State v. Byrd

1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. EBENEZER BYRD, a/k/a EBERNEZER BYRD, E.B. BYRD, EBENEZER BIRD, DONALI BYRD, and DANALL JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JERRY J. SPRAULDING, a/k/a GERRY SPRAULDING, JERRY SPRAULDING, GERALD J. SPRAULDING, JERRY BATTER, MICHAEL HARRIS, MARK LOVE, and GERALD SPAULDING, Defendant-Appellant.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GREGORY A. JEAN-BAPTISTE, a/k/a GREGORY JEAN BAPTIST, GREGORY BAPTITE, and GU JEAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. A-4941-18, A-5095-18, A-1452-19

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division

May 20, 2024

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

Argued (A-4941-18 and A-5095-18) and Submitted (A-1452-19) November 30, 2022

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Monmouth County, Indictment Nos. 16-04-0718 and 18-06-0809.

Stephen William Kirsch, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant Ebenezer Byrd in A-4941-18 (Joseph E. Krakora Public Defender, attorney; Stephen William Kirsch, on the briefs).

Margaret Ruth McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant Jerry Spraulding in A-5095-18 (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Margaret Ruth McLane, of counsel and on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant Gregory A. Jean-Baptiste in A-1452-19 (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Daniel Ian Bornstein, Deputy Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent in A-4941-18 and A-5095-18 (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Maura Kathryn Tully, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).

Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent in A-1452-19 (Monica do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

OPINION

GOODEN BROWN, P.J.A.D.

Following a months-long joint jury trial conducted in 2019, defendants Ebenezer Byrd, Jerry Spraulding, and Gregory Jean-Baptiste were convicted of first-degree felony murder and related offenses stemming from the 2009 brutal beating and fatal shooting of Jonelle Melton in her Neptune City apartment. James Fair was indicted along with defendants but pled guilty to a related conspiracy charge prior to defendants' trial. At trial, the State's proofs included DNA evidence placing Jean-Baptiste in Melton's apartment and an unindicted co-conspirator's testimony that supported the State's theory that defendants had set out to rob Melton's neighbor, a suspected drug dealer who kept upwards of sixteen-thousand dollars in his freezer. Instead, they mistakenly broke into Melton's apartment. Melton was a fifth-grade school teacher who lived alone.

Byrd was sentenced to life in prison, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. He also received two consecutive twenty-year terms, each with a ten-year period of parole ineligibility, and a consecutive five-year term, all for witness tampering charges. Spraulding received a life term, subject to NERA. Jean-Baptiste received an aggregate term of life plus twenty years, with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility and a ten-year period of parole ineligibility, respectively. Jean-Baptiste's sentence was also consecutive to sentences he was already serving on unrelated indictments.

In these back-to-back appeals, which we consolidate for purposes of issuing a single opinion, defendants assert multiple trial errors. They variously raise evidentiary issues, question the trial court's handling of a juror issue, challenge several jury instructions, dispute the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, invoke ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and contest their sentences as excessive.

Specifically, Byrd raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS BY JAMES FAIR IN WHICH HE TOOK RESPONSIBILITY FOR KILLING THE VICTIM, ACTING WITH OTHERS WHO WERE NOT THE DEFENDANT OR THE CODEFENDANTS, WERE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY GUILT AND THE JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN EXCLUDING THEM.

POINT II

THE STATE USED IMPROPER OPINION TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT WITNESS AND OF LAY WITNESSES TO BOLSTER ITS THEORY OF THE CASE REGARDING THE ULTIMATE ISSUE FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE, AND ON MATTERS CLEARLY NOT BEYOND THE KEN OF THE AVERAGE JUROR. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

POINT III

NUMEROUS JURY INSTRUCTIONAL ERRORS TAINTED THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

A. The Jury Instruction for Robbery Omitted an Explanation of Attempted Theft. (Not Raised Below).

B. The Improper Use of "And/Or" Language, or The Functional Equivalent, in The Instructions. (Not Raised Below).

C. The Instruction on [The Unindicted Co-Conspirator's] Testimony. (Not Raised Below).

D. The Instruction on Witness Tampering Omitted Any Reference to Accomplice Liability. (Not Raised Below).

POINT IV

IN THE PHASE-TWO TRIAL FOR "CERTAIN PERSONS" WEAPONS POSSESSION, DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS ATTORNEY LITERALLY DID NOTHING TO DEFEND HIM. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

POINT V

THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.

