State v. Bryan

307 Conn. 823

60 A.3d 246

STATE of Connecticut

v.Courtney BRYAN.

No. 18776.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 25, 2012.

Decided Feb. 19, 2013.

Sarah Hanna, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state's attorney, and Paul Rotiroti, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.^*

ROGERS, C.J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the defense of others, set forth in General Statutes § 53a–19,¹ in light of the evidence cited by the defendant in support of that justification defense. The defendant, Courtney Bryan, was convicted, after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–59 (a)(1)² and attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49³ and 53a–59 (a)(1). At trial, the defendant admitted to stabbing the victim, Abdelmoutalib Sofiane, but requested that the jury be instructed on his two theories of defense: that he was acting in self-defense, and that he was acting in defense of another. The trial court instructed the jury on the former, but refused to instruct on the latter.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court. Concluding that the defendant had “met his burden of providing an evidentiary foundation to inject the issue of defense of others into the case,” the Appellate Court held that the trial court's refusal to charge on the defense of others was improper. State v. Bryan, 126 Conn.App. 597, 609, 12 A.3d 1025 (2011). Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. We then granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court's failure to give a defense of others instruction required reversal of the judgment of conviction?” State v. Bryan, 300 Conn. 941, 942, 17 A.3d 477 (2011). Because the evidence in the record was insufficient to support the defendant's request to have the jury instructed on the defense of others, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

“In determining whether the defendant is entitled to an instruction of [defense of others], we must view the evidence most favorably to giving such an instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Terwilliger, 294 Conn. 399, 408–409, 984 A.2d 721 (2009). Viewed in this light, the record reveals the following relevant facts. On March 1, 2007, Farrah Lawrence, the defendant's girlfriend, drove to Lincoln Technical School (school) in New Britain, where she was a student, to register for classes. Lawrence was accompanied by the defendant, who rode in her car. Lawrence got out of the car and walked toward the school building while the defendant remained in the car and listened to the radio. Soon thereafter, the victim pulled into the parking lot. He recognized Lawrence's car and parked parallel to it, leaving a few empty spaces between them.

The victim and Lawrence had dated for approximately two years, until Lawrence broke off their romantic relationship in 2006 after the victim became “threatening” and “abusive.” On one occasion, the victim came to her apartment, broke a lamp, smashed her television set, and demanded to “look inside [her] phone.” When Lawrence refused to hand her telephone over, the victim pushed Lawrence and broke the telephone. Lawrence's friend, who was present during the altercation, called the police, who instructed the victim not to return to Lawrence's apartment. Lawrence called the defendant with her girlfriend's telephone immediately after this incident to tell him about it.

Notwithstanding the instructions of the police, the victim returned to Lawrence's apartment two weeks later, seeking to resume their romantic relationship. Lawrence told him she did not wish to do so. In response, the victim shouted at her and stabbed himself with a knife. Lawrence again called the defendant shortly after this incident.

On another occasion, when Lawrence was driving home from work with the defendant, the victim appeared alongside them in a van, and attempted to run them off the road while shouting and spitting at them. As they proceeded further down the road, the victim blocked their path, exited his vehicle and told the defendant and Lawrence that “he was going to fuck [them] up.” Afterward, Lawrence and the defendant reported the incident to the police.

A few weeks later, the victim again showed up uninvited at Lawrence's house, banging on the patio door and demanding admittance. Lawrence refused, promptingthe victim to attempt to smash the door with his head. When this proved unsuccessful, the victim shattered Lawrence's bedroom window with his fist, and proceeded to climb through the window frame as Lawrence ran out the front door. Police arrived at the scene minutes later. Lawrence called the defendant that night to recount the incident.

The victim also had physically abused Lawrence, and had threatened to kill her. On one occasion in early 2006, while Lawrence was riding with the victim in his car, he struck her with his arm, and then slammed on the brakes, causing her head to strike the window. On several occasions, the victim threatened that if Lawrence “[got] him in any trouble so he couldn't get his citizenship, he would kill [her] and run back to Morocco.” In light of the foregoing, both Lawrence and the defendant were afraid of the victim.⁴

In support of his argument that he is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of others, the defendant relies on aspects of the victim's testimony regarding the March 1, 2007 assault that contradict his own testimony. The defendant testified that on March 1, 2007, he was waiting in Lawrence's car, listening to the radio, when the victim's car pulled up alongside Lawrence's car. The defendant testified that he did not notice the other car until the victim approached him, opened the passenger door of Lawrence's car, and lifted up his shirt to display a gun tucked into the waistband of his pants. The victim threatened to kill both the defendant and Lawrence, stating that Lawrence was “a bitch” and that he was “going to get her.” The defendant testified that the victim then returned to his car and drove away. After this encounter, the defendant testified, he searched Lawrence's car for a pen to record the victim's license plate number, and discovered a knife in the glove compartment.

The defendant testified that the victim returned five to ten minutes later, and parked in the same space. The defendant watched the victim out of the corner of his eye. About thirty seconds later, the victim again opened the passenger door of Lawrence's car and told the defendant that “he was going inside of the building to f'ing kill [Lawrence].” As the victim walked toward the building, the defendant took the knife from the glove compartment, placed it in his pocket, and followed him. The defendant testified that the victim had entered the building, but was on his way out at the time the defendant arrived at the front door. As the two men passed each other, the defendant testified, the victim spat in his face and lunged at him, grabbing him around the neck. The victim then “went for his waistband.” In response, the defendant removed the knife from his pocket. The two men struggled, but eventually separated when the victim declared, “you stabbed me!” Noticing that the victim was wounded, the defendant “panic[ked],” ran back to Lawrence's car and drove away. Shortly thereafter, the police contacted the defendant who confessed to stabbing the victim, and agreed to meet with the police to give a report of the incident.

The defendant gave somewhat contradictory testimony as to why he had stabbed the victim. As the Appellate Court observed, “[t]he defendant testified that the stabbing was accidental, but he also testified that he was acting in defense of himself and of Lawrence. The defendant first testified that he did not think he had to stab [the victim] but then said he did so in defense of himself and later said also that he did so in defense of Lawrence because he was afraid of what [the victim] might do to Lawrence and him.” State v. Bryan, supra, 126 Conn.App. at 601, 12 A.3d 1025.

For his part, the victim testified that on March 1, 2007, he drove to the school in order to obtain copies of his transcripts, which he needed to apply for a job. The victim testified that he recognized Lawrence's car, but did not immediately recognize the defendant. The defendant, however, apparently recognizing the victim, began shouting at him to stay away from Lawrence or he would “get a gunshot” and “get hurt.” The victim shouted back at the defendant and the fight escalated. Sensing that “it was kind of getting bad at that point,” the victim returned to his car and drove off, but soon turned around, realizing that he needed his transcripts. The victim returned to the same parking spot, got out of his car, and began walking toward the school. The victim testified that “right before [he] made it to the entrance, [he] heard someone walking behind [him],” and turned around to see the defendant holding a “knife in his right hand.” The victim testified that “when [he] saw the knife, [he] tried to just run away [but] before [he] made it, [the defendant] stabbed [him] in [his] left chest.” The victim denied having a gun, reaching for his waistband during the fight and threatening Lawrence or the defendant on that, or any other, occasion.

The parties submitted written requests to charge to the trial court. At a charging conference conducted by the trial court, Espinosa, J., on February 27, 2009, the court granted the defendant's request for a jury instruction on...