State v. Bryson

541 P.3d 582

STATE of Arizona ; Major General Michael T. McGuire (Ret.); Major General Howard P. Purcell (Ret.); Brigadier General Andrew MacDonald (Ret.); and Brigadier General Jeffrey L. Butler, Petitioners,

v. Hon. Kyle BRYSON, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pima, Respondent,andGilbert Delgado, Real Party in Interest.

No. 2 CA-SA 2023-0069

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2.

Filed December 15, 2023

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, By Christopher P. White, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson and Rebecca A. Banes, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Counsel for Petitioners

Lewis & Llewellyn LLP, San Francisco, California, By Paul T. Llewellyn and Kenneth M. Walczak and Gregory J. Krino, Santa Monica, California, Counsel for Real Party in Interest

Chief Judge Vásquez authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Judge Gard concurred.

OPINION

VÁSQUEZ, Chief Judge:

¶1 In this special-action proceeding, petitioners the State of Arizona and officers of the Arizona Air National Guard (AZANG) (collectively, "the state") challenge the respondent judge's denial of their motion for summary judgment on real-party-in-interest Gilbert Delgado's claim that the state failed to comply with a clearance order entered pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4051. The state maintains the respondent erred by concluding that § 13-4051 applies to more than law enforcement agencies and the courts. Because we agree, we accept special-action jurisdiction and grant relief in part; however, the respondent must now determine whether AZANG is a law enforcement agency as contemplated by § 13-4051.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 The relevant facts are undisputed. Delgado was a member of AZANG from July 2006 through April 2010. In October 2013, he was indicted under Pima County cause number CR20134290002 for multiple criminal counts stemming from alleged improper travel reimbursements. However, the trial court later dismissed the indictment with prejudice at the prosecutor's request.¹ In November 2014, upon "[s]tipulation of the parties and the [c]ourt believing that justice will be served," the court entered the following order in CR20134290002:

It is hereby ordered, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4051, that entry of a notation that Gilbert Delgado has been cleared in this matter shall be made on all court records, police records and any other records of any other agency relating to his arrest and indictment herein.

The Clerk of the Court shall cause a copy of this Order to be delivered to all law enforcement agencies and Courts. All law enforcement agencies and Court[s] shall not release copies of or provide access to any records in this matter pertaining to Gilbert Delgado to any person except on Order of the Court.

¶3 The following month, Delgado informed AZANG of the order. To ensure AZANG's compliance with the order, Delgado submitted a Freedom of Information Act request, asking for any documents related to his 2013 indictment. He later received several documents, which he maintains were not "properly annotated."

¶4 In December 2020, citing § 13-4051, Delgado filed a complaint against the state, which included a request for nearly three million dollars in damages for failing to abide by the trial court's order in CR20134290002.² In November 2022, the state filed a motion for summary judgment on several grounds. As relevant here, the state asserted that § 13-4051 does not support a cause of action in this case because the statute "applies only to law enforcement agencies and to courts—not to the military or to the Arizona National Guard." The state maintained its position was supported by the rules of statutory construction, the statute as a whole, and legislative intent. In response, Delgado argued that the state's interpretation of the statute was "so narrow as to leave [him] with no remedy whatsoever." Relying on what he characterizes as the plain language of § 13-4051(A), Delgado reasoned that the state's interpretation would make § 13-4051 ’s reference to " ‘records of any other agency’ meaningless surplusage."

¶5 In March 2023, the respondent judge denied the state's motion for summary judgment. The state filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing, in part, that the respondent had "failed to address the substantial—and purely legal—arguments regarding the proper interpretation of ... § 13-4051." Specifically, the state pointed out that the ruling had failed to address "whether the statute even reaches non-law enforcement agencies like the Air National Guard."

¶6 In July 2023, the respondent judge affirmed his prior ruling. In addressing his interpretation of § 13-4051, the respondent quoted subsections (A) and (C) of the statute in whole. The respondent agreed with the state that the phrase "any other agency" in subsection (A) "should be read narrowly and specific to the context of the rest of the statute." However, the respondent pointed out that the state's reading "would apply only to courts and law enforcement agencies within Arizona, but this would render the phrase in question pointless." The respondent thus concluded "the phrase in question must include some other agencies besides courts and police," including, in this case, the state defendants. This petition for special action followed.