In a supplemental brief, Byrd adds the following point:

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND AN IMPARTIAL JURY WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT RECEIVED INFORMATION MID-TRIAL THAT JUROR [NO.] 8 HAD "ALREADY DECIDED SHE'S GOING TO FIND THEM ALL GUILTY AND GOING TO BURN THEIR ASSES," AND THE JUDGE FAILED TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE OF THAT JUROR, AND FAILED TO CONDUCT ANY VOIR DIRE OF THE REST OF THE JURORS.

Jean-Baptiste raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED INADMISSIBLE CERTAIN EXCULPATORY OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS MADE BY JAMES FAIR AND [HIS ASSOCIATE,] KEVIN BROWN, AS THE COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF N.J.R.E. 803 (C) (25) DENIED DEFENDANT A COMPLETE THIRD-PARTY GUILT DEFENSE.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ALLOWED THE STATE TO RELY UPON IMPERMISSIBLE LAY AND EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY AS TO THE ULTIMATE QUESTION OF GUILT.

(A) Lay Witness Testimony. (Not Raised Below).

(B) Expert Witness Testimony.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED CO-DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL TO ELICIT PREJUDICIAL OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE FROM [THE UNINDICTED CO-CONSPIRATOR] OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE STATE'S MOTION TO READ INTO THE RECORD CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY [THE UNINDICTED CO-CONSPIRATOR] AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS WHICH SERVED ONLY TO

BOLSTER THE STATE'S WITNESS AND THEREBY ALLOWED IMPERMISSIBLE OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE TO BE PRESENTED TO THE JURY.

POINT V

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY VOIR DIRE JUROR NUMBER 8 AND THE JURY AFTER IT LEARNED THAT JUROR 8 HAD ALREADY DECLARED DEFENDANT GUILTY BEFORE DELIBERATIONS AND HAD BEEN RESEARCHING ARTICLES ABOUT THE CASE.

POINT VI

THE TRIAL COURT'S INCOMPLETE AND ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR AND RELIABLE TRIAL.

(A) The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury On Attempted Theft. (Not Raised Below).

(B) The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Provide The Jury With A "False-In-One, False-In-All" Charge.

(C) The Trial Court's Use Of "And/Or" Language In The Jury Instruction Was Confusing And Could Have Reasonably Led The Jury To Non-Unanimous Verdicts. (Not Raised Below).

(D) The Trial Court Prejudicially Erred In Its Instruction As To The Burden Of Proof Related To [The Unindicted Co- Conspirator's] Testimony. (Not Raised Below).

POINT VII

AS·THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT HAD ENGAGED IN FIRST-DEGREE WITNESS TAMPERING, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.

POINT VIII

THE TRIAL COURT'S CUMULATIVE ERRORS DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

POINT IX

THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.

Spraulding raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CONDUCT ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE AFTER LEARNING MID-TRIAL THAT A JUROR HAD ALREADY DECIDED THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY AND WAS "GOING TO BURN THEIR ASSES" REQUIRES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS.

POINT II

THE ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF A THIRD-PARTY'S STATEMENTS TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR KILLING THE VICTIM REQUIRES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS.

POINT III

THE ADMISSION OF IMPROPER LAY AND EXPERT TESTIMONY REQUIRES REVERSAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

A. Lay Opinion Testimony

B. Expert Opinion Testimony

POINT IV

NUMEROUS JURY INSTRUCTION ERRORS REQUIRE REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

A. The Court Erroneously Failed To Instruct The Jury On Attempted Theft.

B. The Use of "And/Or" Language Was Confusing And Could Have Led To Non-Unanimous Verdicts.

C. The Court Lessened The Burden Of Proof With Its Instruction on [The Unindicted Co-Conspirator's] Testimony.

D. The Court Improperly Took "Judicial Notice" Of An Element of The Certain Persons Charge.

POINT V

THE LIFE-TERM SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE.

Having reviewed the points raised in light of the voluminous record and the governing legal principles, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

I.

On April 25, 2016, Monmouth County Indictment No. 16-04-718 charged Byrd, Spraulding, Jean-Baptiste, and Fair with second-degree conspiracy to commit armed burglary, N.J.S.A 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count one); second-degree armed burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count two);...