State v. Carter

3 Wn.3d 198

[Nos. 101777-4; 101859-2. En Banc.]

Argued September 14, 2023. Decided May 23, 2024.

The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Kimonti D. Carter, Respondent.

The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Shawn Dee Reite, Respondent.

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Montoya-Lewis, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Owens, Gordon McCloud, Yu, and Whitener, JJ., concurred. González, C.J., filed a concurring opinion. Madsen, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Johnson and Stephens, JJ., concurred.

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Nature of Action: Pursuant to In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305 (2021), two defendants who were sentenced to mandatory life without release sentences under RCW 10.95.030(1) for aggravated first degree murders that they committed between the ages of 18 and 20 filed CrR 7.8 motions seeking resentencing. Defendant Carter sought a determinate sentence on the basis that his youthfulness contributed to his offenses. Defendant Reite sought a determinate sentence of 30 years followed by a term of community custody.

Superior Court: The Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 97-1-02261-6, Stanley J. Rumbaugh, J., on July 8, 2022, in defendant Carter’s case entered a judgment imposing a determinate sentence of 280 months on the aggravated first degree murder conviction and low-end sentences and community custody terms on assault and unlawful possession of a firearm convictions; and No. 88-1-03416-0, Bryan E. Chushcoff, J., on October 3, 2022, in defendant Reite’s case entered a judgment imposing consecutive 280-month determinate sentences on two aggravated first degree murder convictions and 36 months of community custody as an exceptional sentence.

Supreme Court: Holding that (1) determinate sentences were permissible sentences under RCW 10.95.030(1) where life without release sentences could not be mandatory under Monschke, (2) the trial court properly considered defendant Reite’s rehabilitation as a mitigating factor of youth at resentencing, (3) the trial court properly resentenced defendant Carter on his assault and firearm possession convictions, (4) there was no double jeopardy violation because the trial court impliedly vacated the prior judgments, and (5) the trial court improperly imposed community custody on defendant Reite because community custody was not authorized by statute for the crime of conviction, the court affirms the judgment in defendant Carter’s case, affirms in part and reverses in part the judgment in defendant Reite’s case, and remands defendant Reite’s case to the trial court

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to strike the community custody term and leave the remainder of the sentence intact.

Mary E. Robnett, Prosecuting Attorney, and Teresa J. Chen, and Pamela B. Loginsky, Deputies, for appellant.

Jeffrey E. Ellis (of Law Office of Alsept & Ellis), for respondents.

Gregory K. Ziser on behalf of Washington Indeterminate Sentence Review Board, amicus curiae.

¶1 Montoya-Lewis, J. — Kimonti Dennis Carter and Shawn Dee Reite ask us to give depth to the sentiment that " ‘youth is more than a chronological fact.’ " Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982)). While both committed devastating crimes in their very young adult years, neither Carter nor Reite come before us as young people today, having both served decades in prison. Today, as adults in their 40s and 50s, both ask this court to affirm their determinate sentences, after the superior courts recognized at resentencing that they demonstrated an ability to transform through deep reflection, accountability, and a commitment to change during their decades in prison. We affirm.

¶2 "[Youth] is a moment and ‘condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage,’ " but "its ‘signature qualities’ are all ‘transient,’ " as youth are malleable and have a heightened capacity to transform who they are and how they walk through life. Id. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115; Johnson

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v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 125 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1993)). In this case, we are presented with two individuals who demonstrate that power of transformation.

¶3 Carter and Reite were both originally sentenced to mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentences for aggravated first degree murders they committed between the ages of 18 and 20. After they were sentenced, we held in In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 307, 326, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality opinion), that such mandatory sentences were unconstitutional for their age group and that courts must consider a defendant’s youthfulness. Upon considering Carter’s and Reite’s mitigating qualities of youth and demonstrated commitment to change, the superior courts resentenced both to determinate sentences. The State appealed both resentencing decisions.

¶4 Primarily at issue is whether the superior court had the statutory authority to impose determinate sentences for aggravated first degree murder. In addition, at issue is whether the court had authority to resentence Carter’s other convictions, whether the court must vacate Carter’s original sentence, and whether the court could impose community custody on Reite.

