State v. Carnes

548 P.3d 415

2024 MT 101

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.William Jerome CARNES, Defendant and Appellant.

DA 21-0648

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: September 13, 2023

Decided: May 14, 2024

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District, In and For the County of Butte-Silver Bow, Cause No. DC-19-49, Honorable Kurt Krueger, Presiding Judge

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Bjorn Boyer, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Eileen Joyce, Butte-Silver Bow County Attorney, Kelli Johnson Fivey, Deputy County Attorney, Butte, Montana

Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Defendant William Jerome Carnes appeals the August 10, 2021 order denying his "Motion to Dismiss: In Accordance With [the] Interstate Agreement on Detainers" and the subsequent Judgment of the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, on Carnes’s plea of guilty to an amended charge of criminal endangerment pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. Concluding that Carnes failed to preserve his right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, we accordingly affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On October 22, 2018, Carnes was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The State charged Carnes by Information in February of 2019 with felony DUI for a fourth or subsequent offense; misdemeanor resisting arrest; and misdemeanor driving without a valid liability insurance policy in effect. Carnes retained a local attorney, who was present for his arraignment on March 21, 2019. Carnes entered pleas of not guilty to the three charges contained in the State’s Information, and the court set dates for a final pretrial conference on June 11, 2019, and a jury trial on June 24, 2019. During Carnes’s arraignment, the District Court advised him that "[y]ou may appeal any of the pretrial rulings following a guilty plea."

¶3 After Carnes failed to appear for his June 11, 2019 final pretrial conference, the District Court issued a warrant for his arrest. Carnes was served with the arrest warrant in Nevada after his July 2019 arrest in Douglas County, Nevada, for fleeing the scene of an accident. On October 2, 2019, Carnes was sentenced to the Nevada Department of Corrections for a term of 24 to 72 months.

¶4 On August 10, 2020, Carnes filed a prose motion that he entitled "Motion for Speedy Trial or in the Alternative Dismissal for Lack of Speedy Trial and Timely Prosecution." Carnes cited as the bases for his motion the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Nevada Revised Statutes, § 178.556(2). Carnes advised that he was currently serving a term of imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections and asserted that "the responsibility of having the [Defendant] transported lies with the marshal[ ] of the City Butte, Montana and/or with the [N]evada Department of Corrections." Carnes asserted:

Therefore, the chief marshal[ ] and Silver Bow district attorney’s office, being fully aware of the whereabouts of the [Defendant], against whom a [warrant] is pending must execute the command of said warrant[.]

Carnes attached six addenda to his motion, including a "Verification of Incarceration," signed by a caseworker at the prison where Carnes was incarcerated, that verified Carnes’s earliest release date and his sentence expiration date and described Carnes’s "sentence structure" as 24-72 months. One of his attachments also included a paragraph referring to Article III of the IAD and requested that the State return him to its jurisdiction within 90 days to resolve the outstanding charge.

¶5 In response to Carnes’s pro se motion, the State acknowledged that the warrant issued from the District Court served as a detainer but asserted that Carnes "should be asserting his rights based on [§] 46-31-101, MCA[ ], the Interstate Agreement on Detainers." The State argued that Carnes did not follow procedure as contemplated by statute to make a request for final disposition. The District Court agreed with the State and denied Carnes’s motion because he had not "follow[ed] the procedure set forth by the State of Montana pursuant to § 46-31-101 of the Montana Code Annotated."

¶6 On December 23, 2020, the District Court appointed Carnes a public defender to represent him for the remainder of the proceedings. Through counsel, Carnes filed a motion on February 12, 2021, to dismiss the case for the State’s failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Carnes asserted that "there is no question that the State was made aware [of Carnes’s Nevada incarceration] on August 10, 2020," when his pro se motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial was filed and provided to the State by the clerk of court. The District Court denied Carnes’s motion, concluding that the State was given improper notice as to Carnes’s request for a final disposition.

