State v. Brown

157 N.H. 555

953 A.2d 1174

The STATE of New Hampshire

v.Russell BROWN.

No. 2007–253.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: April 3, 2008.

Opinion Issued: July 31, 2008.

Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Susan G. Morrell, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.

David M. Rothstein, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.

DUGGAN, J.

The defendant, Russell Brown, appeals his conviction in Superior Court (McGuire, J.) for conspiracy to sell controlled drugs, see RSA 318–B:2 (2004), :26 (Supp.2007), arguing that the trial court erred by ruling that his speedy trial right under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) had not been violated. See RSA ch. 606–A (2001). Because the defendant was not brought to trial within 180 days after the State received his request for final disposition of his charges, see RSA 606–A:1, art. III(a), we reverse and remand.

The defendant was incarcerated in Arizona when he was indicted on the charges at issue here. The State lodged a detainer against him. The defendant, pursuant to the IAD, promptly requested a speedy trial in New Hampshire. The State received the defendant's request on September 12, 2005. The defendant's charges were not resolved until October 27, 2006.

Based upon this delay of approximately thirteen months, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in not ruling that the State violated his rights under the IAD by not bringing him to trial within 180 days after the State had received his request for final disposition of his charges. See id. "The denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment under the [IAD] is a question of law reviewed de novo. The factual findings underlying the decision are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard." United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir.1992) ; see also United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir.1998) ; cf. State v. Sprague, 146 N.H. 334, 336, 771 A.2d 583 (2001).

The IAD "is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one State's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State." New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000) (citations omitted); see RSA ch. 606–A; 18 U.S.C.A.App. § 2 (2000). See generally Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 98 A.L.R.3d 160 (1980). "As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction." Sprague, 146 N.H. at 336, 771 A.2d 583; see Hill, 528 U.S. at 111, 120 S.Ct. 659. Further, Article IX of the IAD requires that the IAD "be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes." RSA 606–A:1, art. IX; see also Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir.1993) ; cf. Allen v. Hancock, 109 N.H. 254, 257, 248 A.2d 632 (1968).

"[T]he purpose of the [IAD] is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints." Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 720, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985) (quotation omitted); see also Sprague, 146 N.H. at 335–36, 771 A.2d 583. To achieve this purpose, Article III of the IAD "establishes a procedure by which a prisoner incarcerated in one party State ... may demand the speedy disposition of any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner by another party State." Carchman, 473 U.S. at 720, 105 S.Ct. 3401 (quotation omitted).

"After a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner may file a request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint." Hill, 528 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 659 (quotation omitted). Upon receiving such a request, "[t]he authorities in the receiving State then must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days." Carchman, 473 U.S. at 721, 105 S.Ct. 3401; see also Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993) (holding that "the 180–day time period in Article III(a) of the IAD does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him").

The 180–day period may be extended, however, in three circumstances. First, "provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." Hill, 528 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 659 (quotation omitted); see RSA 606–A:1, art. III(a). Second, in certain circumstances, a defendant may waive his IAD speedy trial rights. State v. Dolbeare,

140 N.H. 84, 87, 663 A.2d 85 (1995). Finally, "the running of [the 180–day] time period[ ] shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter." RSA 606–A:1, art. VI(a). However, "[i]n the absence of a waiver, the defendant's inability to stand trial, or a proper continuance [as set forth above], the pending charges must be dismissed with prejudice if a prisoner is not brought to trial within the prescribed time period." Dolbeare, 140 N.H. at 86, 663 A.2d 85 (citing RSA 606–A:1, art. V(c)); see also Hill, 528 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 659. The burden of showing compliance with the IAD is upon the State. Dolbeare, 140 N.H. at 86, 663 A.2d 85.

In this case, the parties agree that the 180–day period began to run on September 12, 2005, the date the State received the defendant's request for final disposition of his charges. See Fex, 507 U.S. at 51, 113 S.Ct. 1085. Because the IAD does not provide any specific method for computing the 180–day period, local time computation periods are used. See Sprague, 146 N.H. at 338, 771 A.2d 583; 5 W. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 18.4(c), at 176 (3d ed. 2007). Thus, unless the State demonstrates that the 180–day time period was extended because "the defendant waive[d] his speedy trial right, the defendant [wa]s unable to stand trial, or the court grant[ed] a necessary or reasonable continuance for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present," Dolbeare, 140 N.H. at 86, 663 A.2d 85 (quotations omitted), the defendant was required to have been brought to trial on or before Monday, March 13, 2006, see RSA 21:35 (2000) ("when a period or limit of time is to be reckoned from a day or date, that day or date shall be excluded from and the day on which an act should occur shall be included in the computation of the period or limit of time"); Sprague, 146 N.H. at 338, 771 A.2d 583 (explaining that, if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, that day is excluded); see also Super. Ct. R. 12.

The defendant was arraigned on November 7, 2005, fifty-six days after the State received his request for final disposition of his charges. On November 8, 2005, the trial court appointed counsel for the defendant. On December 13, 2005, the court scheduled the final pretrial conference for March 10, 2006, and scheduled trial for March 20. The defendant's counsel, however, moved to withdraw due to a conflict of interest on December 15, 2005, thirty-seven days after he was appointed. The court appointed new counsel on December 21, 2005. The defendant's new counsel, however, also moved to withdraw due to a conflict on January 30, 2006, forty days after he was appointed. The trial court appointed new counsel on February 23, 2006.

On February 24, 2006, the State filed a motion requesting that the defendant be transported to the final pretrial conference scheduled for March 10, 2006, "to be present for any discussions on the record regarding the status of counsel and the reason for the delay in bringing him to trial." In the motion, the State argued, among other things, that, given the complexities of the case, "[t]here [wa]s no possibility that [defendant's newly appointed counsel] c[ould] be prepared for trial on March 20, 2006." On March 10, 2006, the trial court held a final pretrial conference, at which the defendant, his counsel, and the State were present. At that time, the State "sought a continuance ... due to delays in preparatioin (sic ) and proceedings caused by the involvement of two conflicted prior counsel for the defendant." On March 23, 2006, the trial court ruled: "that good cause exists within the meaning of the [IAD], to continue the trial in this case; that the continuance is necessary and reasonable to allow for appropriate pretrial development. The clerk is directed to reschedule this matter for trial in the fall, 2006 timeframe." Trial was then scheduled for September 25, 2006.

The State argues that the 180–day period was tolled from the date the defendant was arraigned, November 7, 2005, to the date the defendant was represented by conflict-free counsel, February 23, 2006, because the defendant was "unable to stand trial" during that entire period. The defendant counters that, although the time it took the court to dispose of the motions to withdraw and appoint new counsel should be excluded from the 180–day period, the time he was represented by each counsel must be included. We agree with the defendant.

The parties agree that the period of time between the filing of the motions to withdraw and the appointment of new counsel should be excluded from the 180–day period. During this time period, the defendant was without counsel and, thus, "no action of consequence to the defendant c[ould have] occur[red] in the ... case until the motion [wa]s resolved." State v. Rieger, 13 Neb.App. 444, 695 N.W.2d 678, 687 (2005) (holding that delay when defense counsel withdrew because of conflict is excluded from IAD time calculation), rev'd...