Special-Action Jurisdiction

¶7 Special-action jurisdiction is appropriate when a party has no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal." Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 1(a) ; see also Sw. Gas Corp. v. Irwin , 229 Ariz. 198, ¶ 5, 273 P.3d 650 (App. 2012). "Our decision to accept jurisdiction of a special action is highly discretionary." League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Martin , 219 Ariz. 556, ¶ 4, 201 P.3d 517 (2009). We normally disfavor accepting special-action jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment. City of Scottsdale v. Mikitish , 253 Ariz. 238, ¶ 4, 512 P.3d 92 (App. 2022). However, exceptions exist for pure issues of law, matters of statewide importance, and questions of first impression. Jennings v. Agne , 254 Ariz. 174, ¶ 4, 520 P.3d 665 (App. 2022) ; Deal v. Deal , 252 Ariz. 387, ¶ 10, 503 P.3d 838 (App. 2021).

¶8 This special action presents a pure question of law concerning the interpretation of § 13-4051. See State ex rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage , 200 Ariz. 582, ¶ 8, 30 P.3d 649 (App. 2001). The issue presented is also one of first impression and statewide importance. See ChartOne, Inc. v. Bernini , 207 Ariz. 162, ¶ 9, 83 P.3d 1103 (App. 2004). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the respondent judge erred as a matter of law by denying the motion for summary judgment.

See Pima County v. McCarville , 224 Ariz. 366, ¶ 6, 231 P.3d 370 (App. 2010). Finally, if we were to decline jurisdiction, the state would be subjected to the unnecessary expenditure of time and money associated with further proceedings. See ChartOne, Inc. , 207 Ariz. 162, ¶ 10, 83 P.3d 1103. For these reasons, we exercise our discretion and accept special-action jurisdiction.

Discussion

¶9 As below, the state contends that § 13-4051 "applies only to records of law-enforcement agencies and courts" and "does not apply to documents in AZANG's custody." Because this issue involves the interpretation and application of § 13-4051, our review is de novo. See State v. Christian , 205 Ariz. 64, ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241 (2003) ; Strojnik v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. , 201 Ariz. 430, ¶ 11, 36 P.3d 1200 (App. 2001).

¶10 Section 13-4051 provides:

A. Any person who is wrongfully arrested, indicted or otherwise charged for any crime may petition the superior court for entry on all court records, police records and any other records of any other agency relating to such arrest or indictment a notation that the person has been cleared.

B. After a hearing on the petition, if the judge believes that justice will be served by such entry, the judge shall issue the order requiring the entry that the person has been cleared on such records, with accompanying justification therefor, and shall cause a copy of such order to be delivered to all law enforcement agencies and courts. The order shall further require that all law enforcement agencies and courts shall not release copies of or provide access to such records to any person except on order of the court.

C. Any person who has notice of such order and fails to comply with the court order issued pursuant to this section shall be liable to the person for damages from such failure.

The statute is directed at remedying "the ‘economic and personal harm result[ing] to an individual if even a baseless arrest becomes known to his employers, credit agencies, banks, or even his neighbors, notwithstanding the absence of a conviction.’ " State v. Mohajerin , 226 Ariz. 103, ¶ 15, 244 P.3d 107 (App. 2010) (alteration in Mohajerin ) (quoting Beasley v. Glenn , 110 Ariz. 438, 439, 520 P.2d 310, 311 (1974) ).

¶11 When interpreting a statute, we start with the statute's plain language, giving words their ordinary meaning. Secure Ventures, LLC v. Gerlach , 249 Ariz. 97, ¶ 5, 466 P.3d 874 (App. 2020). If the language is clear and unambiguous, we give it effect without resorting to our secondary rules of statutory construction. Glazer v. State , 244 Ariz. 612, ¶ 9, 423 P.3d 993 (2018). However, if the text is ambiguous, we determine the meaning "by reading the statute as a whole, giving meaningful operation to all of its provisions, and by considering factors such as the statute's context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose." State v. Gonzales , 206 Ariz. 469, ¶ 12, 80 P.3d 276 (App. 2003) (quoting Zamora v. Reinstein , 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996) ).

¶12 The parties disagree whether we must resort to the secondary rules of statutory construction. The state argues that "any other agency" in § 13-4051(A) means "any other law enforcement agency" and "does not encompass all agencies," like, as relevant...