State v. Carpenter

194 Conn.App. 364

221 A.3d 510

STATE of Connecticut

v.Benjamin Chase CARPENTER

AC 41888

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 17, 2019

Officially released November 19, 2019

Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, with whom were James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, and, on the brief, Emily Graner Sexton, assigned counsel, and Dan-ielle J.B. Edwards, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick Griffin, state's attorney, and Seth Garbarsky, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Lavine, Prescott and Harper, Js.

HARPER, J.

The defendant, Benjamin Chase Carpenter, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder and arson in the second degree. The defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, as he requested, on third-party culpability. We disagree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. Early on the night of December 25, 2015, the defendant communicated with Jennifer Antonier, the victim in this case, who was seeking to obtain narcotics from the defendant on "credit." Later on that night, the defendant reconnected with Antonier on the streets of his neighborhood. Specifically, Antonier, accompanied by an unidentified male, picked up the defendant in her Subaru Impreza and had him sit in the front passenger seat. At that time, Antonier was in the back seat of her car and the unidentified male was in the driver's seat. Once the defendant entered the car, the unidentified male began to drive, at which point Antonier held a gun to the defendant's head and demanded everything he had. After a brief altercation in the vehicle, during which the defendant admitted to punching Antonier, he was able to escape.

Later that same night, the defendant made his way back to Antonier's home located at 28 Lilac Avenue, Hamden (28 Lilac). Once he arrived, he punched Antonier in the face, took a knife that he regularly carried on his person, cut Antonier's throat two times, and severed her jugular vein. To ensure that Antonier would bleed out, the defendant then slashed her left arm with the knife, leaving a gaping wound that led to her almost immediate death.

After cutting Antonier, the defendant dragged her body up the stairs to the second floor landing. He then left and eventually returned with gasoline that he poured throughout 28 Lilac, including all over Antonier's body. Shortly thereafter, the defendant set the house ablaze and departed, taking Antonier's cell phone and car with him.¹

In the early morning of December 26, 2015, the defendant connected with his cousin, Jerome Dixon, at Poor John's Pub (Poor John's). The defendant arrived at Poor John's by driving Antonier's car. Dixon testified that the defendant arrived with blood on his pants. While with Dixon, the defendant asked if he knew the best location to get rid of a car. Dixon confirmed that he did know of a place; however, before showing the defendant the location, Dixon elected to go purchase marijuana at a location away from Poor John's.

After Dixon completed his marijuana transaction, he drove back, heading for Poor John's, when he realized that he was being followed by the defendant. After pulling over and having a brief conversation with the defendant, Dixon led the defendant to Russell Street in New Haven, a location he felt was a safe and dark place to abandon a car. Once they arrived at Russell Street, Dixon remained in his car and waited for the defendant.

Through his rearview mirror, Dixon witnessed the defendant exit the Subaru Impreza and wipe down the steering wheel, door, and handle of Antonier's car.² Then, Dixon saw the defendant reach back into the Subaru as it lit up in flames, followed by the defendant jumping into the passenger side of Dixon's car.

Several hours later, in the afternoon of December 26, Dixon gave the defendant a ride to work. Before exiting the vehicle, the defendant asked Dixon to dispose of a bag containing the clothes that he wore the previous night. Dixon subsequently disposed of the bag at a gas station. A few days later, the defendant and Dixon met up again at Poor John's, during which time the defendant confessed to Dixon everything he did to Antonier at 28 Lilac and why.

The defendant became a person of interest for the Hamden Police Department's investigating detectives when they discovered that the last telecommunication Antonier had, either by phone call or through text message, was, in fact, with the defendant. Police suspicion of the defendant's involvement in Antonier's death grew stronger when he would not provide a straight answer as to his whereabouts on the night of the murder. Additionally, Harrington informed the police that the defendant had told her that he stabbed Antonier, and, through historical cell site analysis, Hamden police traced the defendant's cell phone to a location near 28 Lilac, as well as Gorham Avenue and Russell Street, on the night of the murder. Weeks later, on February 10, 2016, pursuant to a warrant, Hamden police arrested the defendant, and he was subsequently tried for the murder of Antonier and for having committed arson.

The defendant's trial began on April 3, 2017, and lasted five days. At the conclusion, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder and arson in the second degree.

Prior to the conclusion of trial, the defendant requested that the court provide the jury with a third-party culpability instruction, arguing that there had been direct evidence that a third party, and not the defendant, committed the crimes of which he was accused. The defendant argued the following evidence supported a third-party culpability instruction: (1) Antonier's neighbor, Timothy Snodgrass, heard multiple car doors shutting between midnight and 12:20 a.m. and a beeping noise during that time period; (2) Wines testified that Dixon's cell phone connected to cell towers in the area of 28 Lilac at 12:10 a.m.; (3) Dixon's testimony contained intimate knowledge of nonpublic details of the murder; and (4) Dixon's DNA was found on a lighter.

The court denied the defendant's request for a third-party culpability instruction, citing State v. Baltas , 311 Conn. 786, 91 A.3d 384 (2014). The court opined that "[e]vidence that would raise only a bare suspicion that a third party rather than the defendant committed the charged offense would not be relevant to the jury's determination. In this particular case there's been no evidence that the third party knew [Antonier], that the third party was [at 28 Lilac] prior to or during the ... alleged crime. There was no evidence, no physical evidence tying the third party, no fingerprints, no DNA, no weapons, no gasoline. The third party's connection is simply information allegedly received from the defendant, his cousin, who allegedly indicated to him some of the details about his alleged crime." This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request to charge the jury regarding third-party culpability. Specifically, the defendant argues that the following evidence supported a third-party culpability instruction: (1) "cell phone site data shows that [Dixon] may have been at [28 Lilac] within minutes of the time that her neighbor, [Snodgrass], was awoken by car doors closing and moments before [28 Lilac] was consumed by fire"; (2) "[Dixon had] accurate knowledge about the nature of [Antonier]'s fatal wounds, which were not made public"; and (3) "[Dixon] was initially charged with an arson related offense in this case, and he was only permitted to avoid prosecution for that offense because he pleaded guilty to hindering the prosecution and tampering with evidence, and entered into a cooperation agreement with the state to testify against the defendant." The defendant also points to the fact that Dixon's testimony regarding the events of December 25, 2015, is unreliable because his story changed several times.

We first set forth the standard of review and applicable legal principles that guide our analysis. "In determining whether the trial court improperly refused a request to charge, [w]e ... review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to supporting the ... proposed charge.... A request to charge which is relevant to the issues of [a] case and which is an accurate statement of the law must be given.... If, however, the evidence would not reasonably support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court has a duty not to submit it to the jury.... Thus, a trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with a party's request to charge [only] if the proposed instructions are reasonably supported by the evidence....

"It is well established that a defendant has a right to introduce evidence that indicates that someone other than the defendant committed the crime with which the defendant has been charged.... The defendant must, however, present evidence that directly connects a third party to the crime.... It is not enough to show that another had the motive to commit the crime ... nor is it enough to raise a bare suspicion that some other person may have committed the crime of which the defendant is accused....

"The admissibility of evidence of third party culpability is governed by the rules relating to relevancy.... Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material to the determination of the proceeding more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.... Accordingly, in explaining the requirement that the proffered evidence establish a direct connection to a third party, rather than raise merely a bare suspicion regarding a third party, we have stated: Such evidence is relevant, exculpatory evidence, rather...