¶5 Consistent with our precedent and recognition of youth’s heightened capacity for change, we hold that the superior courts had the statutory authority to impose determinate sentences for aggravated first degree murder for Carter and Reite and, with respect to Reite, that the superior court did not err, despite finding that her youth at the time did not substantially mitigate her crimes. We also hold that the superior court had the authority to resentence Carter on his other convictions and that the State may challenge the superior court’s decision to vacate Carter’s original sentence, but the superior court’s decision was not error. Last, we hold that the superior court improperly imposed three years of community custody on Reite because this was unauthorized by statute for the crime of conviction. Therefore, we affirm the superior court that sentenced

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Carter. We also affirm the superior court that sentenced Reite for all but the imposition of community custody; on that matter, we reverse and remand to the superior court only for purposes of striking the community custody term.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶6 In 1990, a jury convicted Reite of aggravated first degree murder. In 1998, again after a jury trial, Carter was also convicted of aggravated first degree murder.

A. Carter’s Original Sentence

¶7 In 1997, two months after Carter turned 18 years old, he was riding in the passenger seat of a car with fellow gang members, when he shot a gun at a car he believed held rival gang members. Instead, the car was occupied by five people, none of whom were gang members. Three people in the other car were injured, and Corey Pittman was killed.

¶8 In 1998, a jury convicted Carter of aggravated first degree murder of Pittman, four counts of first degree assault with firearm enhancements for each of the individuals in the car with Pittman, and unlawful possession of a firearm. 1 Clerk’s Papers (CP) (Carter) at 20-22. The superior court initially imposed the maximum sentence for all convictions to be served consecutive to each other, including mandatory LWOP on the aggravated first degree murder conviction as required under RCW 10.95.030.¹ Id. at 20-21, 26, 38-39.

B. Reite’s Original Sentence

¶9 In 1988, when Reite was 20 years old, she shot and killed her mother and her mother’s partner. Reite had been taking out credit cards in her mother’s name and incurring

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debt, and when her mother discovered this, she insisted that Reite tell Reite’s husband and that they pay off the debt. Reite wanted to avoid telling her husband because she was concerned that it would upset him and when he became upset, he tended to drink and become violent. Reite’s actions were an attempt to cover up the theft.

¶10 In 1990, a jury convicted Reite of two counts of aggravated first degree murder. 1 CP (Reite) at 680-81, 683. The superior court initially imposed a sentence of mandatory LWOP. Id. at 709-10, 712.

C. Our Decision in Monschke

[1] ¶11 In 2021, we held in Monschke that the life without release mandate from RCW 10.95.030 is unconstitutional when applied to 18- to 20-year-old offenders because it denies discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth in imposing sentences, in violation of constitutional cruel and unusual punishment principles. 197 Wn.2d at 306-07, 326.²

D. Carter’s Resentencing

¶12 Pursuant to Monschke, in 2021, Carter filed a CrR 7.8 motion asking the superior court to impose a determinate sentence on the basis that his youthfulness contributed to his offenses. After a hearing and oral ruling, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, resentencing Carter on all of the 1998 convictions based on several mitigating factors of youth and his rehabilitation in prison.

¶13 First, the superior court found that Carter committed the crime impulsively rather than as a result of a long-term plan. The court noted that the drive-by shooting

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"was a spur-of-the-moment, somewhat opportunistic event" where Carter mistook the occupants of the car as rival gang members and began to shoot indiscriminately. 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Carter) at 88; Suppl. CP (Carter) at 802. There was no evidence that Carter considered the risk this behavior posed to neighboring residents, nor did he take any steps to conceal himself or prevent identification of the car they were in. Consequently, the court found that "the entire circumstance reflects impetuosity, a clear failure to appreciate risks and consequences." 1 VRP (Carter) at 88; Suppl. CP (Carter) at 803.

¶14 Second, the court found that the nature of Carter’s surrounding environment "put him at great risk of juvenile crime...