. The defendant first argued that the officer did not have a valid basis to stop her vehicle. Specifically, the defendant argued that the officer had no difficulty reading the license plate and he knew or should have known that the defendant was aware of the malfunctioning lightbulb. Therefore, in her view, "there was no lawful basis for the intrusion upon the privacy interests" of the defendant. The defendant further argued that she did not freely consent to the search of her vehicle. The defendant maintained that the odor of marijuana was the sole basis for the officer's request for consent to search the vehicle and alleged that the officer threatened to impound her vehicle if she did not consent. Based upon these facts, the defendant argued that she was compelled to consent to the search.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion. The court found that the officer had a reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop because the defendant was driving with a malfunctioning license plate light, "which is a violation of RSA 266:44." The court further opined that "[t]he fact that [the officer] could read the license plate [did] not render her defective light beyond the scope of RSA 266:44." As to the defendant's second argument, the court, citing State v. Perez, 173 N.H. 251, 239 A.3d 975 (2020), ruled that "the scent of the marijuana emanating from the [vehicle] was sufficient for [the officer] to ask for permission to search the [vehicle]." The court also found that the defendant's allegation that the officer threatened to impound the vehicle was "not consistent with the testimony provided to the [c]ourt at the hearing." Accordingly, the trial court found that the defendant's "consent was freely given." A jury subsequently found the defendant guilty on charges of possession of a narcotic drug and control of a vehicle where a controlled drug was illegally kept. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court's failure to suppress all evidence obtained from the search of her vehicle violated her state and federal constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19 ; U.S. CONST. amends IV, XIV. More specifically, the defendant first argues that the officer's observation of the defective license plate light did not provide a lawful basis for the motor vehicle stop. She also argues that the officer unreasonably expanded the scope of the stop and her consent to the search of her vehicle was tainted by her illegal detention. We first address the defendant's claims under the State Constitution and rely upon federal law only to aid our analysis. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). When reviewing a trial court's order on a motion to suppress, we accept its factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous. Perez, 173 N.H. at 256, 239 A.3d 975. We review, de novo, the trial court's legal conclusions. Id.

Because we find the issue to be dispositive of this appeal, we address only the defendant's argument that the officer unlawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop. Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution protects all people, their papers, their possessions and their homes from unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable under Part I, Article 19 unless the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the seizure falls within the narrow confines of a judicially crafted exception. Perez, 173 N.H. at 257, 239 A.3d 975. One such exception allows law enforcement to conduct traffic stops of motorists without a warrant. Id.

A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of the State Constitution. State v. Sage, 170 N.H. 605, 610, 180 A.3d 1098 (2018). To undertake such a stop that complies with the State Constitution, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific, articulable facts taken together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, that the particular person stopped has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Monegro-Diaz, 175 N.H. 238, 242, 286 A.3d 154 (2022). A reasonable suspicion "must be more than a mere hunch." Id. The scope of such an investigative stop must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification, must be temporary, and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Sage, 170 N.H. at 610, 180 A.3d 1098.

The scope of a stop may be expanded to investigate other suspected illegal activity "only if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that other criminal activity is afoot." Id. (quotation omitted). An investigatory stop may "metamorphose into an overly prolonged or intrusive detention and, thus, become unlawful." Perez, 173 N.H. at 257, 239 A.3d 975 (quotation omitted). Whether the detention is a lawful investigatory stop, or goes beyond the limits of such a stop, depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Id. To determine whether an officer's inquiry unlawfully expanded the scope of an otherwise valid traffic stop, we undertake the following analysis:

If the question is reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, no constitutional violation occurs. If the question is not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the question. If the question is so justified, no constitutional violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must consider whether in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.

The defendant argues that "the only evidence supporting [the officer's] inquiry into drug possession was the smell of burnt marijuana." Relying upon our holding in Perez, the defendant maintains that the officer "did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion of a drug crime [necessary...