¶7 After the District Court denied his February 2021 motion to dismiss, Carnes reached a plea agreement with the State. The agreement called for the State to file an Amended Information charging Carnes with a single count of criminal endangerment, to which Carnes would plead guilty. In the agreement, Carnes acknowledged that he "knowingly engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury in others by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol." The plea agreement included a proper acknowledgment and waiver of rights. It set forth the ten-year maximum sentence for the amended charge and included the State’s recommended sentence of a five-year commitment to the Montana Department of Corrections, with execution of all but 824 days suspended. The recommended sentence specified further that Carnes would receive credit for time already served in connection with the case in the amount of 824 days. It called for Carnes to be placed on probation and released from custody at the time of his change of plea so that he could return to Nevada, where he was then on parole. The agreement said nothing about the order denying Carnes’s motion to dismiss.

¶8 Carnes appeared for his change of plea hearing on October 14, 2021. The District Court engaged Carnes in a standard colloquy to confirm that his change of plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Carnes acknowledged that he was aware of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and that he understood the impact of his guilty plea. During the colloquy, the District Court asked Carnes: "Do you understand that by pleading guilty, you’re giving up your right to appeal your conviction?" Carnes responded: "What’s appeal?" His response apparently went unnoticed, as the court proceeded with the colloquy, and neither Carnes nor his attorney raised the question again. Carnes acknowledged that he was satisfied with the services of his attorney, and defense counsel confirmed with the court his satisfaction that Carnes understood his constitutional rights and that his waiver of those rights was knowing and voluntary. The District Court accepted Carnes’s guilty plea and later sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] ¶9 A district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case presents a conclusion of law over which we exercise de novo review. State v. Watts, 2016 MT 331, ¶ 7, 386 Mont. 8, 385 P.3d 960 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶10 "Montana’s long standing jurisprudence holds that ‘where a defendant voluntarily and knowingly pleads guilty to an offense, the plea constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of constitutional rights violations which occurred prior to the plea.’ " Watts, ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Lindsey, 2011 MT 46, ¶ 19, 359 Mont. 362, 249 P.3d 491). See also State v. Westfall, 2024 MT 99, ¶ 17, — Mont. —, 548 P.3d 400; State v. Spreadbury, 2011 MT 176, ¶ 11, 361 Mont. 253, 257 P.3d 392; State v. Pavey, 2010 MT 104, ¶ 11, 356 Mont. 248, 231 P.3d 1104; State v. Violette, 2009 MT 19, ¶ 16, 349 Mont. 81, 201 P.3d 804; State v. Kelsch, 2008 MT 339, ¶ 8, 346 Mont. 260, 194 P.3d 670; State v. Rytky, 2006 MT 134, ¶ 7, 332 Mont. 364, 137 P.3d 530; State v. Gordon, 1999 MT 169, ¶ 23, 295 Mont. 183, 983 P.2d 377; State v. Turcotte, 164 Mont. 426, 428, 524 P.2d 787, 788-89 (1974). Consequently, after the plea, the defendant may attack only the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea, any jurisdictional defects, and any specified adverse pretrial rulings he has reserved the right to appeal. See Violette, ¶ 16 (citations omitted). In this regard, § 46-12-204(3), MCA, provides that "[w]ith the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecutor, a defendant may enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving the right, on appeal from the judg- ment, to review the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion."

¶11 Carnes argues that the District Court’s statement at his March 2019 initial appearance—that he could appeal any adverse pretrial rulings after a change of plea—secured his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. We are not persuaded by this argument. First, that statement was correct; under the law, Carnes could appeal adverse pretrial rulings. But in order to do so, he needed to reserve that right with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecutor. Relatedly, the court made the remark more than two years before the parties agreed to a plea deal; as noted, the plea agreement says nothing about Carnes’s reservation of the right to appeal the adverse pretrial ruling. Attempting to save the issue on appeal, Carnes makes the argument that although "the written plea agreement contained no waiver of the right to appeal pretrial rulings[,] [t]he State cannot create a new waiver of defendant protections outside the bounds of the written plea agreement and plea colloquy."

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